




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SKETCHES

IN REMEMBRANCE OF THE

HUNGARIAN STRUGGLE

FOR

Independence and National Freedom,

IN THE YEARS

1848, 1849, 1850 & 1851,

WRITTEN BY SEVERAL HUNGARIAN REFUGEES,

EDITED BY

J. C. KASTNER,

*Late Hungarian Captain, Editor of different Historical and Artistical Works,
and Lecturer on Modern History.*

AND RESPECTFULLY

DEDICATED BY HIM TO THE BRITISH NATION.

LONDON AND GLASGOW:

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PREFACE.

IN delivering to the subscribers this volume explanatory of my sketches of the late Hungarian struggle for national freedom, I beg to offer a few remarks on behalf of my work, and, at the same time, to return my best thanks for the kindness with which it has been received. Both the artistic and literary parts of the work will show that the greatest pains have been taken to justify the confidence reposed in me, the drawings having been executed by eminent artists, and the text supplied by pens fully equal to the task.

When the sword was wrested from my hand, and I had escaped from the Austrian gaoler and hangman, I was hunted through Germany and France, like a wild beast, until I stood

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upon the glorious soil of Great Britain, the only spot in Europe where the poor refugee may yet rest in safety from the persecution of infamous tyranny.

The Magyar's sword is broken—the cannon's brazen mouth hushed—our warriors are asleep beneath an immense pall. Where before the soul-stirring strains of the war trumpet, and the wild hurrah of the brave Honvéd rent the air—where the ground shook far away with the deafening roar of artillery, and the tramp of charging squadrons, a calm now reigns, only occasionally broken by the clanging of fetters, and stifled sobs and prayers, and maledictions. The Russian Czar hath planted his foot upon the neck of noble Hungary, and lashed with his knout her bleeding back.

Hungary, with her constitution of eight centuries, hath been betrayed and ruthlessly destroyed, and the unclean vulture of Austria is tearing her corpse. Such is the fate of Hungary, which so heroically withstood the irruptions of Osmanic barbarism, and rescued for a time the tottering throne of Hapsburg from certain perdition, and whose mighty spirit

overawed even Napoleon, the conqueror of half a world.

Single men may vanish, and leave not a trace behind;—not so a noble people. The imperial boy of Austria will never succeed in strangling the brave nation of the Magyars. Perhaps sooner than dreamt of by our vile oppressors, the day of just retribution will dawn, and the standard of freedom be raised once more. May another editor then present you with more joyful sketches of Hungary. What I have to unrol is a sad but faithful picture.

In soliciting your continued sympathy, I can only say, that I shall endeavour to render myself in every respect worthy of my second fatherland, glorious Britain. May she always be great and free, and for ever wield her mighty trident, the terror of despotism.

J. CONST. KASTNER,

CAPTAIN IN THE LATE HUNGARIAN WAR.



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INTRODUCTION.

TO THE READER,

THE cause of Hungary excites a very great interest in this free country with its high-minded people, I therefore feel it a holy duty to give some sketches in the form of historical description, which will enable you rightly to appreciate the characters of the leading men, and to understand the true causes of the great struggle for national freedom and independence in which they were engaged. Before entering into a description of the operations of war, I will here give a brief sketch of my beloved home.

Hungary is one of the most beautiful countries on the European Continent, it contains 40,500 English square miles, with nearly 15,000,000 inhabitants of different races, viz: Hungarians, Germans, Croats and Slovacs. The religion is half Roman Catholic and half Protestant. The land is very fine and the soil rich in natural productions, it contains gold, silver, copper, iron, salt, coals, produces wood, corn and grapes, while horses and cattle in abundance pasture under its healthy climate. We have lofty mountains and extensive plains, three mighty rivers run through the country, in short, God the Almighty has given every thing to her to make man happy.

In the time of the migration the Hungarian race came from Asia to Europe and settled in Hungary, the language and the type of the Hungarian bear the true stamp of this historical fact.

Stephen, surnamed the holy, was the first king of Hungary, he gave the land a constitution which the Hungarians defended against the Turks. Yes, it was the heart's blood of the Hungarians and of the Poles which saved the

western parts of Europe from the Turks, the holy cross gleaming in the ranks of the Hungarians eclipsed the crescent and stopped the progress of the Koran—the principles of the holy Gospel triumphed.

For five hundred years Hungary has had her own kings, and had always been independent. Three hundred years ago, with Louis II., died the last of the kings of the Hungarian race, and the nation then gave the crown to the house of Hapsburg, the present reigning dynasty of Austria, with the stipulation, that Hungary should be for ever free and independent, and should never be ruled in the manner of the other provinces of the Hapsburg Empire; and, as a security of this stipulation, every Hapsburg king of Hungary was required to swear a solemn oath. Fourteen kings of this dynasty did swear this oath, but, alas! there were numbers of perjurers! None, however, went so far as Ferdinand V., and Francis Joseph, the present emperor of Austria, whose repeated breaches of faith roused the ire of the people in the years 1848 and 1849. "To the sword" exclaimed the patriots, "we have so often saved the

Austrian dynasty, therefore can we, and will we, now save our own freedom and independence!" No, the Hungarians would not willingly bend their necks under the Russian Austrian iron yoke, but they fought a great and holy struggle, and should they not have drawn their swords when a tyrant banquetted in the blood of the nobles, and in the sweat of the people? Should they not have drawn their swords if an absolute monarch put his foot upon their liberty, which they had defended and which they had possessed for nearly 1000 years? Should they not have drawn their swords, I ask again, when the blood-thirsty Croats under Jellachich, burnt down their churches, robbed them of their property, and dishonoured their wives and daughters? It was a holy cause. Would not every Englishman have put his hand to the sword, if an absolute king of Hanover had endeavoured to grasp at the liberties of this constitutional kingdom?

But the genius of freedom has not yet inflamed every heart, and this is, I believe, the reason why the western powers of Europe

looked idly on whilst my countrymen then struggled unaided, and why the Russians were permitted to crush the young flower of continental freedom.

The genius of Freedom shone through Europe in the spring of 1848, and gave to Hungary back again, her old freedom and independence, for a while only, alas ! Again Hungary had her own parliament in Buda Pesth, and her own ministry, under the presidency of the noble patriot, Count Louis Batthiany. King Ferdinand came in person to Presburg, and sanctioned these alterations in the state.

Every town, every village, every house—yes, every single individual was happy, and rejoiced in the blessings of freedom and peace. But not long was the nation to enjoy this happiness, for the King of Hungary, unfortunately wore, also, the crown of the Emperor of Austria. Two crowns united on one and the same head governing the land after different principles. The Emperor of Austria reigned an absolute monarch, under the influence of the Jesuits, and secret police and spy system ; whereas the same person, as King of

Hungary, was obliged to rule the land after the principles of political and religious freedom. Like a thunder-storm from the clear sky came the rebellion of the Raitzen upon the peaceful land. No doubt exists that they were stirred up and influenced and secretly assisted by the camarilla at the Austrian Court. The Hungarian Government was obliged to send troops against these rebels. In my sketches you will find a further description of the same.

It is a historical fact that the Hungarians struggled gloriously against the treachery of the Austrian dynasty and their coadjutors, and that only the shameful intervention of the Russians, which was against all the laws of nations, saved Austria from sure destruction. The names of the commanders will show you how carefully Russia assisted Austria, Haynau, the disgrace of his age, Paskiewitch, Grabe, Pautunia, Ruediger, Sacken ; in short the oppressors, or what they called the heroes, of all parts of the world were sent against us, This was not a war, it was more like a chase after wild beasts, and Great Britain, France, and North America stood mute spectators whilst the

noble Hungarian nation was hunted to death. From France, it is true, we expected nothing, because her government was already acting inconsistently towards her sister republic, Rome. America was too far off, but we could not understand why Great Britain did not better look to her own interest. I am a stranger, a refugee, in this country, and I have no right to blame the government of a nation so great as the English, but I claim for myself on the other hand all the privileges of a citizen of this free land ; I claim the right to say what I think, and I must say what religion, what honour, what patriotism dictate to me. Yes, it would have been the interest of religion, of humanity, and of the political and commercial greatness of Great Britain, not to permit the Russians to destroy the Hungarians, the friends, the outposts of England's political existence and influence on the continent. One single word full of determination and meaning would have saved our freedom, and the freedom of all the continent. What if the English had declared to the Russian cabinet, "At the same moment that your troops cross the Carpa-

thians, we shall despatch a fleet to the Adriatic Sea !”

Still would have stood the republics of Rome and Venice, with their heroic people led by Mazzini. The *coup d'état* of the 2nd December, 1851, with all its consequences, would never have occurred ; and may I not ask you now, where are the fruits gained on the battle field of Waterloo ? I certainly appreciate the blessings of peace, but the peace that shall be lasting, must rest upon another foundation than the present state of Europe. Only a short-sighted or narrow-minded man can believe that the nations of France, Italy, Hungary, Germany, Poland, and Naples, are at present satisfied with their governments. No ; they only wait for the moment that the genius of freedom shall storm again through Europe, arousing the nations to strike down their oppressors for ever, and to take revenge for the days of Brescia, Pesth, Arad, Vienna, Naples, Rome, Paris, and Rastadt. Not the foot of a tyrant on the neck of the betrayed nations is a security of peace ! It must also not be forgotten that Peter the Great went to Holland to learn the art of ship-

building, and that since that time the desire of all the Russian emperors has been to undermine Europe, and to break the power of France and England. It must be owned, the policy of Russia has so far been successful enough. Poland has been cruelly torn to pieces—the once so powerful German empire has fallen a victim into the hands of thirty-four greater or smaller despots—Austria's very existence depends solely upon the good will of Russia—Turkey alone depends more upon the protection of Great Britain—France, Naples, and Prussia, are the willing tools of Russia. Cossacks, only in another uniform, stand already on the borders of the Channel, and Rome with her Pope. Let me be silent. It is my principle not to interfere in religious matters ;—but let nobody overlook the dark cloud which lowers on the horizon ; one bold blow, and the liberty, the principles of the Reformation will be destroyed for ever ! Everlasting darkness and slavery, or liberty and the triumph of the Reformation, are the two opposing principles of the forthcoming storm. The first are represented by Russia, the latter by Great Britain.

Let us hope that when the hour of freedom sounds again, Great Britain will understand her high mission, entrusted to her by God the Almighty, to be the deliverer of Europe—the deliverer of the world.

THE EDITOR.

KOSSUTH.

THE most prominent character in the history of the events of the late war in Hungary, for freedom and independence, is Louis Kossuth, first imperial deputy of the county of Pesth, afterwards minister of finance, and of the treasury of Batthianyi, afterwards chairman of the committee appointed for regulating the defence of the country, and at last, after the declaration of independence, on the 14th April, 1849, governor of the provisional government of Hungary.

It is a difficult, nay even an ungrateful task, one the success of which cannot but be very doubtful, to write the history, or even a mere sketch, of the life of a man so highly distinguished as Kossuth. The time has not come when the history of his career in the Hungarian struggle can be considered complete. Very often whole centuries have to pass away before

the motives and deeds of such historical characters can be sufficiently understood, so as to qualify the historian to pronounce an impartial judgment. Thus history shows us characters which had been condemned by their contemporaries, yet whose principles and actions were appreciated and honoured by future ages.

We do not wish to be partial by either giving him undue praise, or unjustly blaming him. We will do neither the one nor the other ; we will simply write the history of his life ; the book of his deeds is open to every one to read. We shall here unfold the pages of this history, leaving the reader to judge impartially.

No one with the least feeling of justice and sympathy, and who is not led away by jealousy and selfishness, can deny that this man is the pride of his nation, a bright ornament of his age. Never have we known a man who, whatever faults he may have had, and no one is entirely free from some, who acted from more pure and disinterested motives than did Louis Kossuth ; the love of his country and of his nation seemed to him everything ; all his thoughts were concentrated in the noble feeling of patriotism.

Already, long before a revolution, or a separation from Austria had been thought of, when the people wished for nothing but a constitutional reform, his whole heart was filled with the love of his country; his whole outward and inward life were bound up with the freedom and independence of Hungary.

This real patriotism won for him the affections of almost every one among his countrymen, and the unlimited confidence which the whole nation had placed in him, and of which neither the calumnies of his enemies, nor the adversities of fortune could entirely deprive him. In this love for him we can read the wishes of his countrymen, their feelings and their hopes. But not only his own country, all Europe have given vent to their esteem for him as the great defender of freedom and independence.

In Kossuth we see the Hungarian character with all its beauties and defects, in him the virtues are reflected in their greatest purity and simplicity. He is grave and serious, and of a religious disposition. His words and actions all show this. His deep reliance upon the

Supreme is not mere outward feeling, it comes from the bottom of his heart. On it he builds all his hopes, and relies with unwavering trust when all external sources fail. He counts freedom as the most sacred treasure which man received from God, because despotism in every shape is immoral and wicked. His straightforward character induced him ever to base his policy and his political principles, upon the moral law, contrary to the diplomacy and acts of despotism. His patriotism and his love for humanity, filled him with hatred against the Czar of Russia and the Emperor of Austria, and he was not in the least afraid to declare it, and show it in an open manner.

Louis Kossuth is the only son of Andrew Kossuth, and of Caroline Kossuth, whose maiden name was Weber. He was born on the 27th April, 1802, at Monock, a market town in the county of Zemplin. His family were not wealthy, and belonged to a class of the Hungarian nobility, which takes its origin from very early generations, but which had subsequently been impoverished, from the operation of the Hungarian law of hereditary succession to real

property. His parents though of noble extraction, were more distinguished through their nobility of character, than through the nobility of their descent. Their conversation, and the refined society which they kept, shewed distinctly the purity of their own character. They possessed that nobleness of mind, which constitutes what we call true nobility, and which is preserved amongst the highest families. With such examples before the boy, Louis Kossuth grew up. His father died when he was still very young, and his education was, therefore, solely entrusted to his mother, who discharged this important duty with all the earnestness becoming a noble and generous character as she was, and we recognize it in her son.

After having received his primary education within the walls of his paternal mansion, he entered, very early, the Calvinistic college, at Patack, which, though not so widely known as others, yet had this in common with nearly all Protestant colleges in Hungary, in opposition to the Roman Catholic institutions, that its system of education was based upon sound and

liberal principles. Like most sons of noble Hungarian families, he studied the law, and having finished his studies, we afterwards find him at the district court of Eperies, and next at the royal court at Pesth, where he went through his preparatory course, to be initiated into the practice of the law.

After having completed his course, he returned in the year 1822 to his native place, Monock, and was appointed honorary attorney of the county. At this period he resembled most young men in his country, and who were likewise of a noble family—he indulged in all sorts of worldly pleasures, gambling, hunting, and was generally given to rather loose and extravagant habits. Kossuth spent much time in this way, which he might have devoted to his profession, but still he distinguished himself beyond his companions through his refined genius. Fortunately he very soon abandoned the ordinary amusements of his companions, and directed his thoughts to a more noble object—the protection of his country's honour and freedom, against the efforts which the Austrians then began to

make to insult the one and to undermine the other.

He then began to feel that it was his sacred duty to prepare himself to save his country, and society at large, whenever his services might be required, although he had not then an idea of the great events that were ere long to come to pass. He probably did not foresee that providence had selected him, through his exertions and his services, to open a way for the freedom of thought in his country ; that he was destined by God's will to exercise a powerful influence over his countrymen, in rousing them from indifference and pusillanimity to energetic action, and by this means to inspire them with confidence in their own strength. He became inspired with the thought that through his instrumentality his countrymen should be liberated from the oppressions which they had had to bear during five centuries, and that, through their political emancipation, they should become a free people in the eyes of the world.

Such was the course which providence seemed to have marked out for him, and we shall

henceforth see him, with a courageous spirit, devoted to the fulfilling of God's will, in pursuing the destiny for which he was designed.

In the year 1831, the cholera broke out in Hungary. It was a disease till then unknown in that country, and many were the victims who fell under it. The Slavonian peasants, like many of the labouring classes in other parts of Europe, laboured under the erroneous opinion that death was caused through the rich and affluent trying to get rid of them, and to that end that they poisoned the wells. This caused an open revolt, in which many of the clergy, and still more of the land-owners and Jews, both of whom the lower classes of the people considered as their bitterest enemies, were killed. At that time every body was filled with fear for his own life and property. It was then that Kossuth became first generally known. Wherever the disease raged with the greatest virulence, wherever the terror of it seemed to be the greatest, he used his utmost exertions for obtaining aid and assistance on behalf of the sufferers. He addressed the people in private and in public, and tried to

convince them of their vain fears, and of their unfounded prejudices. And indeed it required all the courage and resolution which he showed on these occasions for the great object that he had in view ; and thus it came that he was respected and beloved by almost all his countrymen.

So great was the esteem of the people for him, that in the year 1832 he was appointed as advocate for several noble women at the diet. Every widow of a magnate, that is of a member of the Upper Chamber, was obliged, according to the Hungarian law, to supply the place of her deceased husband in the Upper Chamber, by a lawyer as a substitute, for which purpose generally the most competent of the young lawyers were chosen. It very often happened, that in order to save a part of the great expense necessary for remunerating the deputy for his services, several joined and appointed one deputy in common. Every beginner in his career of the law, who felt the least anxiety to advance, and to become known, applied for such a post, which afforded him a good opportunity both for improvement in his law practice, and

as a public speaker, and opened for him a chance for some lucrative place in parliament.

Kossuth spoke but once in public whilst engaged in the capacity of a deputy at the diet, and, strange to say, whilst he wrought miracles with his eloquence among the people at large, he had but little success here ; he stammered, his voice trembled, and his arguments soon became so confused, that he almost made a laughing-stock of himself. After he had finished, and taken his seat again, he observed faint-hearted to one of his friends who sat next him, "I see I am not made for a public speaker." Those who heard him speak then, never anticipated in him the great orator of the present day, who, even in England, with her great parliamentary speakers, has not found his equal.

Kossuth then tried to make himself known through the pen, which, employing it upon the noblest subjects, he soon used with a degree of power and success exceeding his oratorical efforts.

The debates of the diet were only known to the members themselves, and to those who

were occasional hearers, to others only by rumour, or by some report in a newspaper, always written under the influence of the Austrian government, and without any warmth of feeling. But very few of those who took a warm interest in the affairs of their country were in circumstances to allow them to proceed in person to Presburg, the seat of the diet, at the extreme border of Hungary. The press was but limited, it suffered under the hard pressure of a tyrant, who suspected in every word traces of treachery and revolt. Under these circumstances how was it possible to tell those at a distance of the state of the country, and to excite their sympathies, to enlighten them, to rouse their minds to prepare them for whatever duty might require.

This was the great object which Kossuth endeavoured to accomplish. He gathered around him a few young men of strong minds, truly devoted to the cause of their country, who had all of them been his former school-fellows. With their aid he drew up reports of the diet, which were then sold in manuscript to a certain number of subscribers. Every one who

received such a paper was pledged to copy the manuscript, and then to give it to his friends and acquaintances, who copied it in their turn, and thus circulated it. Kossuth continued thus to labour together with his friends with unceasing perseverance and industry, and owing to the great variety of the news, and documents, and speeches, their journal contained, all of which were highly interesting, he had, in the year 1834, eighty subscribers for his newspaper. In order both to lessen the expense, and to increase the circulation of the paper, he constructed a small hand-press, through the assistance of which he could work easier and quicker.

The Austrian government had been secretly informed of this hand-press, and tried by all possible means to obtain possession of it. His friends were even afraid that the matter might be brought before the diet, at which, just then, the very important question of servitude in Hungary formed a subject of debate. In order, therefore, that the attention of the diet might not be drawn away from this question by any investigation of the matter respecting the press,

his friends advised him to give up the printed paper, and to continue the publication by means of manuscripts. Nevertheless, the paper, which was at first but very small, was read at all assemblies of the fifty-two counties in Hungary with increasing interest, and everywhere a lively desire was felt to devise the means to resist, in an effectual manner, the oppressions inflicted by Austria.

Notwithstanding her disadvantageous geographical position, being surrounded on all sides by the most despotic powers, such as Turkey, Russia, and the Hapsburgh dynasty, Hungary had for eight centuries always been a constitutional monarchy, and had, as such, protected her rights and her freedom, though the people themselves, originally descended from the Asiatic race, differed in manners and customs widely from all the other nations of Europe. Though Hungary was a constitutional monarchy, yet the people, the best and firmest protectors of their country, were excluded from all political privileges, because the constitution was based upon purely aristocratic principles. Aristocracy in Hungary is not as in England,

necessarily synonymous with power and wealth—it is nothing but an aristocracy of birth, and the law of descent is to the male heirs of a family and their children, and children's children. Thus it came, that many of the descendants of ancient and powerful noble families were scattered and impoverished more and more, because being of noble extraction they felt too proud to work as common labourers, whilst the operation of the law of descent left them no other resource for independent subsistence.

This portion of the Hungarian nobility were properly only a part of the people. Some cultivated the field like labourers, and sometimes that of their feudal lords. But they had certain privileges, which they defended most eagerly, whilst they at the same time had the welfare of the whole country at heart.

Hungary had two means of preserving her constitutional rights—first, the appeal to the parliament, or the diet; and secondly, the constitution of the country, through the municipal councils. The latter were especially adapted to check the Austrian government in its violation of the rights of the Hungarian

nation ; for the government could not make any decree without the consent of the counties. The county diets consisted of all the noblemen who inhabited the counties where they were held, very often of 25,000, in some cases of 30,000 people. Every nobleman had the right to speak at these assemblies, and also the right to be elected as chief magistrate of the county. This chief magistrate was the only officer of the executive power for carrying out the decrees of government in the counties. The magistrates, however, never were in any communication whatever with the imperial government, and, therefore, could never receive any orders from the latter, except through the county diet, which had the right, at its public meetings, to inquire into the legality of the decrees. If the majority of the meeting were against the decree, the magistrate received no orders for executing it, and the meeting would apply to the Hungarian government to protest against it. For this reason these municipal institutions were a great bulwark to protect the people from the arbitrary despotism of the Austrian government.

In no country was this more necessary than in Hungary, which had for the last three centuries been under the Hapsburg dynasty, not one of whose members had ever tried to protect the rights of a free nation.

Though Hungary had come into the hands of the Hapsburg dynasty through the free decision of the nation, yet it was under certain conditions, the principal one of which was, that the kingdom should be governed according to the same rights of succession as in the other territories belonging to Austria; that the emperors of the Austrian dynasty should be recognized as the only lawful kings of Hungary, in consideration of which they were required to take a solemn oath that they would always respect and defend the constitution of Hungary, and rule her in conformity with her public laws. The words of the oath are as follow :—
“I swear to God, I swear to the eternal God, as truly as I hope that He will help me, so long as I keep my word.” Every one of the thirteen kings of this dynasty violated this oath, and they therefore perjured themselves.

At the time when the people of Hungary called the Hapsburg dynasty to the throne, every one of the states of the Austrian empire had its own constitution, which they preserved even after they became connected to Austria. But in the course of three centuries Austria gradually strove to become an absolute monarchy ; so that before the last war of Hungary broke out against Austria, not one of these states had its constitution, all having been destroyed by the despotism of the Austrian monarchs. Hungary alone had maintained her rights and her treaties ; for according to the latter there was to be no relation between Hungary and Austria, except that both countries should be ruled over by the same head, in such a manner, however, that if ever the succession in Austria should pass to a prince that was still a minor, Hungary should be governed by a different person ; for there was a family treaty in the Hapsburg dynasty, according to which, in such cases, the eldest member of the family would be the guardian or agent, but according to the Hungarian constitution, only a Palatine could be regent, so that it might possibly occur

that one regent governed in Austria, and another in Hungary.

After Austria had thus succeeded in annihilating every trace of a constitution in her provinces, she found that Hungary alone resisted the introduction of an absolute monarchy, and opposed her intrigues, and her secret and open acts of violence. The Austrians, therefore, tried their utmost to kindle among the Hungarians the flame of discord, and to overthrow their constitution, and to some extent this infamous policy succeeded. The law originally was, that the diet should be assembled every three years ; but previous to the last struggle for independence it had not been called for twenty years. In addition to this the Austrian government increased the taxes, and committed, besides, the greatest acts of tyranny.

This roused the people of Hungary out of their slumber, they saw that a few noblemen would not be sufficient to oppose in the diet the absolutist policy of Austria ; but a few enthusiastic patriots made it their object, gradually to bring the people to a higher state

of political freedom, that so they should enjoy the ancient rights and privileges of the Hungarian constitution.

They began in 1825 with the emancipation of the country people, the chief part of the population, and who suffered most from the system of oppression. The peasant had to work 104 days for his feudal lord. If we deduct the Sundays and the festivals, also the winter period, but little time will be found to have been left for himself. Besides, he had to pay the ninth part of his field-crop to his lord, and one-tenth to the bishop. This was a condition contrary to justice, degrading to the people, and directly opposed to the welfare of Hungary, and the natural rights of humanity.

At the diet, in the year 1832, a proposition was brought before the Lower House of the diet, that every peasant should have the right to free himself from feudal burdens, by paying the value of the capital which was in the land, in certain instalments, and thus, after having become free from these burdens, to enjoy himself the fruit of his labour.

The Austrian government rejected this measure, as one the execution of which ought to be left to a future generation. The sittings of the diet were closed in the year 1836. Austria could well perceive, from the manner in which the business of the diet was carried on, that the spirit of opposition against the government increased every day. With a view to stop its progress, the Austrians spread the absurd rumour of some widely-spread conspiracy, and caused some of the most influential men to be arrested. To give a colour of justification for this course, a further wrong was done to the parties—charges were circulated without the slightest foundation in fact, but attempted to be sustained by perjury and deception, as we have lately seen at Naples and elsewhere. Kossuth remonstrated in a most powerful manner against this unjust and unconstitutional course of proceeding, but in vain. The influence of the accused was considered dangerous to the growing despotism of Austria; they were therefore found guilty, and sentenced to imprisonment.

Kossuth in the meantime proceeded indefa-

tigably with his paper. As the sessions of the Comitatus Assemblies became of more and more importance, he endeavoured to open a direct and continued communication between the different assemblies, which had up till now not acted in unison. His lithographic correspondence reported the results of the different sessions, by which means the Assemblies could more readily and clearly understand the proceedings of each other. Thus his paper, although still only published for private circulation, became a new power, which the people felt, and which the court feared and abhorred. Kossuth lived at this time in quiet retirement at a country seat near Pesth, when suddenly one morning, as he had just left his house to take his usual morning walk, a patrol of grenadiers pounced upon him, armed with an order for his arrest issued direct from the court. He was detained in prison a full year before he was put upon his trial, and then he was brought before a court martial, and condemned to four years' imprisonment. But this audacious act of tyranny could not, of course, be performed without coming to the knowledge of the people ;

a general outcry of indignation burst through the land, and the matter was discussed by the different sessions. The diet assembled in 1839, and its first resolution was a declaration that the imprisonment of Kossuth was entirely illegal ; the second resolution, a refusal of the ways and means to government, or rather, that they were only to be granted upon condition, that Kossuth was immediately set at liberty, and that a general amnesty for all political prisoners should be issued.

On the 15th May, the taxes were, at last, granted by the diet, and the next day all political prisoners were set at liberty. Kossuth had spent three years in solitary confinement in the Joseph's barracks ; but, as the government allowed him books and writing materials, this period was by him not spent unprofitably. He devoted his time to the study of important subjects and particularly national economy, which latter proved exceedingly useful to him when he became minister of finance, in later years.

On the day of his liberation, when he stepped from his prison a pale, emaciated, and bowed

down man, but still full of hope for the futurity of his country, he found an immense crowd waiting for him, cheering him and expressing the liveliest satisfaction at his liberation, and accompanying him through the streets with all possible demonstrations of joy. In the evening, the inhabitants of Pesth arranged a torch light serenade before his house, the usual mode in Hungary of testifying the high respect in which a person is held by his townsmen. Thousands had assembled on this occasion to cheer the martyr for the liberty of the people, now happily restored to them. The love and the sincere attachment of a whole people are more to be valued than the anger of the tyrant dreaded, and that sympathy and love was a balm for years of incarceration. Love also had lightened the darkness of his cell, by cherishing the image of her who was as a daughter to his mother during the painful period of the uncertainty of his fate; and in the following year, hands and hearts, though long separated, were for ever united. Kossuth's marriage with Theresa Mezlènyi took place on the 10th January, 1841. Kossuth being the only son

of his mother, he had naturally to support her, when therefore, she became deprived of this support by his imprisonment, some of the noblest and richest families privately opened a subscription, by which his mother was supported, and on Kossuth's liberation the remainder of this sum was delivered to him, by which means he was enabled to purchase a small farm in the neighbourhood of Pesth. The liberated patriot returned now with redoubled energy to the press. The ministry, and the greatest part of the deputies were liberals, and supported the publication of his newspaper, the first number of which, appeared on the 1st January, 1841, under the title, *Pesth Hirlap*, (Journal of Pesth), and edited by Kossuth. At first the paper was only published once a week, but it soon became a daily paper, and the issue increased from five or six to ten thousand; and at times, to twelve thousand a number. Kossuth could not fail to win numerous friends amongst the people; his pen was able, his heart full of the most patriotic feeling, corresponding to the demands of the time; his style of writing plain to every one, his views and counsels were

as much to the point, as his rhetoric powers were glowing, and carried his hearers along with him. He was closely united to the people. The struggle which he had for a long time with his own pecuniary circumstances had been such as to develope his sympathies for those whose existence was a struggle. Every line of his writings showed clearly that he considered it the duty of his life to give to the people, not a class, or sect, but the people as a whole, political and social liberty. He also strenuously endeavoured to extend the advantages of public instruction to the very lowest classes of society, as the surest means of advancing them politically and socially.

But in the year 1844, the Austrian party, which had not been inactive all this while, caused at last a change of the ministry, and the liberals were displaced by adherents of Austria. Kossuth had a quarrel with his publisher, who had begun to accommodate his principles to the new reigning power, and in consequence the editing was taken from the former. By the law in Austria a license is required to become the publisher of a newspaper; in accordance

with this law as soon as he had left the *Pesth Hirlap*, Kossuth went to Vienna to apply for a licence. Here he often met the Archduke Ludwig, and the prime minister, Prince Metternich; both tried to win him over to their party, and they made him the offer of a very high office through one of the great Hungarian noblemen, with whom he was acquainted. Kossuth disdained to accept the office, and expressed his opinion upon the subject very strong in a letter to the same nobleman, which afterwards found its way into the newspapers. He observed: "That his (Kossuth's) political views being so very different from those of the Count—nay, almost entirely opposite, he could not but refuse the offered place, with many thanks, and which, under different circumstances, considering his pecuniary position, would have been a welcome gift to him." This refusal tended to raise Kossuth still higher in the esteem of the people.

The newspaper licence was refused to him, but the publisher of the *Pesth Hirlap*, Károlyi, received a second licence for a German newspaper, which pursued a political direction dia-

metrically opposed to Kossuth's principles, and devoting itself entirely to the Austrian interests. This Károlyi must not be mistaken for one of the noble house of the Counts Károlyi, with whom there was a coincidence only in name.

Kossuth, however, was not disheartened, but now directed his attention to another object of great importance, the advancement of industry generally, but especially of the land, which, under the Austrian government, had been sadly neglected. Nothing is more closely connected with the general welfare and liberty of a country than the flourishing state of trade and commerce. Absolutism is in its very nature opposed to liberty, and not the least to the liberty of industry. It is consequently an antagonist to the free intercourse of nations, it hates free trade, because it promotes the development of liberty, and is one of the most powerful auxiliaries of political rights and privileges. We need not, therefore, be surprised that Austria should try to destroy the means by which Hungary might raise and develop her industry and commerce. She con-

sidered Hungary her most dangerous political enemy.

The great natural advantages with which a kind providence had blessed the land, only tended to excite feelings of envy and jealousy on the part of Austria, she was afraid Hungary might grow too great and powerful, and the government made every effort to stop up or destroy the numerous resources of industry the land possessed. Hungary was to become a kind of general corn store for Vienna, Bohemia, and Moravia—thus providing the population of these places with the raw material; and the products which Hungary received in exchange cost its people nearly double, by having to pass through the Austrian Customs. For this purpose a strict watch was kept on the borders of Hungary and Austria, and a code of very stringent Customs' rules were enforced, preventing, by a heavy impost, every exportation of manufactured goods from Hungary, except through Austria, and subjecting the commercial relations of both countries to a vexatious system of taxation. But not only was the government jealous of the formation or

extension of a peaceful intercourse with other nations, but the Hungarians were even refused the means to promote the internal improvement of their country. Roads were wanting, and all other means of communication tending to improve trade, commerce, and shipping. All measures were carefully taken to prevent success, should the Hungarians endeavour to improve their position. To remove this evil, Kossuth, at this time, published an energetic address to the nation, pointing out the low condition of industry, and exhorting, in glowing language, the whole people to be true and faithful to each other, by which means they would most surely promote the welfare and advancement of the nation. He proposed to form a union, every member of which was to be bound by his voluntary promise, to discourage the importation of foreign manufactures, and to make use of only inland-manufactured articles in all their private and home wants and comforts.

Hungary was not yet so low in industry, trade and cultivation, but that it could have produced almost all the finer and superior

articles of comfort, under the existing system. Articles of luxury, however, could be imported cheaper and better, than they could be produced at home. It was, therefore, not to be wondered at that the higher classes of society had all along mostly satisfied their wants from foreign sources. From this cause, many of the highest nobles did not live in Hungary; like other absentee lords of the soil, they were not ashamed to spend their riches in foreign lands, instead of spending them in the country from which they drew them, thus depriving their native country of large sums which would have helped to improve the condition of the people. They were too proud to live in a land which, perhaps, had not reached the most refined degree of civilization, but they were not ashamed to drain its resources, and then to leave it to its fate.

However, the people responded to Kossuth's call; hundreds of thousands, not only of the lower classes, or the small tradesmen, but also of the highest families of the land, inspired by their love to fatherland, gave the required pledge. The most exalted ladies and gentlemen

pledged themselves to dress in no other fabrics than those of Hungarian manufacture, to take no other wine than of home growth, and to have no other produce on their tables than that which their own country could furnish them with. Many of these were amongst the fashionable classes, who formerly had not felt comfortable if their dress had not come direct from Paris or Vienna at least, and if not after the last French fashion, and shawls of Indian texture, and fruits and desserts on their table were not of rare exotic quality ! Soon, however, everything of foreign origin had to disappear. Formerly the shops had boasting announcements to persuade the public that their articles on sale were genuine French or English ; now plain cards made their appearance, marking the articles and goods simply "from fatherland," "from the inland," "home made," "Hungarian manufacture." The formerly so very rich dresses of the ladies, set with lace and jewellery, disappeared from all balls, assemblies, theatres, and concerts, and the ladies now adopted the more simple but yet elegant national costume.

Pesth was the seat of the committee at the head of this movement, and Kossuth again was the heart and soul of the committee. Every tradesman or manufacturer had to pledge himself to sell only home-made articles, or to manufacture them only of home-wove raw material; he then received a card of membership of this "Self-protection League," or "Honvédegy le li társoság," as it was called. In the drawing rooms at Vienna many a witticism was heard about this "merry humour" of the Hungarian patriots, and an opportunity was often taken to express to the Hungarian nobles who still frequented the soirees at Vienna, contempt for the "half-civilized barbarian people." But the court soon felt the effects of this league, first so much laughed at. The Austrian manufacturers were soon forced to transfer their manufactories into Hungary, to avoid the ruin of their business. But this was not all; the stock on hand of inland articles being soon bought up by the general demand for the same, the home manufacturers were compelled to exert themselves to meet the increasing demand; consequently, hundreds of

hands, before unoccupied, now suddenly found remunerating labour. Every day witnessed the opening of new establishments, and trade and commerce had received an impulse which justified the most cheering hopes for the future. To suppress this spirit of opposition, as the court called it, a new law was issued, which was as follows :—As the law stood at this time, every Comitát Assembly had a constitutional president, under the title of Obergespann, or Deputy Lord Lieutenant, but to check the spirit of opposition, which was growing against the Austrian government, a law was now enacted by which, instead of those presidents, an imperial commissary, or administrator, was in future to preside over the sessions. This law was fuel to the fire. Up to that moment these Comitát Sessions had preserved at least some appearance of independence; for the Obergespann, although elected by the king, could not always exert any undue influence at the sessions, being a member of the Upper House of the diet, and under the obligation of attending its sittings, whilst the instructions for the deputies to the diet were

being consulted and fixed upon by the Comitatus Sessions. So restricted, the Austrian government had been unable to exercise any improper influence over the debates, and there was no opportunity for bribery, even if bribery could have been successful. It was clearly now intended by the new law, that not only would the Obergespann be relieved of a great part of his duties, but the administrator, who was to officiate beside him, had the instruction never to leave the comitat for which he had been appointed, to be present at all sittings, and closely to watch all the proceedings of the sessions, to forward the views of government as much as possible ; and, as the Obergespann had the gift of all government offices in his hands, the expectation was, that in future the proceedings of the sessions would be null, or would be used to advance the purposes of the government.

The liberals and reformers of the land strongly opposed this measure. From all parts of the kingdom they hastened in great numbers to Pesth, publicly to consult what steps to take next, what reforms to introduce, in short, to go

into the detail of the people's wants and wishes. At the head of this movement, as president of the assembly, stood Count Louis Batthiányi and Baron Podmanizky. At this time Kossuth delivered numerous speeches and became extremely popular. His voice was not now weak or trembling as it had been when he spoke for the first time in the parliament of 1832; he did not stammer, nor was confused in manner; he had not again to sit down under the sarcastic smile of the Assembly. No! like one sprung from higher regions, he stood before the people now in his enthusiasm, his voice thundered and went to the hearts of all. His arguments and sentences were striking and convincing, and the applause which followed his speeches was a proof of their effect. His breath came forth like fire and flame, and threw a quickening spark into the hearts of his hearers, melting the ice round the hearts even of many of his enemies. The people not only liked him, but they adored him. Count Batthiányi and his colleague, Podmanizky, knowing the value of such a man at the forthcoming diet, used all their influence and exertion to get him elected

a deputy, and in spite of the strong opposition of Austria, supported even as she was by most of the Catholic clergy, Kossuth was elected a deputy for the Pesth Comitatus,—a decided victory for his friends, particularly as this comitatus was not only one of the largest, but the most influential, forming, by the intelligence of its inhabitants, and by its geographical situation, the reform centre of the country.

By his eloquence Kossuth soon became one of the most distinguished members of the diet; his eloquence took the hearts of his hearers by storm, and the clearness and correctness of his views raised him soon above all other deputies. His speeches were anticipated with so much pleasure, that, let the debates have been ever so stormy, or the Assembly ever so excited, so that, perhaps, even the speaker or president could scarcely uphold his authority, no sooner did Kossuth rise from his seat, making a sign that he wanted to speak, than, as if by magic, the storm subsided; all was calm, and every ear was strained to catch what he had to say. As soon as the diet had been opened, Kossuth proposed the following questions for

consultation : “Ought not the municipal institutions of the land to be upheld in their constitutional integrity ?—ought not the new system of administrators to be abolished ?—and if government should not agree to these propositions, ought we not then to refuse the ways and means ?”

The debates on this subject lasted full two months, as the two houses could not agree to a resolution, which by the law must have been formed by both houses, before it could be laid before the King for his sanction. The reason of the delay was, that the Upper House for the most part was composed of men who either held an office under government, or who had claims for such, still a great part of the most influential magnates of the country were on the side of the Lower House, and at the head of these stood the excellent patriot, Count Batthiányi, who afterwards fell a victim to the cold-blooded vengeance of Austria.

Government and the commissaries continued meanwhile their shameful exertions to bribe and corrupt the Comitatus Sessions. They had succeeded in winning some parties over, when

Kossuth and his friends proposed some most energetic measures. At the sittings of the diet on the 3rd March, 1848, Kossuth made a most masterly speech, proposing a complete reform of the constitution; the progress of Hungary, being, he contended, absolutely impossible under the existing circumstances. He argued, that as on the head of the King of Hungary two crowns rested, the one a constitutional, the other an absolute crown, these principles were so diametrically opposed to each other, that the same individual could not be a good constitutional and an absolute ruler at the same time. At present the Austrian or absolute crown was the sole impediment to the enjoyment of the rights of Hungary. So long as the two crowns remained united, the Hungarian nation could never attain its constitutional stability. Revolution was always to be expected so long as Hapsburg held back from Hungary her rights, inherited by, and purchased through the blood of her forefathers; therefore, Hungary originally having a constitutional government, deemed it her duty, as the elder sister, to procure at the same time,

the same liberty to the other lands, which had been robbed of it by the Austrian sceptre. After these arguments, came Kossuth's proposition, that it was the duty of Hungary to call upon the King to restore "all parts" of his crown to their ancient liberties, and thus to break down all the barriers, which from time to time, had been raised against the constitution of Hungary.

On this occasion Kossuth spoke nearly three hours without intermission. The Lower House was crammed full; the seats of the deputies, as well as the galleries, were filled to suffocation; the hall could not hold the crowd; the corridors and staircases of the building, even the adjoining streets were filled to overflowing. From the open windows of the hall Kossuth's voice sounded clear and distinct to the hushed multitude—first, with slow accentuation, then waxing warm with the subject, till it sounded like the trumpet of war, his own enthusiasm carrying along the enthusiasm of the people. The deputies had listened to his speech with deep surprise and silent respect;—the public immediately caught joyfully the idea of the

future security of Hungary, by means of the liberation of all the lands united under the sceptre of Austria. Kossuth's popularity increased hourly ; it was felt by all that such a proposition, emanating from the midst of the diet, might be accepted as the verdict of the whole Hungarian people. Never was eloquence more successful. A resolution was immediately adopted to send a deputation to the Emperor, with the proposition of the restoration of all the constitutions of his crown lands !

Kossuth's speech, and the report of the proceedings of the diet, reached Vienna on the same day as the news of the outbreak of the French revolution. The news flew like wild-fire through the town. The speech was immediately translated into German, printed, distributed, and discussed, at all public places. The great interest the Viennese took in this question, perhaps accelerated the outbreak of the revolution at Vienna.

But Kossuth did not stop here. He now demanded the emancipation of the serfs, or peasants. This was immediately agreed to by both Houses. His proposition was very

judiciously framed, so as not to strike too hard, nor too suddenly, at any of the conflicting interests of this question, which, although originated in an unjust manner, had, by the length of time and other circumstances, become incorporated with the interest of property, so as to affect a large portion of the public; he therefore now proposed, and the diet agreed, that the people were to be liberated from all fiefs and vassalage, without having anything to pay for it, but that at the same time the landholders were to have an indemnification for giving up their ancient privileges. "Hungary is rich enough," said Kossuth, "to be able to remunerate the nobles for the loss of such privileges, and, by a good management of her financial affairs, she can easily double her revenues." He next pledged his word and honour that a perfect indemnification should be provided for all, and the proposition was accepted by the diet.

The second proposition was, that as the people had heretofore only participated in the duties which they had to perform, and had possessed no rights or privileges, that they

should now, also, participate in the introduction of an equality of duties and privileges, and that every one should be taxed for his share to the general wants of the state, according to his income or his property. This proposition was also accepted.

The third and last proposition was, for the perfect liberty of the people to participate in the election of the deputies for the diet, and also of the authorities charged with the execution of the laws of the country, and for a free and unbiassed representation of the people at the diet.

A deputation, consisting of Kossuth, Batthiányi, Széchényi, Cziráki, and the Archduke Stephen (then Palatine of Hungary), as spokesman, were appointed to go to Vienna to demand of the King his sanction to these proposals, and thereby to restore peace and happiness, and future comforts and harmony to Austria and her dependencies, as well as to Hungary.

The day on which the diet sent this deputation was an important day for Hungary, and of the greatest excitement for the theatre of all these conferences.

The news of the outbreak of the revolution at Vienna, reached Kossuth one morning after he had just entered the hall of the Lower House. The place was crowded that morning in expectation of a very important conference. Kossuth stood up—the greatest silence prevailed. In a solemn and grave voice he said: “Last night the blood of the citizens has been shed at Vienna—the ministry of Metternich has been thrown down.” Stormy applause interrupted him at these words, and lasted several minutes. After he had again found a hearing, he added only a few words. It did not require much consultation to advise upon what measures had to be taken now. The deputation already appointed to wait upon the King received the last instructions, and were ordered to depart instantly. The sitting was dissolved immediately afterwards.

The deputation were accompanied by a great number of young men, the so-called “young diet,” and arrived at Vienna at midnight, under the joyful acclamations of the people, who had assembled in great number, notwithstanding the late hour, to receive the depu-

tation with all honours. The excitement at Vienna was great, as it also was at the same time nearly over the whole continent. The multitude had seized upon all arms which could be had, and had surrounded the imperial palace, in constant expectation that their demands would be granted.

The court scarcely knew what to do. They were in a state of stupor, from fear. Consent to the demands of the people was delayed for some time. Kossuth, therefore, went to the palace, and warned the Camarilla that he would not be answerable for the consequences, if the deputation should be kept waiting too long; such a detention might lead to an extension of the present commotion at Vienna into Hungary, if the people should find themselves disappointed in their expectations. He therefore pressed the court to do justice to the fair demands of the people. At last the court resolved to grant everything, in order to pacify the Viennese. Thus Austria determined, at the last hour, to be just, but from fear only.

In Presburg, and the whole country, the results of the deputation were anxiously looked

for. The people in Pesth, Comorn, and many other towns, had sent in their demands for reforms to the diet. Besides those points pressed already by the deputation, the demands for liberty of the press, and for a national guard, were the principal ones.

Kossuth, in the meantime, worked hard at Vienna for the liberty of his people. Austria at that moment was totally in his power, for the masses stood ready, entirely devoted to him. It was in his power to pronounce upon Austria's existence for life or for death. At court he was beseeched to restore peace; so his demands were granted, and peace was restored!

The deputation now returned to Presburg, decorated with the flowers, bouquets, and colours of the Viennese. The entry into the town was a triumphant one. A public meeting was immediately called, to hear the result. Kossuth spoke to the meeting from the balcony of a hotel. He now, for the first time, spoke to the sovereign people—Batthiányi, and the other members of the deputation, stood at his side; he introduced them to the people, the heralds

of young liberty, and pointed out Count Batthiányi as the newly-elected prime minister, charged by the King with the formation of a new ministry. He was received with most tremendous cheers. Kossuth now, in a few words, delivered to the people their new liberty ; but he reminded them also, that they only stood at the beginning of difficulties—that the work of reform was not yet finished, but had only been begun—that a rough draft of the intended reforms had been made, but that it would require greater energy and exertion still, to bring the great work to a happy result in the end. Hereupon Batthiányi addressed the meeting, and the people cheered him most heartily, also Kossuth, and Madame Kossuth, and other ladies and members of the deputation, who had taken their stand on the balcony. Kossuth, his wife on his arm, walked through the crowd to his dwelling, accompanied by the joyous multitude. In the evening the citizens honoured him, Batthiányi, and the other deputies, by a grand torch-light serenade, at which, also, the members of “the young diet” assisted, who had accompanied them back from Vienna.

A month later, on the 14th April, King Ferdinand appeared in person at Presburg, where he publicly and with great pomp and solemnity, gave his sanction to the new laws, and on this occasion also the new ministry, under Count Louis Batthiányi, was officially installed, Kossuth was nominated Minister of Finance.

The King closed the diet in the Hungarian language, beginning his speech with the words "I feel the highest pleasure once more to be among you, for I find my beloved subjects, the Magyars, always the same, true and faithful."

From this moment a change had come over Hungary. Trade and commerce appeared to have received a sudden and powerful impulse. The ministry, now carried forward by the force of public opinion, developed great activity and energy. Kossuth in particular, with the active assistance of his clever secretary, Joseph Dushek, showed an indefatigable ability. He found not only an empty treasury, but a great many abuses which had been carried on in the system of finance. His first care, therefore, was to give Hungary a new financial

system. The rich resources of the land remained unused, or had only been applied to keep up the army of Austrian Bureaucrats, and to fill the coffers of Metternich, and the private treasury of the Princes of the imperial house.

Hungary had no coined money of her own, but was completely overrun with Austrian paper money, which was illegal in Hungary, but which still had found its way into the country in spite of all the continued protestations of every diet. What had become of the regular produce of its own rich mines nobody knew, it had always disappeared without leaving a trace behind; certainly, the finger-posts pointed, "road to Austria."

Hungary thus having no funds of her own, Kossuth tried to lay a foundation for such by voluntary subscription. He appealed to the whole population of the country, that every one, be he rich or poor, might, to the best of his ability, lay down his gift in precious metals on the altar of fatherland. This appeal was responded to by the people with the most hearty good will and zeal. Rich and poor, young and old, male and female, all brought

their mite to the public treasury in gold, silver, precious stones, or other valuables. Besides large sums in ready money, jewellery was brought, and gold and silver dinner sets, costly ornaments, and other objects of great value; poor women brought their wedding rings, the only precious metal probably they ever had called their own. Thus the minister found himself in a short time in possession of a fund upon the security of which, and with the consent of the Austrian government, he ordered the issue of two millions gilders C: M: paper money, in bank-notes of two gilders each. Besides this, a great quantity of gold and silver money was coined with an inscription in the Hungarian language.

The new Minister of War found the nation in just as bad a state respecting the military arrangements, as the Minister of Finance had found the treasury.

Méssáros on being appointed to this office was in Italy, from whence he arrived only at the end of May; Count Batthiányi, the prime minister, therefore filled also this office until the return of the former, it being his duty, as

president of the cabinet, to see the establishment of the national guard immediately proceeded with.

The duties of the war office were in the hands of Major-General Oettinger. The first act after the proclamation of the new constitution was the swearing faithfulness to this constitution on the part of the native military garrisoned in Hungary. Afterwards, when danger from the rebellious Croats became pressing, the King sanctioned the enrolment of 10,000 volunteers more; the equipment and armament of these new troops occupied the whole attention of the minister. The new ministry was thus in full activity; the country looked to a bright future; means were preparing to advance in the path of justice and civilization, and to repair the injuries under which the country had suffered from a tyrannical government for the last three centuries. Austria, on the contrary, stood now on the precipice of destruction. A third and terrible bankruptcy was expected. The public debt was above two thousand millions; the treasury was utterly exhausted; Hungary was now

independent, and did not feel inclined to take a part of the national debt, nor to sacrifice her own now flourishing industry for the benefit of the Austrian treasury. The native Hungarian regiments had been sworn upon the constitution; they could not now be drafted from their own country without the consent of the diet, neither could they be employed to force despotic measures upon the people, nor to serve as a safeguard to the Austrian bureaucracy.

The only plan which Austria seemed to consider open to her to rescue herself from this terrible situation was the diabolical one of exciting nation against nation, race against race, and arming them against each other. This plan originated with the Arch-duchess Sophia, the mother of the present Emperor, Francis Joseph, a woman of the most unbounded ambition, and who, by her cleverness and determination, had gained the reputation of being the only man of the family of the Hapsburgs. Her right-hand and devoted tool was the Bann of Croatia, Baron Jellachich. First the Raitzen were instigated to open rebellion against the liberal measures of the new ministry. Later

on, the Croats followed their example, then the Wallachians, and lastly, the Saxons in Transylvania.

The Raitzen, a people of Slavonian race, and adhering to the Greek united church, live in that part of Hungary which lies along the lower Danube, and in the eastern parts of Slavonia. About the seventh century they came from Servia and settled, to the number of about 80,000, under the protection of the privileges of the country. Austria, however, soon used this warlike nation as a protective barrier against Turkey on the one hand, and Hungary on the other. Ignorant, vulgar and uncivilized they were blind and suitable tools in the hands of the Archbishop of their church, who was always elected under the influence of Austria, and from whom he received his secret instructions. Many of them emigrated to Russia during the religious persecutions in the reign of Maria Theresa, whilst those who remained at home were constantly hunted down by this fanatic Empress, and lost by degrees all their privileges. The new constitution restored to them these privileges, and making

the former serfs free men, put them upon an equality with the Hungarian citizens; they received lands and were liberated from their military duty to Austria, in short, they were rescued from the depth of misery. The only hindrance to make the two races of Hungarians and Raitzen one nation of brothers, was the difference in their languages. In the reign of Joseph II. it had been attempted forcibly to suppress the Hungarian language and to supplant it by the German, but this attempt not only failed, but had served to awaken in the Magyars a stronger love for their own language and literature, and has ever since been a point which the Magyars watched with the greatest jealousy, and which afterwards was frequently a bone of contention, and excited considerable animosity when the Magyars attempted to Hungarianize the language of the other nationalities of Hungary.

The diet rather too precipitately attempted to make the Hungarian the only official language, and did not strictly adhere to the just and reasonable law of the diet of 1844, upon the same subject. This law enacted that from

the 1st January, 1844, no one could obtain an office under government, who was not perfect master of the Hungarian language. The legal language in parliament was to be exclusively the Hungarian, with an exception in favour of such deputies as were sent by provinces where the Magyar language did not predominate. Such deputies were to be at liberty for six years, from the date of this law, to make use of the Latin language in their official communications. In the schools of such provinces the Hungarian language was ordered to be taught, while in the native Hungarian schools this language was ordered to be the only one permitted. Austrian emissaries, and some fanatic agitators in favour of the Panslavismus, made this law a handle to light the firebrand of discord among a low, ignorant, and neglected people. The former bribed Archbishop Prachich, and other members of the Serbian aristocracy, to make the people believe that liberal measures of the new Hungarian government were intended to undermine their nationality and religion. These sentiments, taught from the pulpit, were but too readily

received by the fanatic and credulous people. At a general synod of the chiefs at Karlowitz, Prajachich, the archbishop, drew up a memorial, explaining the complaints of the people, their wishes and demands. The language in which this memorial was couched showed too clearly who had dictated the same; but, instead of treating with the misled Raitzen, and explaining to them the real merits of the case, the ministry refusing to entertain the memorial, closed the door to an amicable arrangement, and thus gave the Austrian intriguers free scope.

Hostilities commenced in the month of June, the chief seats of the insurrection being the German and Illyrian frontier districts in the Banat. Hungary at this time had few native regiments at home; as, in conformity with the policy of Metternich, to keep one nationality in check by another, the Hungarian troops had been mostly distributed in Bohemia and Italy, whilst Hungary had generally been occupied by Wallachian or Polish troops. All efforts to induce the Austrian court to recal the Hungarian regiments from foreign

service were unavailing. Taking advantage of this state of things, the Bann of Croatia, Jellachich, appointed governor of this province by the King, now raised the same pretensions and claims as the Servians, and refused obedience to the Hungarian ministry. At a meeting of the Croatian House of Assembly a declaration of war against Hungary was pronounced, and the people were called to arms. An army of about 45,000 men was soon assembled at the river Drava, mostly composed of the frontier soldiers, all well armed, and abundantly provided with ammunition. Jellachich, with these forces, held himself ready on the first favourable moment to invade Hungary. Thus pressed, the ministry urged the King to call the diet together, which was done, the Archduke Palatine Stephen opening it in the month of July, 1848, at Pesth. In a speech read on the occasion by the Palatine by order of the King, the Bann of Croatia was charged with high treason, was deposed from office, and the diet were exhorted to take stringent and proper measures to uphold peace and order.

Kossuth deeply felt the danger of the coun-

try, and on the day following the opening of the diet, he made a most brilliant speech,* expressive of his feelings and views on the state of affairs.

The Hungarian government earnestly desired to avoid a war with the Croats, and had therefore, at the first, made proposals for an amicable arrangement. A deputation of about sixty members of both houses was sent to Vienna, on the 8th September, 1848. Having obtained an audience with the King at Schönbrunn, they requested him to endeavour to settle the differences. They were, however, received very coldly, the King expressing himself in such a way, that the ministry immediately resigned office. The Palatine at once declared himself ready to take the reins of government until the King should appoint a new ministry. Kossuth protested against this, and stated that as the nation could not remain without some government, and as the Palatine could not be recognized as the legal authority, he would remain in office till his successor should be nominated. Kossuth and Szemere were,

* See Appendix.

therefore, charged with the government for the time.

Towards the end of September, a new attempt at reconciliation was made, by sending a deputation to the constituent assembly at Vienna. The Bohemian faction of the assembly, however, displayed a very hostile spirit, and refused the deputation admittance, who, therefore, returned home unsuccessful.

Meanwhile, Jellachich had already, on the 9th September, 1848, invaded the country. He advanced with 15,000 men by the road of Gross Kanisa and Kéthely along the shores of Lake Platten towards Siotok, whilst another army under General Hartmann marched by Sharos, Berény, and Kaposvár, and joined the Bann at Enying.

Jellachich, on being requested by a deputation to show the imperial order for his attack upon Hungary, confessed that he had no such authority, but he declared at the same time, that he was acting under a direct suggestion from the Emperor.

The diet now requested the Archduke Stephen, who by his dignity of palatine was also

commander-in-chief of the army, to put himself at the head of the troops. Kossuth did not oppose this, but insisted that the Archduke should solemnly undertake to carry on the contest with vigour and faithfulness.

Stephen professed himself willing to comply, but, as a last attempt to restore peace, he requested Jellachich should meet him in conference on board of a steamer anchored midway on the Platten lake. On the one shore stood the Croats, on the other the Hungarians. Jellachich did not make his appearance, stating as his reason, that the Archduke had hoisted the Hungarian and not the Austrian flag, which was that of his family. This farce having been played out, the Archduke deserted the army, and fled to Vienna.

The papers discovered, which he had forgotten to destroy before his flight, brought to light his true character as a traitor to the Hungarian cause. Not only had he been all along on the best terms with the court, but he had also advised the safest and best plans how to subdue Hungary again. Thus basely did this man betray the confidence the nation had

placed in him. A deplorable event which now occurred, widened the breach between the nation and the dynasty. A royal decree, although in an unconstitutional form, nominated Count Lamberg commander-in-chief of the Hungarian army. A second commanded him to dissolve the diet. On this occasion the diet issued its first protest, declaring such a step of the King illegal, and unconstitutional, and refusing to acknowledge Count Lamberg, as commander-in-chief. A terrible excitement prevailed at Pesth; and Lamberg, during the commotion, fell a victim to the rage of the people. The day following this tragedy, Kossuth moved an address to the King, in which the representatives of the people unanimously expressed their regret at the cause, and the manner of the death of Count Lamberg. Jella-chich having advanced to Stuhlweissenburg, government was thus forced to fight, to uphold a constitution, which the King himself had sworn to maintain. Batthiányi had left Pesth, and the diet nominated a new power, under the title of "Committee of Land Defence," of which Kossuth was elected president.

With the increasing danger of his country grew also the energy and courage of Kossuth. In Pesth, when all were in the utmost consternation, when the courage of the highest to the lowest had fallen, Kossuth was full of courage and hope. Being called upon to speak from the balcony, as soon as the people saw him their confidence returned, his words spoken with precision, and in an impressive manner, restored their sunken courage and hope; he said, "I certainly am at present ill in health but fatherland calls, and I must not and will not be ill any longer, but I shall devote myself to you with all my energy, and we certainly shall be victorious."

Clad in the simple uniform of a Honvéd, with only a sword at his side, he went upon the immense plains of Hungary among the dwellings of the original Magyar race, and preached there from cottage to cottage, the holy war for the constitution against treason.

These people had never before heard such language. Their enthusiasm was awakened—the spark was stirred into a flame—by thousands they left their dwellings to rally under

the banner of old Hungaria. All ages, from the scarce full-grown boy to the white-haired veteran of many former battles, armed themselves with whatever weapons they could lay their hands upon. Undisciplined, without proper leaders, badly equipped, these thousands yet panted to meet the enemy, Jellachich and his Croats.

On the 29th September, Jellachich, with 40,000 experienced troops, marched to the attack. Moga, who commanded the Hungarians, had only a few guns worked by volunteers, students, and mechanics from Pesth, who had been drilled but a short time by Mack, an Austrian artillery officer; yet these raw masses of the Hungarians, ready for self-sacrifice, threw themselves boldly upon the Croats, and by simple physical strength beat the disciplined troops of Jellachich. His lines were broken without a chance of rallying, and his troops fled in wild fright. Jellachich requested an armistice of three days, which he, violating his word, abused, and fled with the remnant of his troops under the walls of Vienna.

Thus ended the battle of Pákozd; the expe-

dition of Jellachich was defeated by the energy of one man, and the bravery of the nation roused by him into action.

The news of Jellachich's defeat reached Vienna on the 3rd October, the same day on which a decree had just been published, nominating him Military and Civil Governor of Hungary, and ordering him to dissolve the diet. A brigade of grenadiers was ordered to march for his support from Vienna to Pesth;—they refused. The Minister-of-War (Count Latour) who had given this order, was murdered by the people. The Emperor fled—the citizens overpowered the troops, who retired from the town, and then commenced a siege of the same, after having been joined by the troops of Windischgrätz and Jellachich. Instead of pursuing the latter to the utmost of his power, to annihilate him altogether, Moga halted his army on the frontiers of Hungary. His clear duty, without doubt, would have been, to march direct upon Vienna, to the support of the inhabitants; but this General also, unfortunately, proved weak, and the so necessary assistance to the

Viennese was postponed, until it came too late !

Although Moga had already excited suspicion, by his conduct during the battle of the 29th September, which was won almost against his will and intention, he was yet most imprudently left with far too much power. Kossuth did not like to show his suspicion too openly, and he therefore proposed to have him watched by a few Honvéd staff officers, promoted to Generals. Some old experienced officers, however, advised him against such a step, well knowing the true character of the Austrian army in Hungary. Kossuth, therefore, abandoned this intention, as it was possible that it might have caused defection or dissatisfaction and ill-humour in the army. He, therefore, charged Görgey alone with a secret mission for the camp. Kossuth's attention had been directed to Görgey by his determined conduct in the case of Eugen Zichy, and he took him to be the most trusty and competent officer from whom to obtain a correct judgment of the movements of Moga from personal observation. Colonel Görgey was despatched on the 11th

October, and reached the camp on the 13th, near Parendorf, above Presburg. Görgey found in Moga a man who had declared that he still would defend Hungary against the attacks of the Croats, in obedience to the orders from his Emperor, but that he never would willingly march across the frontiers, and that he repudiated *in toto* all the consequences of such a step. The proceedings in the camp at Parendorf showed already the utmost irresolution and uncertainty under which the Committee of the Land Defence were labouring, as to the next step to be taken. One did not seem to know whether to take the offensive or the defensive; one advanced and retired again, without a visible motive or cause. Now, it was proposed in the interest of the young constitution of Austria, to pursue the offensive against the Bann across the Leitha; then, again, it was considered unnecessary to cross this river, and it was supposed that the Croats would be disarmed by the Austrians themselves.

The Viennese, in the meantime, waited impatiently for the assistance of the Hungarian

troops, but to no purpose. The Committee of the Land Defence expected an official demand for this step from the Constituent Assembly at Vienna, but this application the Assembly declined to send. A month having thus been lost by needless marching and counter-marching, Kossuth himself appeared at last at Nickelsdorf, at the head of 12,000 men, and a battery of guns, which had joined him during his march from Pesth, from whence he had led a battalion of national guards. He immediately assembled a council of war at his quarters, over which he presided. Kossuth opened the proceedings with a speech, in which he declared it a moral necessity to march to the assistance of besieged Vienna, and represented every thought of not doing so as dishonourable. He described in glowing colours the good feeling of the Viennese respecting the newly-gained liberty of Hungary, their noble devotion to the welfare of Hungary, the sacrifices they had made in the cause, and lastly, the sufferings they were enduring under the blockade which had been brought upon their city. "Vienna is standing yet," thus he concluded his speech;

“the courage of the inhabitants, our faithful allies, against the attacks of the generals of absolutism, is not yet broken, but without our assistance they will have to submit in the end, for the forces are too unequal; let us, therefore, hasten to pay off a debt which we ought to hold sacred, remembering what our brothers at Vienna have done for us. We must hasten to the assistance of Vienna! The honour of the nation requires us to do so, and we can do it with a good heart, for the brave army which not long since drove the flying enemy out of the country, has this day received a reinforcement which I have led hither, 12,000 inexperienced warriors, it is true, but burning with desire to dispute the laurel with their valiant comrades on the next battle-field, and animated by the patriotic feeling which swells the breast of every true son of Hungary. Yes, we shall do it, we shall advance. Our friends in Vienna count upon us; and when has it ever been said that the Hungarian did forsake his friend?” But among the officers in council Kossuth found many obstinate opponents of his proposition, and

the council was dissolved without coming to a resolution.

The next day, Kossuth arrived at Parendorf. His first public act in the camp was to assemble the officers of the regular troops at his quarters, and there he read to them a letter which he had written to Prince Windischgrätz, in which he proved the good right of the Hungarians against the Bann and his party, and demanding of the Prince that the Bann and his troops should be disarmed—that thus a clear proof might be given that the new constitution, lately sanctioned and sworn to by the King, was intended to be kept inviolate. He also demanded the raising of the blockade of Vienna, but first and chiefly he demanded, within a certain short time, a distinct and satisfactory answer to this, as otherwise the Hungarians would be immediately obliged to pursue their enemy and his allies even upon neutral ground, and to attack, and if possible, annihilate him.

Two officers immediately went with this ultimatum to Prince Windischgrätz. The answer was, only one of the two was allowed to depart again. The other, Twanka had

been seized upon in the camp of the Bann Jellachich, and was retained a prisoner. This contempt of the general law of all nations silenced all opposition to Kossuth's proposition in the camp at Parendorf. Kossuth was anxiously waiting for some news from Vienna, but none arriving and the thunder of the besieging batteries being heard more and more distinct in the Hungarian camp; he at last, on the 28th October, gave orders for a general advance.

The details of the battle of Schwechat it is not necessary to give, the result was disgraceful, although some of the troops fought most valiantly at Manneswörth, especially the division of Count Guyon, and the most eminent, the second battalion of Pesth volunteers. During the battle, Kossuth had taken his stand at the side of the commander-in-chief, accompanied by the commissaries, and he tried all possible means as soon as he saw the army turn to flight, to collect the troops and to make a stand, but it was useless—they retreated in great hurry and disorder, and that the army did not become totally destroyed that

day may only be ascribed to the circumstance that the enemy was himself too much weakened to pursue the fugitives. The citizens of Vienna had also made their last efforts during the time this battle raged. The defeat of the Hungarians was therefore disastrous to them. Vienna fell into the hands of Windischgrätz on the 30th October.

Kossuth arrived at Presburg very ill from the efforts on the battlefield. He resolved immediately to purify the army from all wavering political elements and took the command from Moga, as it was clear that Moga had made his dispositions for the battle with the intention to let the army suffer a defeat, so that he, who had raised the strongest opposition against the offensive, might be proved to have been right in his prophecy.* Moga was at present disabled by a fall from his horse, and Görgey was now appointed to the command on the Upper Danube. Kossuth now made all necessary arrangements for the defence of the

* It is said that Moga, when afterwards examined before a court martial at Vienna, defended himself with the words, "I could not do more than I did, viz., to arrange the Battle of Schwechat in the manner I did."

country which was threatened by an invasion from the Austrians. He and Görgey exerted themselves to the utmost to re-organize the army. The battle of Schwechat had proved that the zeal and enthusiasm of the militia and volunteers, however praiseworthy, was not sufficient security for the country; they were therefore as much as possible separated from the regulars, or attached to the Honvéd battalions. Kossuth devoted his particular attention to the war office. The diet dissolved the council of war in November, and transferred the duties of this body to a Committee of the Land Defence, which was put under Kossuth's personal direction. It was resolved to keep the frontiers occupied, and not to give up an inch of ground if it could possibly be helped. Kossuth saw that the sympathies of the masses for the upholding of the new constitution, had not taken root sufficient in their hearts to bear them up under the recent adverse turn of affairs. He, therefore, sought to counteract the bad effect of the defeat at Schwechat by the occupation of the frontiers. By this plan he accustomed the population of those parts nearest the Austrian

territory, to see their former intercourse with Austria interrupted, as the strong watch kept on the frontiers forced them by degrees to break up their relation to the other possessions of Austria, and to confine their mercantile activity to the inland trade, the real Hungarian trade, and thus to make the boundaries between Hungary and Austria more distinct. By thus hermetically closing the frontiers, he also prevented the export of any kind of provisions to Vienna, to the greatest inconvenience of the imperial army concentrated in and around this city, at the same time securing for his army the large stores of corn and hay of the frontier counties, and covering the carrying off of the same into the fortress of Comorn, where immense magazines had been established. He thus, also, secured a favourable circulation for the new paper money.

It was in the beginning of December that the Austrians began their march against Hungary. Prince Windischgrätz marched with the mass of the army along the Upper Danube; General Schlick, through Gallicia; General Puchner, from Groswardein; and Count Nugent

advanced along the shores of the Drave, against Eszeg. The army of Windischgrätz crossed the frontier on the Upper Danube, on the 16th December, broke the lines of the Hungarians, and forced Görgey, after some hard skirmishing at Tyrnau and Kasimir, to retire towards Altenburg and Raab. Görgey here concentrated his army, and, receiving pressing directions from Kossuth, he kept the town for ten days, but was at last forced to evacuate the same, which was immediately taken possession of by the enemy. He retired towards Ofen, to join Perczel and his 6,000 men; but before the junction could be effected, Perczel had suffered a most signal defeat at Moor. Kossuth seemed to have had the intention at first to offer the enemy a pitched battle, under the walls of Ofen; but this defeat of Perczel, and the news of another suffered by the rear guard of Görgey, determined him to change the seat of government, and for the time at least to seek security behind the Tissa. It could not, indeed, be concealed that these defeats had produced a bad dispiriting impression even upon the boldest and best patriots. Before this step

was taken, however, he tried once more to come to an understanding, and to make a peaceful arrangement, but this attempt failing, and Count Batthiányi having been made prisoner, through the most dastardly treachery, the nation was driven to desperation.

Kossuth changed the seat of the government to Deberczin. The army left Pesth immediately afterwards, on the 3rd January, 1849, with instructions that the chief towns, the Banat Bácska, between Maros, and Theresianopol, were to be given up; that all the forces of the nation were to be drawn behind the Tissa, there to await the attack of the Imperialists; and also, to defend the new seat of government. Görgey was sent with 20,000 men to Upper Hungary, to conceal the real movements, and cover the dispositions of the other body of the army. He marched upon Waitzen, and from thence into the mountainous district in the locality of the gold and silver mines. Perczel went with 10,000 men to Szolnock. They had succeeded in their plan to mislead Windischgrätz, for he now pursued mostly only Görgey; and after the capture of Pesth, on the 5th January, he

sent only a small force in the direction of the Tissa. On the 4th January, the Hungarians under General Mèszaròs, were defeated at Kaschau. Kossuth was on his road to Deberczin, when he received the news. He immediately directed General Klapka to take the command of Mèszaròs' troops. On the 22nd, 23rd, and 24th January, Klapka had three engagements with the enemy at Tarzal, Keresztur, and Tokay, in which he gained the upperhand, and effectually stopped Schlick in his march towards Deberczin. The diet at Deberczin at present remained in dull inactivity; the late unfortunate events had left their baneful effects upon every one except Kossuth; he alone remained the same active, energetic man as before. His inexhaustible eloquence strengthened the army by thousands and thousands of valiant men, so that the saying became general, "wherever Kossuth puts his foot, there a soldier springs up." But not only was the army in want of men, but arms, ammunition, and all the materials of war had to be provided. All this his ever active mind, assisted by an enthusiastic people, found means to furnish.

Out of peaceful blacksmiths he made armourers; into the peaceful, retired valleys he brought powder-mills; from churches and chapels the bells were taken, to be transformed into cannons. They had now reached the point from whence no retrograde movement could be made without inevitably leading to subjection and slavery. The existence, the property, the honour of the nation, were closely united in the holy cause of fatherland; the sword alone could now decide the contest. The enemy was powerful, too powerful, still Kossuth's courage did not fail him; his faith in the justice of the cause, in the strength and power of the nation, could not easily be shaken; he never wavered, he trusted in God, the God of justice and righteousness, who allows no lasting victory to follow the footsteps of the unjust.

Görgey had had some skirmishes in the mountain district. After the engagement of Guyon, on the Branyiskó, he joined Klapka, and the other divisions of the army, at the Tissa, having been absent altogether four weeks. This junction of the three armies under Dembinsky, Klapka, and Görgey, took

place on the 10th January, 1849. Dembinsky had been nominated Commander-in-Chief of all the Hungarian troops, by Kossuth, and issued now his dispositions against Windischgrätz, who was already in full advance upon the Tissa.

Both armies met near Kapolna. On the 26th February, the battle was begun, and lasted two days. The Hungarians were defeated, but on the other hand, the Austrians gained no advantage. Dembinsky retired, first upon Mezeköves, and afterwards behind the Tissa. By this retreat, he became obnoxious in the eyes of many of the Generals and staff-officers; soon unpleasant scenes occurred, which made Kossuth's presence in the camp necessary. He hastened thither, accompanied by General Field-Marshal Lieutenant Vetter, and the Minister-of-War, Mészáros, and arrived at the same on the 7th March, at Fizza Füred. He immediately called for a committee of investigation, but Dembinsky, by resigning his command, saved him the unpleasantness of this court of enquiry, and Vetter was appointed to the chief command, but Vetter soon becoming

disabled by severe illness, it came into the hands of Görgey, first *pro tem.*, and afterwards by appointment. Kossuth now stayed a considerable time with the army, partly by his presence, to prevent the recurrence of misunderstandings or disputes, and partly to inspire the army, and to keep alive a necessary spirit of enthusiasm. The army resumed the offensive again, on the 24th March, and now with such good success, that after several rapidly following victories, the Austrians in a short time found themselves thrown back upon Pesth. Kossuth considered now, that the first and most important step ought to be the liberation of the chief towns, as all victories would remain without any important result, so long as these towns remained in the hands of the enemy ; it was, therefore, necessary to give the country a proof of the success of their arms, by re-capturing these towns. This alone would quickly raise the spirit of the nation, and give encouragement for further unabated exertions ; this was a great point not to be lost sight of, for the hope of the nation for a quick and favourable result, would, if broken down, at once stop all

the resources now so liberally granted, and which were so very necessary to an energetic continuation of the war operations.

Kossuth explained his proposition at a council of war, on the 7th April, at Gödöllő, and his views were admitted to be quite correct, but the strategic position of both armies required that the first attention should be given to the raising the siege of Comorn.

The army commenced operations on the 10th April, and succeeded in driving the Austrians from before Comorn on the 26th April.

This continued good fortune of the Hungarian arms now induced Kossuth to answer, in an energetic manner, the base constitution of the 4th March, 1849, proclaimed by the Austrians, after the battle of Kapolna, and as one of its consequences.

By this constitution it was intended to blot out Hungary from the list of nations; to annul its existence as a kingdom; and cancelling the former liberal constitution, to declare the country to be a province only of Austria.

Kossuth determined to answer this vile manifesto by the fullest and entire separation of

Hungary from Austria. He considered the patience of the nation exhausted, and expected that the people would show themselves worthy of their liberty, and they would not suffer such an indignity as the octroyed constitution, without making a bold stand against it, and taking a full measure of reprisals. On the manner in which the manifesto should be answered, the judgment of the nations of Europe, relative to the justice of the Hungarian struggle, would mainly depend, and by that manifesto also, he calculated the sympathy and assistance they might be disposed to extend, would be affected. England, France, Turkey, Italy, even all Germany, except Austria's hereditary German lands, waited only for Hungary declaring herself an independent state, to grant her that liberal and substantial support which till now they had kept back. The sister nation of the Poles, the deluded, vanquished, and oppressed, would then quickly follow the example of Hungary, and, both nations united, they would find a powerful and effective ally in the sublime Porte, who had been so often wounded in her best interests by the policy of both Austria and Russia.

With the liberty of Hungary would also the freedom of Europe be advanced. The victory of Hungary would be followed by as many victorious risings against the hated absolute principles, as Europe now counted oppressed and enslaved nations.

Thus reasoned Kossuth. On the 7th April a council of war was held at Gödöllő, Kossuth explained himself still more distinctly on this occasion. "Our victory, I trust to God, is certain," he said, "but we can and we must do far more yet than for ourselves alone, we must fight and conquer for the freedom also of all those brave hearts who now pray for our victory. But our word must go forth before our deeds; our shout of victory must be raised before the certain victory; it must be the herald to announce to the trampled down nations that victory is coming, so that they may be awake and ready, and not slumber in their lethargy when the saving moment approaches; a moment lost is giving the common enemy time again to collect himself, to recruit and strengthen his forces, and be ready for another attempt upon young liberty. The octroyed constitution having

denied our existence as a nation, we must not, we cannot remain silent. Our silence would be construed by our enemies into an admission, and all our victories would remain fruitless; but a declaration like the present would raise the nation in her own estimation and national pride; it would throw down all the bridges behind those wavering and undecided parties in and out of the diet; all party interest and party differences would be pushed to the background by that one nearest, general, and most important purpose which all good patriots have in view, and thus victory would be hastened, and also made easier."

The diet accepted Kossuth's proposition to declare the country independent of Austria, and the Hapsburg dynasty to have forfeited the Hungarian throne, and a solemn proclamation to this effect was made on the 14th April, in the Protestant church at Deberczin, at the same time that a provisional government was appointed to conduct affairs until the nation should have agreed upon its future form of government. Louis Kossuth was nominated Governor of the Land, and President of the

Government, and was authorized at once to appoint a ministry.

The people received these important changes with great enthusiasm, except a few timid individuals, who looked with fear and anxiety upon the consequences that might follow. In Deberczin, the provisional capital of the country, all was life and hope. The late brilliant achievement of the army had re-awakened the pride and the energy of the nation. Immense were the difficulties that awaited the new government, but Kossuth developed such exact attention and devotion to the business, as had not previously been found. He was the centre, the soul of the government, as well as of the diet.

On the 24th April, General Aulich, entered the old capital, Pesth, Comorn being relieved, and the Austrians having nearly been brought to the point of total destruction, after the victory of Nagy Sarló. This was the time to pursue the enemy to the utmost—to crush him totally—to “break the staff over Austria,”*

* NOTE OF THE TRANSLATOR.—The form in Hungary and Germany of announcing judgment of death to a criminal; a small white staff is broken by the judge and thrown at the feet of the criminal, thus is his tie to this world broken asunder.

and to give new life and spirit to the development of Hungary's welfare and greatness. But now the operations of Görgey rather worked to the injury of the latter; he ceased pursuing the enemy, lost his army several days at Comorn, and then resolved to lay siege to Ofen, stating to his astonished staff, as an excuse for these unaccountable proceedings, that he had instructions to that effect from Kossuth.

It is quite true that in the beginning, Kossuth held the opinion that an inspiring impulse ought to be given to the nation by the retaking of Ofen, their historic Palladium, thereby animating them to the most energetic continuation of the war; besides, he had been erroneously informed that the garrison of the fortress was too much weakened and discouraged to offer an obstinate resistance. General Klapka having received later and more accurate information, Kossuth changed his opinion, and directed Klapka to advise Görgey not to lose time by the siege.

The letter of Klapka reached its destination, but failed in its purpose, for Görgey, who was

already on full march upon Ofen, declared that it was not customary for him to stop short half way. The siege began on the 2nd May, and ended by the storming of the fortress on the 21st May. Glorious as this deed was, it had nevertheless not only ruined a great part of Pesth, but in its consequences it caused the downfall of Hungary.

Almost the whole population of Pesth were eye-witnesses to the storming. The attack was begun very early in the morning. With unexampled bravery the Honvéds stormed forward, the scaling ladders could only be planted under the fiery grapeshot of the enemies batteries, which fell like hailstones among the brave Hungarians, and drove them back several times. The population on the left shore of the Danube looked with anxiously beating hearts upon the battle, raging fierce and bloody on the opposite side. Now back, and again forward, moved the columns, instilling the hearts of the spectators with fear and hope alternately. At last the tricolour was planted on the turrets of the castle, and a long, loud, enthusiastic cheer rent the air from breasts hitherto oppressed by fear and

anxiety. It was touching to the heart's core to see the wounded and the dying which were being carried from the battle-field—the enthusiasm filling still their breasts. Amidst all their acute suffering, they shouted joyously, “Fresh courage, friends. Buda is ours. Hurrah for Kossuth and fatherland.” Many a one closed his eyes for ever with this exclamation.

The joyful news reached the seat of government, on the 22nd May, and was immediately communicated to the people by a proclamation of Kossuth. The report of the battle was prefaced by the following words :

“Praised be God's holy name ! Praise to the heroes of the national army, who have sacrificed their lives in the liberation of our country.” and ended as follows :—“The fortress of Buda is in our hands ! Let all the nation gather fresh courage and renewed energy from the fact of such a success ! May the combat which is still impending be short, and may the liberation of our beloved country be complete. Peals of bells throughout the country proclaim the victory of the Hungarian arms. Pray to God, and render thanks for the glory he has vouch-

safed to grant the Hungarian army, whose heroic deeds have made her the bulwark of European liberty !”

A few days after, Kossuth adjourned the diet to the month of July, and went with the whole government to Pesth. The people between Pesth and Deberczin, accustomed from old traditions to look upon Pesth and Ofen as the seats of authority, had very plainly given the government to understand that when the ministry fled behind the Tissa, they considered their claims of allegiance forfeited with, or by the evacuation of the old historic residence, and as Kossuth was very anxious that the people should publicly swear allegiance to the present government,—as the old Hungarian only believes in, or acknowledges power where he sees it,—he hastened the return to the capital.

Kossuth was received by the people with demonstrations of the purest joy and enthusiasm, for he was beloved by all as the personification of national freedom and independence. From all parts, deputations were immediately sent to take the oath of allegiance, and even the rebellious Wallachians showed themselves

inclined now to submission, and made overtures for a peaceful arrangement ; and for substantial assistance on their part. Kossuth entered into negotiations with them, which promised a favourable result, but which were afterwards broken off in a most unfortunate manner by the imprudence of the commander of the troops, who still stood in the field against them. Almost the whole country was now in the hands of the Hungarians.

Malkowsky's corps of 10,000 men which had been driven from Transylvania into Wallachia, and from thence had attempted at Orsora to enter the Banat, had been driven back a second time by old General Bem, who had effected his junction with General Perczel, the latter having fought the Servians with equal good success, and begun now the siege of the important fortress, Temesvár. Dembinsky strengthened his troops in Upper Hungary ; his division of 10,000 men kept the towns of Kashau and Eperies. Transylvania had nearly been cleared of the enemy ;—a brighter aspect of things beamed upon the nation.

Whilst all true patriots now breathed freer,

in the hopes of a cheerful future, the clouds of an awful thunder-storm gathered over the horizon of their dear fatherland. The news of a Russian intervention, first only whispered, and scarcely credited, received now more and more probability. Articles in foreign journals, the Vienna official paper, with the announcement to that effect from the Austrian government, and lastly, the actual advance of the Russian troops, unfortunately confirmed the truth of the reports. Kossuth received the news with surprise, although not quite unprepared for it.

The nation was stunned at first ; but, soon recovering from its stupor, every voice was raised for war—war for life or death !

“First may the cleaving earth before our eyes
Gape wide, and drink our blood for sacrifice ;
First perish all, ere haughty Austria boast
We lost our freedom, and our glory lost.”

Preparations were made everywhere for the most desperate defence. Cannon foundries, armouries, powder mills, and saltpetre manufactories were erected all through the country, whilst every effort was made to strengthen the

efficacy of the army, by raising more cavalry, this renowned arm of the Hungarian service; erecting military depôts for the wants of the troops, and providing the necessary equipments for the same. The governor was nobly supported in his efforts by the whole nation, which, devoted and enthusiastic to the cause, flocked by hundreds and thousands on the first appeal, to the banner of fatherland. All ranks, all classes vied with each other, to uphold in this holy war, the honour and the freedom of the nation. The choice was now only between slavery and manly self-defence. To make victory sure, nothing was wanting but cordial understanding and co-operation between the government, the leaders of the army, and the people. But the government, as well as Kossuth, in spite of all his endeavours, failed to obtain this most desirable point.

The ambition of some of the leaders prevented almost anything like a cordial co-operation of the different forces, and the centralization of their resources. In many cases the Generals did not even respect the orders of the government, or flatly refused obedience. A most pre-

judicial effect was early caused by the misunderstanding and mistrust between Görgey and Kossuth. The ambition, hatred, and jealousy of the former against the latter, became the more marked, the more the danger increased, and the more the stability of the nation was shaken to its very foundation. Kossuth had felt bitterly this conduct of Görgey, even at the time whilst he was president of the committee of land defence, and later when he was chief of the provisional government. His proclamation before the taking of Ofen, issued by General Klapka (then Görgey's substitute in the ministry of war), showed Kossuth's feeling on this subject, and characterized the conduct of some of the generals sufficiently. The following are copies of the proclamations referred to:—

“Deberczin, 20th May, 1849.

“The probability of a Russian invasion, and the considerable reinforcements which have lately poured into the Austrian armies, make it incumbent upon the Government, with all its powers, to provide for the defence of the country. On the representations of General Klapka, the

secretary-at-war, I have therefore resolved as follows :

“ The military forces of the nation are to act in concert, and co-operate with the combined plan of defence adopted by the Government.

“ The arbitrary and fanciful character of operations which some commanders, regardless of the direction of the campaign, have adopted, must be done away with.

“ For this purpose, the commanders of forces shall have the general plan of the campaign communicated to them. Each commander will likewise receive his separate instructions, informing him of the part his corps is expected to take in the operations.

“ Immediately after the capture of Buda, or in case of failure, immediately after the establishment of a blockading corps round that fortress and the arrangement of the other corps on the Upper Danube, General Görgey will proceed to this place, to take the lead in the War Office, for the purpose of establishing the preparations for the defence of the country on a broad and solid foundation.

“ The commanders of the various corps have

hitherto taken it upon themselves to remove and appoint officers—grant medals, and to confer orders upon them. For the future, they are bound to appeal to the War Office; and in the higher grades, to the Governor of the country for confirmation. On the field of battle alone, shall the commanders be entitled to reward the merits of individuals, according to the best of their opinion.

“This resolution of the Council of Ministers, and its confirmation by the Governor of the country, shall at once be communicated to the army, and the military authorities throughout Hungary.

“KOSSUTH.”

“THE GOVERNOR OF THE COMMONWEALTH TO
GENERAL KLAPKA.

“My dear General,

“The government has at length arrived at Pesth. The people received us with exulting enthusiasm,—for in our persons they cheered the idea of national liberty and independence.

“I have received your two letters of the 2nd and 3rd June, and reply to them as follows:—

I believe that the plan of operations which you submitted to the Cabinet Council at Deberczin, and which we accepted, was the result of an understanding between yourself and your friend, Görgey; and I had no reason to doubt, but that after your departure for Comorn, this plan would be brought to execution. I calculated the forces under your command to be—

The Garrison of Comorn, . . .	8,000 men.
Kmetty's corps,	4,000 “
Damjanitsh's corps,	7,500 “
Poltenberg,	8,000 “

Making a total of 27,500 men.

“But even if the corps under the command of Damjanitsh, had, for strategical purposes, been ordered to the left bank,—a movement which might always have served to cover Comorn from that side,—I relied on your having still 20,000 men, and that you would have no difficulty in recruiting their strength to the number of 5,000 more.

“But if this is not the case, I confess that I cannot but entertain serious apprehensions, and I must entreat you to come to an understanding

with the Secretary-at-War, and to induce him to a speedy execution of the said plan of operations; for though firmly convinced of the importance of Comorn, I cannot,—if that place is to be regarded merely as a fortress, and not as a great entrenched camp,—but consider it a serious loss that your talents, which require a larger sphere of action, and which in this time of general exertion, are indispensably necessary to the country, should be condemned to the keeping of Comorn, which would be quite as safe in other hands.

“I am in hourly expectation of the return from the Banat of the Minister Vukowitsh. He will have, as one of the results of the recruiting, a corps of from 12,000 to 16,000 men. If this force is to be placed under the command of Bem, there is no objection to its joining our army. But even if they are to join you, it is necessary that your forces be recruited by new enlistments. For this purpose it is indispensable that the War Office, and by means of that office I, myself, am continually to be informed of the numbers actually in the battalions, and of the number of recruits which have been sent

to you. I recommend this affair to your particular notice.

“Under to-morrow’s date, I mean to issue instructions for sending (for the use of your recruits,) 1,000 suits of summer regimentals, for the corps at Comorn, as well as that for Raab. A second supply of regimentals will follow in the course of next week.

“I did not by any means find such an extent of preparations here as I had been led to expect from the promises of Lucáts, &c. But even in the most favourable case, I think it necessary to establish at Comorn a manufactory of weapons and percussion caps, to construct powder-mills, and to set down a commission of equipment.

“For this purpose I recommend to you Mr. Szèkeley, who, you know, is a clever and honest man. If you think you can make use of him as commissioner of goods, or purveyor of stores, I beg you will inform me of it, and I will send him to you.

“The courier has 100,000 guilders for you. The day after to-morrow I shall send you a like amount.

“You will use all your energies in the

construction of the works and fortifications. I will take it upon myself to let you have the money, and the Commissioner Ujházi is instructed to provide you with the labourers and implements.

“As to the question between an offensive and defensive warfare, I am firmly convinced that the longer we delay acting on the offensive, the more difficult will it be to succeed. In the development of resources, the enemy has less obstacles to conquer than we have, especially since the want of weapons is becoming painful. In my opinion, it would have been very advantageous if we had made use of all the time in which the Russian intervention was preparing, for the purpose of attacking the Austrians, who were then isolated, or at least for the purpose of advancing on the Laytha. But whether or not, the latter movement is still advisable, depends upon the powers at the enemy's disposal. If the statement of 15,000 men on the left, and 25,000 on the right bank, be true, we might indeed, by a prompt and energetic movement, attack them on either shore. I propose to confer on this matter with Görgey.

“But the most important point of the operations is, that Comorn may be placed in a most efficient state of defence.

“General Lahner has sent several thousand muskets to Comorn, to be repaired; but I do not believe that your factory will suffice to do the work with sufficient dispatch. If such be the case, you will please to send a part of these muskets back. I mean to put them into the hands of the Pesth gunmakers.

“General Lahner has likewise sent 500 cwt. of saltpetre to Comorn, to be used in the fabrication of gunpowder. Your powder mill is still to be built—when can it work? I think General Lahner would have acted more judiciously if he had sent this transport of saltpetre to some place where the powder mills are actually at work. Whenever yours is so, I will take care that you are plentifully supplied with materials.—Yours sincerely,

“KOSSUTH.”

“Pesth, June 7th, 1849.”

The energetic appeals thus issued by Kossuth, from the most sincere desire for unity, offended the pride of the generals, who had acted here-

tofore independent. Perczel and others, whilst they recorded their protest against it, declared that this measure tended to invest the Secretary-at-War with a plenitude of power which was calculated to make him a prey to the most dangerous ambition.

Harmony and mutual confidence alone could save the young state. Mistrust and suspicion poisoned every nerve of its existence. The instigators and abettors of such an opposition could never surely have thought of the unavoidable and destructive consequences of the same. Their egotism, their stubborn pride, and untamed passions, paved the road for the events which led to the destruction of the country.

At the time that an invasion of the Russians might have been anticipated with tolerable certainty, the Hungarian army counted altogether 135,000 men, with 400 cannons. The enemy of all descriptions, Austrians, Russians, Saxons, Croats, Servians, and Wallachians, amounted to about 307,000 men—nearly double their number. To meet these forces, in addition to the regular army, it was suggested that the population in the villages, hamlets, and

towns, could be armed with scythes, sickles, and lances, and other weapons, and might thus offer a formidable resistance. Thus arrayed, united, and resolute, the nation would have been invincible, and ready to meet the stroke of fate with good heart. Thus thought Kossuth, who, although no soldier, had yet, in a surprising degree, the ability to rouse the masses of the people, and to influence and direct them to noble purposes, and that he would have brought out the strength of the nation as a whole, leading them to victory against the enemy, is certain if he had been properly and cheerfully supported by his subordinates.

The plan for the defence of the country had been fixed on at a Council of State, on the 12th May. The principal idea of the same was to distribute the forces of the country in such a manner that they might be equally effective in bringing the contest to a favourable issue, by one bold, general, and decisive blow, or by constantly avoiding a general engagement to the great disadvantage of the enemy, wearing out his strength, and compelling him to submit from exhaustion. In conformity

with this plan, it was resolved to make the fortress of Comorn a fortified camp for a garrison of 30,000 men, to stop the advance of the Austrian army. General Aulich was despatched with 20,000 men, to take up a position at the river Neutra ;—his right wing to keep up a communication with General Dembinsky, his left with the garrison of Comorn. His instructions were to watch the enemy's movements on the left side of the Danube, to cover the mining district of the mountain cities, and, after having acquired reliable information relative to the intentions of the enemy, by forced marches, according to circumstances, to effect a junction with either the garrison of Comorn, or with General Dembinsky ; in fact, to strengthen one of these two armies, so as to be able to quit the defensive position, and to effect an offensive retreat in the face of the enemy, as circumstances might render either expedient or necessary. General Dembinsky's orders were to occupy the mountain passes in Upper Hungary, supported by General Aulich, and to throw the chief of his army upon the Russians, advancing by the road

of Arva, and after defeating them in the narrow mountain defiles, to concentrate his whole strength against the second Russian army advancing upon Hungary, by the road of Dukla. To enable him to follow out this plan, General Dembinsky received the command over numerous detachments from the north-western districts. If the Russians, instead of advancing by Arva, should push forward the strength of their army on the road towards Eperies and Pesth, Dembinsky and Aulich were instructed to collect their forces in Miscolcz, and their line of retreat was marked out towards the Tissa, in the direction of Türed.

The blockade of the fortresses of Arad and Temesvár, and the protection of the Banat and the Bácska, were entrusted to General Perczel, who, with this view, held the command of the half of his own troops and of the whole of Vecsey's corps, whilst General Bem was ordered to lead his own troops, and the other half of General Perczel's division, towards Titel, to take this place, and to liberate the fortress of Peterwardein, by drawing after him the rest of the besiegers towards the right banks of the

Danube, he then was to return advancing along the shores of the Danube upwards, crossing the stream, at a suitable place, to plant the Hungarian colours upon the right banks of the Danube, to effect a junction with the corps of Colonel Kmetty, and to open his communication with the garrison of Comorn. His line of retreat was by Ofen, in the direction of the main body of the Hungarian army, the command of which he was to assume. Ofen having been taken, the division of Kmetty was to advance upon the Platten Lake, to organize the general rising of this part of the country, and then to join the army of Bem.

The reserve was to form at the Tissa, and there to wait for further orders from headquarters. General Czeecz was charged with the command in Transylvania, and was instructed to suppress the revolt of the Wallachians, to take the fortress of Carlsburg, and to prepare the defiles on the frontiers and in the mountains. This plan was for the most part adhered to, with only a few alterations, till the beginning of July, when Görgey took it upon himself to make a considerable change in it.

We shall give one of the many instructions which Kossuth at that time sent off to the different generals, and which are so characteristic of the events which took place.

Whilst Görgey, after the taking of Ofen, moved by very slow marches towards the Upper Danube, General Haynau took the command of the Austrian troops, superseding General Welden, and he stood with the chief of his army, and a strong reserve of Russians, under the command of Panduine, in position at Presburg. General Grabbe, with a Russian corps was advancing slowly against the mountain towns, in the mining district. The great Russian army, under Field-Marshal Paskewitsch, stood at Dukla, ready to break into Hungary at a moment's notice. 40,000 Russians, under Lüders and Grottenhelm, advanced towards Transylvania. From the Banat, where Perczel's former victories were now unfortunately followed by several defeats, the Bann Jellachich, and his Croats were advancing.

The reader will thus observe that all these formidable masses of the combined Austrians

and Russians, endeavoured to concentrate at one point, towards the centre of the country, to force the retreating armies of the Hungarians to a decisive battle in the plains of Middle Hungary. The Hungarians fought with their accustomed bravery; nevertheless they were always pressed backwards with great loss. Not to tire the reader by repetitions, we must direct his attention respecting the war operations, and the events which followed, to the sketch given in this book of Görgey's life, and we shall only introduce a few letters from Kossuth to Klapka, which may serve to explain the events a little better.

After Poltenberg had evacuated Raab, and the Hungarians had been thrown back upon Comorn, Görgey sent a short and very cool report to the government, stating that it would be impossible for him to cover the capital; and that Kossuth and the government might, therefore, seek protection within the walls of Comorn, or they might select another place themselves for their sittings. To this was added a report from the government commissioner, Ludwig, dated from Görgey's camp, in

which he described the existing danger in a most exaggerated and excited manner, most probably dictated by his personal fears; but which, unfortunately, was sufficient to induce the government to adjourn the diet. All magazines and stores were ordered to be carried further back into the interior, and Görgey was recalled from the command, in consequence of the earnest and pressing representations of Perczel and Dembinsky. The motion to recall Görgey, was carried at a Cabinet Council, at Pesth, on the 1st July, and Kossuth communicated the same by letter to Klapka, as the general highest in rank of those who stood under the direct command of Görgey. The letter was as follows :—

“ Pesth, 1st July, 1849.

“ My dear General,

“ Görgey has broken his word, which he pledged to a Minister of State and to two generals. He shall remain Secretary-at-War, but the chief command cannot be allowed to remain another moment in his hands. The Field-Marshal-Lieutenant, Meszáros, has been appointed to that post. Perhaps Görgey may

refuse to obey it; if so, that would be infamous. It were treason, as indeed was the breach of his promise, and his blind submission to Bayers' influence, is already akin to treason. General! the liberty of our country, and the liberty of Europe depend upon there being at this moment no dissensions, no party quarrels in the army. In you I recognize a Roman character. Our country and our liberty above all! Support General Meszáros. My reasons I mean to communicate to you in another letter. God and history will judge us. I am sure, General, I shall not be deceived in you.

(Signed) "KOSSUTH,

"Governor of the Commonwealth."

The second letter above referred to was intended as an official circular to be directed to all commanders of the different divisions. Kossuth at the same time appointed Klapka commandant of the fortress of Comorn, addressing him the two following letters:—

"THE GOVERNOR OF THE COMMONWEALTH TO
GENERAL KLAPKA.

"By these presents, I inform you that by the authority which the country has given me,

and with the consent and assent of the Council of Ministers, I have this day, in the name of the people, appointed the Field Marshal Lieutenant Lazarus Mészáros to be Commander-in-Chief of all the troops of our country. And with these presents, I decree and ordain in the name of the people, that the armies, corps, divisions, garrisons of fortresses, and all other forces, whatever their names or denominations may be, shall yield an unconditional obedience to the orders and instructions of the said Lazarus Mészáros, and shall consider it their bounden duty to recognize him, the said Lazarus Mészáros, as their lawful Commander-in-Chief; and whoever shall act against his orders, that man is, and shall be considered, a traitor to his country.

“In the name of liberty and the people, I summon you by your patriotism, of which your heroism and devotion have given such signal proofs, that you shall see this decree punctually executed by your corps, and do all you can to preserve the union, which, in the present dangerous moment, can alone save our country, and indeed the liberty of Europe, and to co-operate now, as you did formerly, for the

salvation of our country and of liberty, with your accustomed fidelity, loyalty, heroism, and disregard of all personal feelings; and for the same I give you the thanks of the country, the high rewards of self-esteem, and the verdict of history, with my sincerest respects,

“The Governor of the Commonwealth,

“LOUIS KOSSUTH.

“For the Secretary-at-War.

“SZEMERE,

“President of the Council.

“Pesth, July 1st, 1849.”

The news of his dismissal as Commander-in-Chief, reached Görgey just after his glorious victory of the 2nd July, and made thus a very unfavourable impression as well upon him as upon the troops under his command; a deputation was appointed by the latter to represent to Kossuth their complaints. Kossuth after hearing them, agreed that Görgey was to retain the command of the army of the Upper Danube, but he was to resign his office as Minister of War, and to acknowledge Meszáros as Commander-in-Chief of all the Hungarian troops.

After the battle of Acs on the 11th July, the

government demanded that Görgey should retire upon the Tissa and join Dembinsky and Perczel, and Kossuth ordered Klapka in the following letter to see to the execution of these instructions, but the intrigues of Görgey's supporters defeated every attempt to see the orders of government obeyed.

“THE GOVERNOR TO GENERAL KLAPKA.

“Citizen and General,

“I give you this name because I wish to express what I expect from you in the name of the country—namely, civic virtue. If you obey its dictates, you will save the country.

“You will remain at Comorn, with 18,000 men in the fortress and the camp. General Nagy Shandor will lead the other corps down the river. By defeating the enemy, you have executed my wish, to concentrate the army on the Lower Danube, to be capable of execution.

“We will the more stand by this resolution, since we have obtained possession of Arad, and with it 66 guns, 2,000 cwt. of gunpowder, and 1,500 muskets.

“The captured officers perpetrated excesses at Debreczin, for which the people slew them.

"Within forty-eight hours we are able to concentrate 8,000 Honvéds and four divisions of hussars for General Perczel.

"For the time, and whenever you stay in the fortress, Asserman is placed under your command.

"Confidence and perseverance.

"The Governor of the Commonwealth.

"LOUIS KOSSUTH.

"SZEMERE.

"Pesth, 3rd July, 1849."

It cannot be denied that Kossuth, by his presence in the camp, would have effected more than by simply sending these letters; for although Görgey was well liked by the soldiers, still such was the profound respect for Kossuth, that his influence, wherever he could by his personal presence, bring it to bear, was paramount. It was much to be regretted that Kossuth's friends, in an ill-judged zeal for his safety, prevented him from joining the camp, which was the only step which might have saved them and the country.

On the 14th July the government was at Szegdin, but soon this place also had to be

left for Arad. Kossuth's resignation and his last proclamation to the people, will be noticed more fully in the sketch of Görgey; we need not dwell upon it here. From Arad he went to Orsova and Teregova, and from thence into Turkey.

The Hungarian cause meanwhile had excited a degree of sympathy with the Turks, Greeks, and Albanians, never before known among these people. The Turks looked upon the Hungarians as anti-Russian heroes, and believed in a relationship by blood, on their part, with the Magyars, and of which they now boasted, and in spite of all the agitations and intrigues of the Greek priests, and the Roman Catholic bishops, the Christian inhabitants of the south and west, declared loud their sympathy for a nation which had been bold enough to rise against oppression, and to oppose a brave front in the field against the combined powers of Austria and the Czar.

The most strange reports respecting the war were in circulation in Turkey, but the names of Kossuth and of Bem were those generally named in connection with the last struggle. Kossuth in particular was revered as a wise

and impartial judge and statesman, and as a brave warrior. His brilliant qualities were increased by a thousand different reports associated with the name of Bem, with every thing which was honourable in a patriot and a leader. It may truly be said that since Bonaparte's time no individual has had such a wide-spread reputation in the Orient as Kossuth. Only along the Danube, where the Bulgarian and Servian element predominated, these sympathies were expressed less decided.

Widdin, where Kossuth first resided, after entering the Turkish territory, is a fortified place, on the Danube, and has, besides other fortifications, a kind of citadel, or inner town. In this Kossuth's dwelling stood. A high wall, with large oaken gates, separated it from the street, or rather from a kind of triangular market place; the dwelling consisting of one single room, formerly the visiting-room of the landlord, whose other rooms were in the interior of his harem. This room had but poor comforts. Colonel Asboth, General Dembinsky, and an interpreter, were the only persons here with Kossuth, and for whom the room

was just large enough. Cushioned seats ran along three sides of it, which at night served for beds for the president, his secretary, and the interpreter. Three plain wood chairs, and a small card-table, were the only pieces of furniture, and even these the landlord had put in out of particular regard for his renowned guest. The host was chief of police. A Turkish officer was constantly with Kossuth, and accompanied him when he took his walking exercise; whilst, when he preferred to take a ride, a horse soldier followed at a short distance. Under the pretext of watching over his safety in his solitude, and to do him the honours proper to his rank, a guard was stationed at the house, and it was only after repeated complaints on his part that a better residence was given him, the property of the daughter of a former Pasha. At first Kossuth felt very much depressed in spirit. He did not go out, and did not show himself at all in the camp before the town, where the soldiers suffered a great deal, as they only received victuals, but no blankets nor clothing, nor firewood, nor even straw for beds, and the cold was severe,

so that in a short time no less than 360 of the 5,000 men died of the cholera. Kossuth would not go among them, as he could not promise them anything—at that time, not even personal safety—and he had no wish to make any promises, the strict fulfilment of which he could not guarantee.

Truly heroic was his conduct at Widdin, whilst he was in utter uncertainty about his own fate, and when almost every body supposed that the fugitives would be delivered up to Austria. Being pressed by the Turks, like almost all the chiefs of the emigration, to take the turban, and thus to escape the danger of being turned over to the Austrians, he, with his wonted energy, stated at a council held specially at his house, that he did not wish to dictate to any one of his compatriots, what to do in this dilemma—that every man's religious convictions were a matter that rested only between himself and God—that, consistently with that sincerity and truth, to which he had always rigidly adhered, he could hold out no hope that if they rejected the offer now made them, their extradition could be averted, and that if

given up to Austria, he knew that cabinet too well, to allow them to cherish for a single moment the illusion that mercy might be extended to them. But, nevertheless, he, for his own part, would, if asked to abjure the faith of his forefathers, through the terror of the executioner, welcome rather the gibbet or the block. Kossuth concluded this manly address, by denouncing the tongue which should dare to propose to him anything so infamous!

On September 20th, Kossuth addressed a letter to Lord Palmerston, of which the following are the most interesting passages:—

“Many of my brethren in misfortune had preceded me on the Turkish territory. I followed thither, in the hope that I should be permitted to pass to England, and there, under the protection of the English people—a protection never yet denied to persecuted man—allowed to repose for a while my wearied head on the hospitable shore of your happy island.

“But, even with these views, I would rather have surrendered myself to my deadliest enemy, than to cause any difficulties to the Turkish

government, whose situation I well knew how to appreciate; and therefore did not intrude on the Turkish territories without previously inquiring whether I, and my companions in misfortune, would be willingly received, and the protection of the Sultan granted to us.

“We received the assurance that we were welcome guests, and should enjoy the full protection of his Majesty the Padisha, who would rather sacrifice 50,000 men of his own subjects, than allow one hair of our heads to be injured.

“It was only upon this assurance that we passed into the Turkish territory, and according to the generous assurance given, we were received and tended on our journey, received in Widdin as the Sultan’s guests, and treated hospitably during four weeks, whilst waiting from Constantinople further orders as to the continuation of our sad journey to some distant shore.

“Even the ambassadors of England and France, to whom I ventured, in the name of humanity, to appeal, were so kind as to assure me of their full sympathy.

“His Majesty the Sultan was also so gracious as to give a decided negative to the inhuman pretensions of our extradition demanded by Russia and Austria.

“But a fresh letter from his Majesty the Czar arrived in Constantinople, and its consequence was the suggestion sent to us by an express messenger of the Turkish government, that the Poles and Hungarians, and in particular myself, Count Cassimir Batthiányi, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Hungary under my government, and the Generals Meszáros and Perczel (all present here), would be surrendered, unless we chose to abjure the faith of our forefathers in the religion of Christ, and become Mussulmans. And thus five thousand Christians are placed in the terrible alternative, either of facing the scaffold, or of purchasing their lives by abandoning their faith. So low is already fallen the once mighty Turkey, that she can devise no other means to answer or evade the demands of Russia.

“Words fail me to qualify these astonishing suggestions, such as never have been made yet to the fallen chief of a generous nation, and

could hardly have been expected in the nineteenth century.

“My answer does not admit of hesitation. Between death and shame the choice can be neither dubious nor difficult. Governor of Hungary, and elected to that high place by the confidence of fifteen millions of my countrymen, I know well what I owe to the honour of my country, even in exile. Even as a private individual I have an honourable path to pursue. Once governor of a generous country, I leave no heritage to my children—they shall, at least, bear an unsullied name. God’s will be done. I am prepared to die; but as I think this measure dishonourable and injurious to Turkey, whose interests I sincerely have at heart, and as I feel it a duty to save my companions in exile, if I can, from a degrading alternative, I have replied to the Grand Vizier in a conciliatory manner, and took also the liberty to apply to Sir Stratford Canning and General Aupich, for their generous aid against this tyrannic act. In full reliance on the noble sentiments and generous principles of your Excellency, by which, as well as through your

wisdom, you have secured the esteem of the civilized world, I trust to be excused in enclosing copies of my two letters to the Grand Vizier, and Sir Stratford Canning.

“I am informed that the whole matter is a cabal against the ministry of Redschid Pasha, whose enemies would wish to force him to our extradition, in order to lower it in public estimation, and render impossible its continuance in office. It is certain that in the Grand Council held on the 9th and 10th September, after a tumultuous debate, the majority of the council declared in favour of our extradition, the majority of the ministry against it. No decision was come to, in consequence of the altercation which took place; but, notwithstanding, the ministry thought fit to make us the revolting suggestion I have named.

“This mode of solving the difficulty would not, I am convinced save the ministry, because the protection only given in contradiction to the Sultan’s generous feeling, at the price of five thousand Christians abandoning their faith, would be revolting to the whole Christian world, and prove hardly calculated to win sym-

pathies for Turkey in the event of war with Russia, which, in the opinion of the most experienced Turkish statesmen, is approaching fast.

“As to my native country, Turkey does, I believe, already feel the loss of the neglected opportunity of having given to Hungary, at least some moral help, to enable it to check the advance of the common enemy. But it appears to me that it would be a very ill-advised mode of gaining Hungarian sympathy by sending me to an Austrian scaffold, and forcing my unhappy companions to abjure their religion, or accept the same alternative.

“No friends to the Turkish government would spring up from my blood shed by her broken faith, but many deadly foes. My lord, your heart will, I am sure, excuse my having called your attention to our unhappy fate, since it has now assumed political importance. Abandoned in this unsocial land by the whole world, even the first duties of humanity give us no promise of protection, unless, my lord, you and your generous nation come forward to protect us.

“What steps it may be expedient that you

should take, what we have a right to expect from the well-known generosity of England, it would be hardly fitting for me to enter on. I place my own and my companions' fate in your hands, my lord, and in the name of humanity throw myself under the protection of England.

"Time presses—our doom may in a few days be sealed. Allow me to make an humble personal request. I am a man, my lord, prepared to face the worst; and I can die with a free look at Heaven, as I have lived. But I am also, my lord, a husband, a son, and father; my poor, true-hearted wife, my children, and my noble old mother, are wandering about Hungary. They will probably soon fall into the hands of those Austrians who delight in torturing even feeble women, and with whom the innocence of childhood is no protection against persecutions. I conjure your Excellency, in the name of the Most High, to put a stop to these cruelties by your powerful mediation, and especially to accord to my wife and children an asylum on the soil of the generous English people.

"As to my poor, my beloved, and noble

country—must she, too, perish for ever? Shall she, unaided, abandoned to her fate, and un-avenged, be doomed to annihilation by her tyrants? Will England, once her hope, not become her consolation?

“The political interests of civilized Europe, so many weighty considerations respecting England herself, and chiefly the maintenance of the Ottoman empire, are too intimately bound up with the existence of Hungary for me to lose all hope. My lord, may God the Almighty for many years shield you, that you may long protect the unfortunate, and live to be the guardian of the rights of freedom and humanity. I subscribe myself, with the most perfect respect and esteem,

“L. KOSSUTH.”

Kossuth having spent two years in Turkey, during which time he was carefully guarded, but otherwise treated most kindly and respectfully, he and his compatriots were at last liberated through the influence and energetic exertions of Great Britain and North America. The kind reader who has followed us thus far, will be fully informed by the press of this

country of his hospitable and encouraging reception at Southampton, Winchester, London, Birmingham, and Manchester. Of his visit to the United States, and his return to England, they are also well acquainted; it is not our intention to swell our book with a recapitulation of facts so well known. As we have already stated, Kossuth's mission is not yet finished; it is reserved to future history to be his judge.

We have passed purposely over events, which, perhaps, some may feel inclined to disapprove of. Every light, even the sun has his spots; Kossuth undoubtedly has his foibles, but then how greatly they are counter-balanced by his brilliant qualities as a statesman, a patriot, and orator. The wonderful course which he has run to the present time, we may take as a sign that providence has reserved this noble patriot for a more elevated position, but not in the sense of Austrian conception. May he succeed in liberating his country from perjured, blood-thirsty Austria. The thanks of millions of free citizens will cheer his after-life, and his memory will be blessed from generation to generation!

GÖRGEY;

OR, THE TRAITOR'S DREAM.

IF the denouement of the great Hungarian revolution was gloomy and terrible, the first picture accompanying these pages, representing the man who inflicted the death-blow to Hungary's freedom, is not less so: it is that of the notorious traitor *Görgey*, by whose treacherous means was brought about the fearful termination of the glorious struggle for national liberty and independence.

In carefully reading the history of the Hungarian contest for freedom and national independence, it will be found that among the leaders of the Hungarian revolutionary movement, and especially of the war operations, the most interesting and enigmatic individuality was that of the generalissimo *Görgey*. Before entering into the narration of his deeds during

the revolution, we will furnish our readers with a brief sketch of his person, and some biographical particulars, previous to the outbreak of that revolution.

Arthur Görgey, of Toporecz, descends from an ancient race of Hungary. He is the third son of a noble family, and was born in the comitat of Zips, in the year 1817. He was already, when a student, one of the most talented pupils of the Protestant school at Käsmark. At the age of fourteen he entered the pioneer school at Tulln, in Lower Austria, and when eighteen years old, he, with his elder brother Hermann, entered the Hungarian noble life-guard, garrisoned in Vienna. Whilst the elder brother gave himself up to those pleasures, which a metropolis alone can afford, and being afterwards, in consequence of the many debts he had contracted, compelled to retire from the life-guard, Arthur continued to be the most steady officer of the corps. He conversed very little with his comrades; nay, even with his chamber-fellow. He was always extremely reserved, and whilst his comrades rode, or otherwise amused

themselves, Görgey remained at home reading military, technical, and other scientific books. He was careless in his person—almost always shabbily attired. After his comrades had in vain tried every means of withdrawing him from his seclusion, they at last desisted, contenting themselves with mocking him—calling him cynic, philosopher, and closet-scholar. Görgey took no notice; he went on prosecuting his studies as usual. The young men now sought a quarrel with him. He was obliged to fight a duel with a couple of his comrades; but when they found that he knew very well how to handle his sword, they at last let him entirely alone. Finally, when the time of examination came, Görgey was not only acknowledged the foremost in military and other sciences, but likewise the best fencer, horseman, and marksman of the Hungarian life-guard; so that the military court-council, in acknowledgement of his abilities, not only conferred upon him the rank of second-lieutenant, according to custom, but upon his withdrawal from the life-guard, that of first-lieutenant; he then entered the Palatine hussars, No. 12. Here

he led the same studious life as previously in Vienna, in the life-guard. He frequented no coffee-houses, no *soirées*, but entirely devoted himself to the acquirement of scientific knowledge, so that, when he afterwards quitted the service, he, for a length of time, practised in the chemical laboratory at the University of Prague, and wrote an excellent treatise on the effects and preparation of the oil of the cocoanut, and its application to pharmaceutics. The professors soon recognised his prominent talent, and the university offered him the chair of chemistry, when the cause of liberty called him back to his native land.*

Görgey's exterior was as extraordinary as his character. He was a strong, bony, tall, broad-shouldered man; his look was usually

* There are different opinions why Görgey left the Austrian army; some say that Görgey felt himself slighted because Prince Windischgratz did not appoint him his aide-de-camp, when he was Commander-in-Chief in Bohemia, and although he was recommended for this appointment by the Colonel of his regiment. Others say that first Lieutenant Görgey had the misfortune to have both his horses dying suddenly, and the officers of his regiment well knowing that Görgey was only poor, raised a subscription to provide him with other horses. This well-meant act roused the pride of the man, and he left the regiment because he would not be assisted by his brother officers in this way.

sullen; his eyes mostly cast down, except when speaking to a person; he would then fix them upon his hearer, with the keenness and fixedness of the snake, casting its fatal glance upon its prey, the more easy to secure it. His nose has an upward tendency, his lips projecting, which gives him somewhat the look of a Mulatto. His restless eye of light grey, is exceedingly penetrating: he wore spectacles, being short-sighted. His hair was always closely shorn, and that is why the chief commissary of the government, Ladislaus Csány, never called him otherwise than the "*Round-head*." His voice was rather deep and powerful; he spoke very slowly, as if to affect an inward calmness. His words, whether spoken in Hungarian or German, were always carefully chosen; his delivery was manly and dignified, and devoid of all gesture. Over his lips would frequently hover a smile perfectly sardonic. His bearing was so imposing, that nobody ever thought of gainsaying him. In private life he was easy and natural, fond of listening to jokes, occasionally contributing some of his own, at which others very soon felt his supremacy

over them. He only indulged in exotic amours, and in those very inconstant. His wit was mostly subtle and biting, but sometimes, though very rarely, his puns became heavy. He treated those around him either as his enemies or his servants: he was a friend to none. All were either to obey him or tremble before him. Once an enemy, he was so for ever. In his plans he was obstinate and headstrong; he rigidly kept his own secrets, whilst he would, for the sake of a joke, often expose those of his subordinates.

He was now, as a general, just as cynical in his dress as when an officer in the life-guard. He wore an old shabby uniform of a Honvéd superior officer, buttoned close up to his neck, and a common cap on his head, tight pantaloons of coarse cloth, and high hunting boots. He kept very few horses for his own use, commonly two carriage and three saddle horses. He himself always rode a bay-coloured English steed. He often joked with the private soldiers, and spoke to them in their own plain language; but was excessively severe to them when on duty. He never spared his men; he sometimes obliged

them to march five, six, even eight miles* per day for several successive days. Neither did he spare his officers and soldiers in battle: all were to go forward, and woe to those who were not at once in the thickest of the storm, for he cut them down with his own sword; but it must be owned he set them all a good example, being always in front, and where the greatest danger prevailed; where the shower of missiles was the most dense, there he was to be seen perfectly calm and phlegmatic. In the heat of battle, he in fact knew no danger. He would occasionally become enraged, and then his voice thundered—his eyes sparkled, giving him the appearance of a demon. He was so extremely strong, that his body seemed impregnable to all disease. At the beginning of the campaign, Görgey was very temperate, both in eating and drinking, but he afterwards became a hard drinker. During the first part of his campaign, viz., from the end of September, 1848, to the beginning of March,

* A Hungarian mile contains 28,800 feet, and is, therefore, equal to about six English miles, the Hungarian foot is also larger than the English.

1849, he never undressed himself, always sleeping in an arm chair, even continuing to do so when he returned from Deberczin, where he was invested with the commandership of the first, third, and seventh division of the Hungarian army, and nominated Minister of War. When he, at the beginning of October, 1848, separated himself from General Perczel, and arrived at Parendorf, he was asked what was his opinion about the Hungarian army invading the Austrian territory; whether his advice would be to do so or not? He replied, "As you ask me whether we shall march into Austria, and wish to have my advice thereon, I answer most decidedly—No! But should the government order me to lead the army thither, I will do so, and we shall not be beaten."

Görgey never pardoned any one who considered any of the other Hungarian generals equal to himself. He did not even deem himself flattered when compared with Napoleon: of course with Napoleon the great, and not Napoleon the little.

Such was the man into whose hands the fate of Hungary was the longest deposited. Our

readers will see what use he made of his talents to discharge the trust reposed in him. I will now relate his acts.

When the rebellion of the Raitzens in the Banat and in the Bács comitat broke out in June, 1848, and the country found itself in want of weapons to arm the ten Honvéd battalions, to be newly organized, Görgey, as a man of experience, was commissioned by the Hungarian ministry to provide the required arms; he consequently proceeded to Liège, in Belgium, where he ordered the best weapons for the Hungarian southern army; he then returned, towards the end of August, to Hungary, and was appointed major of a Honvéd battalion, in the small corps on the river Drava, destined to oppose the invasion of Jellachich. Toward the end of September, after the battle of Pákoz, he was placed under the command of Perczel, who was to prevent the junction of the Croats under Roth and Philipovics, with the rebellious Bann Jellachich, whilst another detachment (a larger one) of the army, under Moga's command, was pursuing the retreating Jellachich. At that time Görgey

was commander of a division of Perczel's corps on the island of Csepel.

On the 30th September, 1848, the peasants of the Stuhlweissenburg comitat, caught two men distributing among the troops of the general levy (Landsturm), and the national guard, Jellachich's proclamation, and endeavouring to persuade both the people and the armed forces of Hungary, to become faithless to their country, and to pass over to the Bann. Those two instigators were the Counts Eugène and Paul Zichy; the first, administrator of the Stuhlweissenburg comitat, under the previous government; he was generally known as one of the most violent re-actionists. He harboured Jellachich in his castle, accompanied him to Stuhlweissenburg, where he issued illegal orders against the Hungarian government. He was, in short, an enemy of the people and traitor to the country; and was, moreover, surprised as a spy and secret emissary. Both the Counts Zichy were handed over to a patrol of hussars, which immediately conducted them to their commander, Major Görgey, who at once had them tried by court-martial under his own presidency.

The martial laws inflicted death by strangulation for the crime Eugène Zichy had been guilty of, and which he,—being taken in the act—could not deny; he was accordingly sentenced and executed, whilst his nephew, being to a certain degree only the unwilling accomplice of the traitor, was acquitted. This punishment was not only necessary, but just, and quite in accordance with the law, though represented as a cruelty by the enemies of Hungary.

Soon after, on the 3rd October, the rear guard and the right wing of the Croats, under the command of Generals Roth and Philipovics approached, taking the road along the lower Danube, through the Tolna comitat. A detachment of Roth's division marched on Ozora. Perczel ordered Görgey not to engage in any contest with the enemy, but to remain with his van-guard in his present position. Perczel soon perceived that Görgey would become a dangerous rival to him, and indeed, on that very day, he (Görgey) showed how little he cared for, or respected the orders of his superior; his disobedience was, however, crowned with

such happy success, that it afterwards led him to be bold and more daring. Caring but little, as we have said, for Perczel's orders, he abandoned his position and entered the forest of Ozora; here he left the men of the general levy behind in reserve, and with 125 hussars of the Wurtemberg regiment, No. 6, marched onwards through the glade. Upon this small troop issuing from the forest, they perceived, at a distance of about 1,000 paces, the Croats formed in battle array. They numbered 1,500 men (infantry), with a six-pounder battery. Philipovics was their commander. They were posted behind a ditch whose scarp was only two feet, but its width upwards of six. When the hussars perceived the enemy, they drew their sabres, and, with Görgey in front, rushed upon the Croats, who, when they saw those few hussars, startled, and, of course, took them for a mere van-guard of an advancing corps. Görgey called to Philipovics to surrender his arms, as Perczel was closely following him, and indeed a noise of drums resounded from the forest, which proceeded from the 400 men of the general levy, whom Görgey had left there.

The stratagem succeeded, and the 1,500 Croats laid down their arms, without having fired a single shot, and were led to Perczel as prisoners of war. Meanwhile Perczel, on hearing that Görgey had, despite of his positive order, abandoned his post, became furious against him, and intended to have him shot ; but the successful result of Görgey's expedition caused Perczel to overlook his act of insubordination. From this moment, however, it was easy to foresee that those two officers would never work well together. Görgey now went to Pesth, and requested Kossuth to remove him to another corps. He then was promoted to the rank of colonel, and sent to the army of the Upper Danube, under Moga's commandership. In the battle of Shwechat (October 30th, 1848), he commanded the centre, and was, after the retreat of the Hungarians to Presburg, appointed general in Moga's place. Here he remained up to the 16th December of the same year.

The six weeks of Görgey's stay at headquarters in Presburg, gave ample time to purify the army of its black-yellow elements, viz., Austrian adherents.

Several minor engagements, as those fought near Laitha Neudorf, on the isle of Petschen, near Presburg, at Sandorf, Gallbrunn, Nádas and Jablonitz, caused Görgey's corps to be in a continued warlike training, and some advantages gained now and then, inspired the young warriors with courage and self-confidence.

Görgey now resolved to remove from his corps all the men who were hitherto mere volunteers, national guards, and men of the general levy; in consequence of which several battalions volunteered to become Honvéd battalions, and were left in the corps, all the others being dismissed by Görgey; so that his corps, which at the battle of Shwechat numbered 38,000 men, was now reduced to about 15,000, with 80 pieces of ordnance. The line occupied by this corps was a very long one; it extended from Oedenburg to Nádas, about 13 Hungarian miles (78 English). Colonel Széter was at the left wing, near Oedenburg, with two squadrons of hussars, and one battalion of national guards, and at the right wing Ordódy, with 6,000 men; the centre was commanded by Görgey himself.

On the 15th December, 1848, Prince Windischgrätz entered Hungary, with an army of 90,000 men, simultaneously at three different points. Széter was thrown back upon the centre; Ordódy abandoned his good position near Nádas, and by so doing, occasioned Guyon's defeat near Tyrnau. Meanwhile the main army of the Austrians, under the personal conduct of Windischgrätz, broke in near Bruck upon the Laitha. The next day a hot engagement ensued at Parendorf, between the Hungarians and the Imperialists. The former resisted until sunset, and then retreated in two columns, in the greatest order. Görgey was himself present, and retreated with the right wing towards the towns Hungarian Altenburg, and Wieselburg, whither he was followed by Széter, and where likewise minor engagements took place, up to Raab; whilst the centre, under Aulich, marched to the isle of Schütt, and Guyon, with the remnants of his division, *via* Szered.

Two days after the engagement of Wieselburg, Görgey left Raab, which, on account of the rivers, the Danube, the Raab, and the Robnitz,

being frozen, was untenable ; and after having secured a junction with the centre under Aulich from Comorn, he faced the pursuing enemy near Bábolna. The engagement that ensued was rather a skirmish than a battle, the issue of which was unfavourable to the Hungarians, a battalion of the regiment of the Prince of Prussia, being for the most part taken prisoners. Very few of those brave men were able to fight their way through, and to reach Görgey's army. Görgey himself retreated towards Comorn, and arrived before that fortress on the 24th December.

The plan of operation of the Hungarians was then as follows :—Görgey was to retreat with his corps of 25,000 men, and 80 pieces of ordnance, towards Buda ; Perczel, who after his successful campaign in the isle of Muraköz, was still encamped there, received the order to join with his corps of 8,000 to 9,000 men strong, and 42 pieces of ordnance ; the corps of Görgey, with another corps of 10,000 men, gathered at Pesth and its environs, composed of volunteers and men of the general levy, was likewise to join, so that the main forces of the

Hungarians would have numbered altogether to about 54,000 men, with nearly 140 pieces of ordnance. Here, in sight of Buda, this army was to venture a pitched battle against the Imperialists. The Hungarians had every chance on their side.

Simultaneously, when Görgey with his corps on the Upper Danube arrived at Raab, Perczel reached Pápa, five miles distant from the former town, but meanwhile Görgey had left this town also, and the consequence was, that the junction of the two corps was for the present frustrated, but to be accomplished hereafter. Görgey was encamped at Pilis Bicske, Perczel near Moór, and between those two generals, the enemy. Perczel was ordered to risk, at any price, a battle against the Austrians, and he was obliged to do so with the presentiment of certain defeat. Near Moór he faced the five-fold numerically superior forces of the enemy. Görgey heard the cannonading, and when his officers asked him, whether he would not hasten to the assistance of Perczel, he smilingly replied : "Perczel undertook the battle, he will fight it out." Perczel had

always hitherto been victorious, a fact which annoyed Görgey, who now was glad at the prospect of his rival losing his laurels. The battle of Moór, as might have been expected, was lost; Perczel's disbanded corps were compelled to fly in disorder towards Pesth, and it was only due to the Czriny battalion commanded by Major Bangya, that the whole of Perczel's artillery was not lost. This gallant battalion covered the retreat.

After this battle, Görgey very precipitately marched from Pilis Bicske, by mountainous roads towards Tétény, about twelve English miles from Buda, where he met a division of the enemy under General Lederer, which he at once, on the 31st December, attacked, and after a short engagement put to flight: whereupon he turned towards Buda, and left that city on the 3rd January, 1849, which had likewise been abandoned by Perczel, a short time before; and who was hastening towards Szolnock and Deberczin, whilst Görgey was marching towards Waitzen.

At Waitzen Görgey summoned his superior officers to a council of war, and declared unto

them that neither he nor his corps would longer submit to the orders of a government too weak and spiritless to be obeyed, but that he had henceforward resolved to continue the war according to his own judgment. In this spirit he issued a proclamation to his troops, in which he not only declared himself inimical to all those entertaining republican opinions, but threatened them with condign punishment.*

He now effected his really masterly retreat in a manner not unworthy even of a Napoleon, with a series of engagements through the whole of his route, all of which he sustained against an enemy greatly superior in force. He proceeded to the mountainous towns, especially to Kremnitz, Schemnitz, and Neusohl, from whence he carried away all the gold and silver, and thus rescued it from the rapacious hands of the Austrians. He several times fell into such straits, surrounded by enemies on every side, that no other choice was left him, but either to break through the enemy at the risk of a considerable loss of life, or to surrender his arms; and it was his genius alone

* See in the appendix the proclamation of Waitzen.

which saved him from such a dilemma. Between Schemnitz and Neusohl, where he was encompassed from all sides by the enemy, he marched with his 20,000 men, and 80 pieces of ordnance, through a tunnel passing through a mountain. He accomplished this masterpiece at night, leaving to the Austrians nothing but a distant view of his corps, now beyond all reach. Near Ipoly-Ságh, Schemnitz and Windschacht, Guyon, the commander of his (Görgey's) rear guard, had an engagement, and near Turesek, Aulich, with his van-guard, where the priest Hurbán, with the Slovak hordes, incited by the Austrians, was totally beaten, and his corps disbanded and scattered.

At last, towards the end of January, Görgey entered the comitat of Zips and Leutschau, from whence he dispatched Guyon with a division of 3,200 men, and 19 pieces of ordnance, which formed his van-guard, who, on the route leading to Eperies and Kaschau, had fought two victorious battles near Igló, and the mountain Braniszko, and thus was enabled to rejoin the corps d'armée of Dembinsky, and effect a junction with that of Görgey's.

Nearly five weeks had elapsed since the evacuation of the capital, Buda-Pesth, by the Hungarian government, and the flight of the diet to Debreczin, without the government, or the Committee of Defence even guessing where Görgey, with his corps d'armée, could be (for he had never forwarded any report to the government), so that, when the two commissaries, Baron Paul Luzzenski and Ferdinand Ragály, were sent by the government to Görgey, they only found him at Leutschau. Up to that moment nothing but the most singular rumours about Görgey's march and whereabouts had been spread. It was already believed that his corps was either entirely destroyed by the Austrians, or made prisoners, when suddenly the tidings of the triumph near Braniszko, reached Debreczin.

It was during the time of this complete ignorance of the position of Görgey, that the Hungarian government conferred the command of all the corps in Hungary upon General Henry Dembinsky, recently arrived from France. This appointment so vexed Perczel, that he quitted the army. Klapka likewise had no

great confidence in Dembinsky, but he nevertheless submitted to his orders. The following order was issued by Görgey relative to this appointment :

“ORDER OF THE DAY.

“The decree of the Minister-of-War, of the 12th February, 1849, has put the army on the Upper Danube, under the command of Lieutenant-General Dembinsky, and changed the name to the Royal Hungarian Corps D'Armée, No. 16.

“Announcing this officially to my late division, I have to request all officers and commanders to look upon this apparent humiliation with the same *sang froid* with which I renounce the command, and my independent position ; and I further request that they will, one and all like me, obedient to the decree of the assembled diet, voluntarily submit to the command of Lieutenant-General Dembinsky, who, it is said, is a very worthy General, grown grey in the wars.

(Signed)

“GÖRGEY.”

In placing Dembinsky at this crisis over Görgey, especially after the most masterly

winter retreat of the latter, by which the whole prospect of the campaign had been changed for the better, it must be owned the Hungarian government committed a great mistake. Görgey, however, when the news of Dembinsky's appointment as generalissimo reached him, in no-wise followed Perczel's example ; he said nothing, seemed not even surprised, not angry, but put himself, apparently in all good will, under the supreme command of the Polish warrior. Görgey well knew that if he openly showed himself Dembinsky's antagonist, and refused to obey him, he would by so doing not only irritate Kossuth, the government, and the diet against himself, but that factions, moreover, would form themselves in the army in favour of Dembinsky, and that his own party might possibly be out-numbered.

Such was the state of affairs till the end of February. On the 26th and 27th of that month the great pitched battle near Kápolna, was fought,* when the whole Austrian forces under Windischgratz, 70,000 strong, (and which on the second day of the battle were joined by the

* See the illustration of the battle of Kápolna.

corps of Schlick, amounting to 10,000 men,) were faced by the Hungarian army, composed of the whole first, and a part of the second and seventh corps d'armée, together 40,000 men.

It was the greatest and most obstinate battle fought during the war of independence in Hungary. The Hungarians did not lose ground a hair's breadth before an army numerically twice as strong. The battle remained undecided, but there is not the least doubt that it would have been completely gained by the Hungarians, had Kmetty received in time the order to join the army, with his division of 3,800 men and 23 pieces of ordnance, and had Görgey not delayed his own arrival. The Hungarians abandoned their position on the hills at night, and withdrew to Mezö-Kövesd, without being pursued by the enemy.

The Austrian army only pursued the Hungarians on the 28th February, towards noon, on their march through Szihalom towards Mezö-Kövesd, but the Austrians were compelled, after a short cavalry engagement, to retreat with a loss of four guns and a considerable

number of men, without daring to again molest the Hungarian army on that day.

During this battle a most melancholy event occurred in the Hungarian army, from which an idea may be formed of Görgey's temper. A captain of hussars named Géza von Udvarnoky, once Görgey's comrade in the life-guards, having got a little intoxicated, charged the Austrian cuirassiers too far in advance, so that a couple of Hunyady hussars and Captain Alexander Asböth were obliged to fetch him back. Upon his return to Kövesd a quarrel ensued between him and Major Baier, Görgey's favourite, about some cuirassier horses, just at the moment when Görgey happened to pass by. The latter ordered Udvarnoky to release the horses, and not to attack the enemy again; but upon his not submitting to the injunction, being about to renew the attack, Görgey called for a patrol to arrest the captain; Udvarnoky resisted, and knocked one of the soldiers down. Hereupon Görgey became enraged, and yelled to the patrol "Shoot that dog!" He was obeyed. Thus Görgey did not even spare the friend of his youth. The

only circumstance that can at all justify him is, that the event took place during the heat of battle; but even then, the captain could have been overpowered by numbers, and brought before a court-martial. Had the latter passed sentence of death upon him, Görgey would have had one blood-stain less upon his soul. Udvarnoky's melancholy end occasioned two more deaths. His uncle and aunt, when they received the sad tidings of the death of their beloved nephew, both suddenly died broken-hearted on the next day, and were buried in one and the same grave with him. By the side of the road leading from Erlau to Mezö-Kovesd the passers-by can see the sepulchres of the victims of Görgey's blind rage and unrelenting temper. When a Hungarian happens to pass by their resting place, his mind is oppressed with the remembrance of Görgey's first homicide, perpetrated on one of his comrades, and a curse involuntarily falls from his lips against the destroyer of his country.

But to return. On the following day, (March 1st) the Hungarian army under the commandship of Dembinsky, marched towards

the river Theiss. This march through marshes, was a very dangerous one; the enemy faced Dembinsky near Eger-Farmos, and it was only the perseverance and the heroism of the Hungarian Honvéds that saved the artillery from being lost. In the night of the same day, the Hungarians entered Tisza-Füred, after having crossed the Theiss, whilst a brigade of cavalry under Hertelendy, occupied the enemy, until the whole Hungarian army had passed the long dyke of Paroszló. The next day Hertelendy's brigade likewise crossed the Theiss.

Upon the three corps, viz., the 1st, 2nd, and 7th being assembled at Füred, Görgey went to the respective commanders of the divisions and brigades in order to seduce them to himself, he thus contrived to get up a mutiny against the Commander-in-chief, Dembinsky. Görgey's creatures: Pöltenberg, Zákò, Damaszkín, Hermann and Stephen Görgey, his two brothers, Cornelius Görgey, his cousin, Major Baier, and others, collected votes of censure against Dembinsky, whom Görgey accused of having lost the battle of Kápolna through blunders; that through his incompetency the artillery was

nearly all lost at Eger-Farmos; that he possessed neither military capabilities, nor the least topographical knowledge; that he acted everywhere and always arbitrarily, never convoking a council of war, nor consulting with the other commanders of the army, &c., &c. But he said nothing of his own late appearance in the field, and which very properly was looked upon as the cause of the loss. He shows his true character, however, in the work published by him, where he boasting says in reference to this case:—"If I had been Dembinsky, I would have had Görgey shot!" He moreover went so far as to place a guard at the door of the Commander-in-Chief, and seized upon the registers of the operations, until Kossuth's arrival, who was to determine whether Dembinsky should continue or not to be entrusted with the general commandership of the army. All the superior officers and commanders, Guyon excepted, backed Görgey. Dembinsky seeing this, resigned his post.

Meanwhile the main army was re-inforced by the 3rd corps d'armée, which on the 6th March, 1849, gained at Szolnok a brilliant

victory over the Austrians, by the gallant General Domanovich, and General Ottinger. Marches and counter-marches now followed, and lasted three entire weeks. At last the whole Hungarian army moved on against the Imperialists: the 2nd and 7th corps towards Gyöngyös and Hatvon, and the 1st and 3rd towards Tápió Bicske.

Now followed a series of victories unheard of since Napoleon's time. The Austrians were defeated in nine successive battles: at Tápió Bicske, Isaszegh, Hatvan, Gödöllő, Waitzen, Czinkoto, on the Rákos-field, near Saró, and Comorn, where the Austrian army was almost entirely destroyed. Windischgrätz and Welden lost their commandership, and the disbanded Austrians fled to Presburg. Görgey was now everywhere the fêted hero, and was called the redeemer of the country. Kossuth nominated him Minister of War and Generalissimo. He afterwards also intended to bestow upon him the title of Field-Marshal Lieutenant, and the decoration for valour of the first class, but Görgey refused to accept of either the latter distinctions, saying, "As long as one enemy

remains in Hungary, I do not deserve any such distinction." He despised the barren title and the decoration; for, had he not now in his own hands, the power he aspired to possess? He now would have thought himself humbled by accepting anything from the hands either of Kossuth or of the government.

After the triumph near Comorn, obtained by the Hungarians on the 25th April, followed a phase in the Hungarian war, which up to this moment remains inexplicable, viz., the siege of Buda, the motive and reason for which, and the suspension of hostilities after so many advantages obtained, are quite incomprehensible.

The treachery of Görgey can almost with certainty be dated from that siege.

The manner in which the siege of that fortress was conducted, as well as the operations of the main army, during and after that siege, were such that, it really seemed as if he did all that laid in his power, to lose the fruits of previous victories. The siege began on the 2nd May, and so carelessly was it carried on, that there was a superabundance of needless things, whilst there was an entire

absence of actual necessities ; thus, by the stance, at the commencement there were scarcely any battering guns, but in lieu thereof plenty, of cavalry (7,000 hussars), which at a siege is scarcely of any service ; nay, almost entirely superfluous. Buda could not be taken otherwise than by storm, or by a *coup-de-main*, as indeed it was on the night between the 20th and 21st May, but which could have been accomplished just as well on the first as on the last day of the siege. Add to this, that the 7th corps d'armée, commanded by Pöltenberg, was the only one which Görgey sent in pursuit of the enemy up to Raab. Here the said corps, some skirmishes excepted, remained quite inactive, from the 28th April to the 24th June, viz., for two entire months ; whilst the 8th corps, under Kosztolányi, merely manœuvred, without fighting even skirmishes. Finally, after the taking of Buda, Görgey still remained there for more than a week inactive ; and even when he at last started, he advanced only by short daily marches up the left bank of the Danube, whilst at the same time a Russian corps of 26,000 men, under Paniutine, invaded

remains territory, and made its junction with the such divisions near Presburg.

On the left bank of the Danube, several in greater or lesser engagements now took place, until the 20th June, when the battle of Pered was fought; on the first day of which, towards the evening, the Austrians were repelled, but Görgey left the enemy during the whole night, and part of the next day, in perfect peace, only moving on at 10 o'clock, a.m.

An obstinate contest, like that at Kápolna, now began. The Hungarians were compelled to give way before the more than two-fold numerically superior enemy, and retreated towards Comorn, whilst Pöltenberg too, was expelled from Raab.

Görgey then wrote to the government, that he could not one day longer answer for their safety, nor for that of the capital; he, therefore, recommended Szegedin as the place to which the government ought to remove their seat.

Görgey now clearly appeared to Kossuth in the light of a traitor. A cabinet council was immediately held at Pesth, in which it

was resolved to withdraw from Görgey the general commandership of the army.

Prior to the government leaving Pesth, Csányi wrote a letter to Görgey, in which he besought him, not to sacrifice the cause of the country to his hatred of Kossuth; but Görgey took no notice of the letter. He from that moment seems to have only busied himself with the plan of overthrowing the government, and of negotiating with the Russians. Hungary had already had a verdict passed upon her by the traitor; his plans formed, he only now had to carry them out. Hungary was destined to fall the victim of hatred between Görgey and Kossuth and the other members of the government; for Görgey heartily despised all those who were not soldiers, and even the latter he was by no means attached to. He only wanted passive tools around him; hence he persecuted Guyon and Nagy Shandor, as well as all those who had not blindly submitted to him. Prompted by hatred and envy, he had been hitherto but Kossuth's enemy, a vain, ambitious soldier, but now he was to become a traitor.

The Hungarian government resolved upon a plan, which under the then circumstances, a more foolish one could not have been imagined, viz., the appointment of Mészáros instead of Görgey, as commander-in-chief of the Hungarian army. Now, Mészáros was one of the most honest men in the world, and a true patriot, but at the same time, the most unfortunate military commander in the Hungarian army; he never commanded but in two battles, and those he lost. Mészáros steadily refused to accept the offered commandership, remembering his previous want of success; but the Government insisted upon his at least provisional acceptance of it, until the arrival of Bem from Transylvania, upon whom the commandership would then be conferred; and it was under such conditions that Mészáros at length accepted the appointment.

Görgey mentioned this nomination to his staff with many commentaries thereupon, which provoked roars of laughter. Many of the superior officers abused the government and the civilians in general, were a target for all the witty arrows of Görgey's camarilla. But Görgey

himself got furious. The wine which his friend Colonel Baier plied him with, still more inflamed his temper. In the outbursts of his passion he gave utterance to an expression which startled not a little the few who still preserved some good feeling for the government, but whom fear kept silent. "I see," said Görgey, "that the rabble wants the knout, it shall not fail them; we will soon play at nine-pins, and knock them all down." (By the rabble he meant the government and some generals.) A hearty laugh followed; his words seemed to have been received with general approbation. Champagne had by this time so heated their brains, that the presence of the government commissary, John Ludvig, did not prevent them from openly expressing their mutinous designs; nay, Colonel Baier went so far as to have Ludvig arrested, merely to show the civilians how they ought to be treated by the military authorities. Ludvig was a coward: he did not even dare to protest against such an arbitrary procedure, nor to inform the government of it, which in his person was so glaringly insulted.

Meanwhile the enemy already stood between Acs and Neu-Szöny, in the sight of Comorn and the Hungarian army. Thereupon Görgey suddenly issued the order for all to be in readiness, as he should attack the enemy on the next day. His order was fulfilled; all thought they were on the eve of a great battle, but very few hoped for a triumph, as the combined Austrians and Russians were numerically twice as strong as the Hungarians; they rather expected a defeat like that of Pered.

On the 2nd July, the 2nd and 7th corps were already arrayed on the right bank of the Danube. The 3rd soon followed them, and the battle-array of the Hungarians amounting to 37,000 men; with 132 pieces of ordnance, extended itself from Alt-Szöny to Igmánd. The Russians and Austrians together, reckoned 70,000 men with 230 pieces of ordnance, and were therefore again, as at Pered, both in men and artillery two-fold as strong as the Hungarians; the latter, nevertheless, first began the attack and pushed the enemy back to the forest of Acs, where a tremendous contest ensued. Very soon, however, considerable

detachments, both of Russians and Austrians, were sent thither from the centre of the enemy's line; so that the right wing of the Hungarians was compelled to retreat. Soon after, the enemy occupied several redoubts, and already an unfavourable turn of the battle seemed to menace the Hungarians, as only their centre and their left wing still kept the ground, and would also soon be obliged to retreat, for the right wing once repulsed, the Austrians and Russians would have fallen with all their forces upon the centre and the left wing. The right wing had already lost a battery, whose gunners defended themselves with their sabres to the last drop of their blood,—all were massacred to the last man. Thereupon, Görgey made his appearance on the battle-field, on his foaming English bay-horse, with a white plume waving from his round hat, and a red velvet Attila. His eyes seemed to emit fire. He certainly, at that moment, looked a second Hadúr—the Magyar god of war. His stentorian voice resounded through the ranks of the Hungarians, and rising above the cannonade of the enemy, and the well-known shout of "*Előre Magyar !*"

(Forward Magyars) coming from the mouth of Görgey, brought the already flying hussars to a halt.

The issue of this battle was for the Hungarians, and especially for Görgey, a most glorious one. The enemy was repelled with great loss, and Hungary triumphant.

Görgey himself received a sabre wound on the back of his head, which obliged him to keep his bed for several days.

Whilst by this victory Görgey was elevated in the eyes of the army, the government in the same proportion lost its popularity by their having intended to deprive him of the commandership.

Görgey's camarilla now intended to strike a blow at the government and Kossuth.

On the 7th July, Colonels Baier and Assermann repaired to the camp, and summoned the superior and subaltern officers to solemnly proclaim Görgey, in spite of the government, generalissimo. At that time the first corps d'armée under Nagy Shandor, which had pronounced itself for the government, was then at Bátorkeszi, several miles from Comorn,

and the officers of the 2nd, 3rd, and 7th corps alone proclaimed Görgey generalissimo, with the exception of the Colonel of the Hunyady Hussars, who openly protested against such an illegal act, but he was left in the minority. Assermann and Baier now returned to Comorn in triumph. Torch-light processions, serenades, and every other possible ovation was offered up to Görgey, more in defiance of the government than anything else.

All this was witnessed by the government commissary of Comorn, Ladislaus Uiházi, a man of republican opinions, of austere character, with a heart ardent for his fatherland. He at once went to Klapka, who was then commander of the fortress, told him what he had seen, and asked what was to be done. Klapka said that he also very reluctantly went yesterday with Baier and Assermann to the starredoubt, where the officers had proclaimed Görgey generalissimo, but that a double motive had impelled him to go thither; the first was, his desire of avoiding the suspicion of Görgey, who could remove him from the command of Comorn, and secondly, because he was desirous

to know how the officers were disposed, and whether there was really any reliance to be placed in them; he moreover added that he suspected Görgey of some foul plot, but that he (Klapka) would to his last breath remain faithful to his country and the government. A courier was sent by Uiházi and Klapka to Kossuth at Szegedin, to acquaint him with what had happened in Comorn since the flight of the government from Pesth.

Meanwhile the Austrians, who were beaten on the 2nd July, re-appeared before Comorn. Görgey's treacherous plan was now to break through the united Austro-Russian army, and to remove the theatre of war to Austria; to take Vienna, and to continue his operations in the rear of the enemy. Such a plan was replete with ruin, especially at a time when the enemy was stronger than ever, and would never have suffered Görgey to operate in his rear. Görgey and the Hungarian army would have been crushed between two corps of the enemy. This plan was formed purely in a spirit of contradiction to the government, which had required him to make a junction with Dem-

binsky's and Perczel's corps at Szolnock, or nearer to Pesth. There is no doubt that by such a plan of operation, Görgey designed the ruin of his country.

The Hungarians, on the 11th July, attacked the Austrians and Russians in the forest of Acs, in order to break through their line. Klapka commanded in that battle; he foresaw its unfortunate issue, but was obliged to co-operate, much against his will, in the carrying out of a plan projected by Colonel Bäier. This struggle was a fierce one; the Hungarian troops fought with wonted bravery, but it was in vain, for they were repelled, with considerable loss of life.

At length the whole Hungarian army of the Danube crossed the river, and thus left the right bank, and went over to the left. Görgey, who now was enabled to leave his sick bed, made preparations to leave Comorn with the greatest part of his army, whilst Klapka remained with the 2nd and 8th corps in the fortress.

Instead of taking the shortest road from Comorn to the Theiss, in order to rejoin Dem-

binsky and Perczel, Görgey took a route in quite an opposite direction. This march was nothing but a combined treachery, for it was calculated to demoralize and destroy the army by sheer exhaustion.

On the 12th of July Görgey marched from Comorn towards Waitzen, where he fought for two days against the Russians, who were repulsed on the first day ; but Görgey now did as he had previously done at Pered, viz., took no advantage of the success ; for, instead of pursuing the retreating enemy, he allowed the latter to attack him the next morning, the result of which was his defeat. He was therefore obliged to continue his retreat. Instead of hastening from Waitzen to Turà, where Dembinsky was fighting against Paskewitz, he marched northwards towards Rétság, where he again suffered the enemy to attack him, and then marched on towards Vadkert and Rima-Szómbath. Contests now took place daily between the Hungarians and Russians. At Rima-Szambath Russian negociators made their appearance in Görgey's camp, summoning him to surrender his arms. The Russians began to

fraternise with the Hungarians : Görgey and the Russian generals mutually fêted each other. Rüdiger sent Görgey a present of a pair of pistols, in the barrels of which (as it is supposed) were secreted Russian despatches. The treason was only now really hatched. All the subsequent encounters were but preconcerted games between Görgey and the Russians. Thus the army of Görgey reached Gesztely, about five English miles from Miscoltz, on the 25th July. The first corps d'armée, under Nagy Shandor, was encamped at Dobsza, about eight English miles from Görgey's army. Near Gesztely, on the river Sajó, Görgey fought against the Russians, who were repulsed, with great loss of life, to Miscoltz, and would have undergone a defeat, had Nagy Shandor's corps co-operated in the battle ; but Görgey purposely detached it, knowing that Nagy Shandor and his corps had remained faithful to the government, and that he saw through his dark plans. Görgey could therefore neither trust Nagy Shandor nor his corps.

Already in the evening of the day on which the battle of Gesztely had taken place, the 7th

and 3rd corps crossed the Theiss at Tokay, and all the three corps were on the next day, concentrated at Nyir Egyháza.

In order to help our readers better to understand Görgey's combined treachery, we will here take a survey of the strength and position of the Hungarian army, as it then stood.

The Hungarian army amounted then, the general levy excluded, to 160,000 men. In Transylvania, under Bem, a corps of 24,000 men; Perczel and Dembinsky stood near Szegedin with 42,000 men; Vetter approached from the Bácska with 18,000 men; Kazinczy was at Beregh and Ungh with 12,000 men; Görgey on the Theiss with 20,000; the garrison of Comorn was 24,000 men strong; the rest formed the garrison of Petervardein, Arad, and Munkács; finally 2,000 men near Tisza Fűred, under Korponay, who afterwards joined Görgey.

A glance at the map of Hungary will render the treachery of Görgey as clear as noon-day. We will just now sketch the route Görgey, after his crossing the Theiss, ought to have taken,

and point out the one he did take, his purpose being not to arrive in time.

In marching during the 27th and 28th, he would have reached Deberczin on the 29th, —and on that day reposed,—on the 30th Berettyó Uifalu, on the 31st Gross Wardein, on the 1st August Szalonta, on the 2nd Simánd, on the 3rd Arad, and on the 4th Temesvár : marches which Görgey's army could easily have accomplished, nay, as we have already seen, much more could have been done.

Görgey on the contrary marched thus : he first rested at Nyir Egyháza for three entire days, viz., up to the 29th July ; Nagy Shandor's corps only arrived on the 1st August, at Deberczin, the 7th and 3rd at Vármos Pércs, about six English miles from Deberczin ; Nagy Shandor was attacked on the 2nd by the Russians and defeated ; and although Görgey heard the cannonading, he did not hasten to his assistance. The corps of Nagy Shandor, after having lost a great many men, fled to Gross Wardein, where he again joined Görgey. From Gross Wardein Görgey marched slowly towards Arad, where he only arrived on the

9th August, on the very day the battle of Temesvár between Dembinsky and the Russians took place, the result of which was the total defeat of the Hungarians.

Görgey had everything so cunningly arranged, that he held both the Hungarian government and the Russians in check. He kept them both in vague suspense, which a mere accident was to decide.

He, however, already from Nyir Egyháza sent a courier to Kossuth, then at Szegedin, with a despatch, in which he portrayed to him the hopelessness of the case and the demoralization of the army, and at the same time represented to him the necessity of entering into negotiations with the Russians. Meanwhile one of Kossuth's couriers returned from Görgey's camp. He was again sent thither with a despatch from Kossuth, in which Görgey was urged to hasten his marches towards Arad and Temesvár. This courier hastened back to Görgey, and found him on the 3rd, at night, at Kis-Mario, thirteen miles from Gross Wardein. Görgey, as usual, laid on a sofa dressed, his head enveloped in a blue linen handker-

chief, which he had worn ever since he was wounded near Comorn, on the 2nd July, whilst two of his aides-de-camp were already in bed. It was late after midnight when Kossuth's courier brought him the despatch; he gloomily perused it, and thus addressed the courier: "Those gentlemen ought not to allude even to the possibility of a victory, for all is lost. Tell Kossuth that his beloved Nagy Shandor has been totally defeated, and that in the short time of a fortnight there will be neither an army nor a revolution in Hungary." And upon the courier telling him that he laboured under a mistake, in believing that Nagy Shandor's corps was entirely destroyed, as he had only a short time ago left him—that it could not be denied that the Hungarians had really undergone a defeat, but that their loss was not so great as had been reported, and that the corps had again rallied, Görgey angrily replied: "Well, relate it then to Kossuth as you know it." On the next day, the courier found Görgey at Bihar, only half a mile distant (about three English miles) from Gross Wardein, and where he (the courier) met the

whole camarilla of Görgey, dreadfully abusing and deriding both the government and Kossuth. The said courier likewise brought some reports of victories gained by Bem, and related that he had been told by General Dezsewffy, that Klapka, having made a sally from Comorn, had entirely defeated the Austrians.

It is indeed one of the most singular coincidences, that on the very day, when Klapka made his famous *sortiè*, on the 3rd August, from Comorn, the tidings of it should have been, in all its minutest details, spread in the Hungarian army 400 English miles distant, without a railway or telegraph.

When Görgey heard the courier relating all that, he snubbed him with the following words : —“ Do not spread in my camp such ridiculous reports, and tell Kossuth not to send me such humbug placards about *Bum*.” (By *Bum* he meant Bem, whom he ironically called *Bum*.)

When the courier was about to leave for Arad, Colonel Baier detained him, and told him in confidence that his eyes were now open, that he had fallen out with Görgey, and that it was quite certain that the latter intended to nego-

tiate with the Russians, and to surrender arms ; moreover that he proposed to overthrow the government, and deliver its members to the Austrians. "There is only one way," added he, "to prevent such a catastrophe—let the governor Kossuth furnish me with an authorization, and that modern Wallenstein (meaning Görgey) shall find his Butler." Baier further related to the courier all the interviews of Görgey with the Russians, as well as that he (Görgey) had already received a portion of the reward for his treachery ; that the army was entirely demoralized, that the march and the retreat had already cost the lives of 8,000 men, and that Görgey deluded the army with idle hopes, so that the troops themselves wished for negotiation and pacification.

Meanwhile, in consequence of Görgey's letter to Kossuth, the ministers, Count Casimir Batthiányi and Bartholomew Szemere, were sent into the Russian camp to Paskewitz, in order to negotiate on behalf of the government. But both Batthiányi and Szemere were kept back. Görgey then sent Pöltenberg, who brought from the Commander-in-Chief the

reply, that negotiations for peace would be concluded with Görgey himself; whereupon Batthiányi and Szemere returned without success to the government.

The courier communicated to Kossuth what Baier had told him, to which Kossuth replied, "I cannot employ men upon whom I cannot depend, men who are now for me, and then for Görgey; besides, I have not the least desire to save my country by assassination. Görgey is a traitor, he will sell his fatherland." This was on the 15th August.

An unfortunate accident happened about this time at Szegedin, by which the *morale* of the Hungarian troops was not a little shaken; this was the explosion of a large powder magazine. Different opinions prevailed as to the cause of this disastrous event. Some ascribed it to culpable negligence, others went so far as to attribute it to treason. The army suffered in consequence the loss of a great quantity of ammunition, and it had also the effect of shaking the confidence of the troops, leading them to suspect treachery in some quarter.

Szemere, as premier, moved in the name of the diet, the equal rights of all nationalities in Hungary. If such a step had been taken before, there is no doubt, that Hungary would have been triumphant over Austria and the Russians; but now all that was too late.

What effect Szemere's motion in the national assembly had upon the minds of the non-Magyar populations can be seen from the following circumstance:—Laureani, a delegate sent by Yanku, chief and leader of the Motzians or mountain Wallachs,—who had been for a whole year fighting against the Hungarians, immediately after arrived at Arad, to negotiate the pacification of the Wallachs, offering 40,000 of that race as auxiliary troops to Hungary.

But Kossuth hesitated;—whilst he was negotiating with Laureani, he received a despatch from Colonel Hatvani, acting in Transsylvania, in which it was stated, that having succeeded in surrounding the Wallachs, he could, if Kossuth authorized him so to do, destroy them with one blow. Before Kossuth had the opportunity of communicating with Hatvani, the latter attacked the Wallachs on

his own responsibility, and was defeated and his corps dispersed.

Such was the state of things in Hungary, when on the 9th August Görgey's army entered Arad on the very day of Dembinsky's defeat near Temesvár.

Görgey now repaired to Kossuth and told him that the only means of saving the country, would be to create a dictatorship, and confide it to strong and energetic hands. He solicited Kossuth to appoint him dictator, and was strongly backed in his solicitation by the Minister Csányi, the Bishop Horvath, Vickovics and General Aulich. Kossuth yielded, and after having nominated Görgey dictator of Hungary, resigned his governorship. In his last proclamation to the Hungarian nation, he thus expressed himself:

“After the last blows struck at my fatherland, and after the defeats the Hungarian army have experienced;—after having acquired the conviction that the country is irretrievably lost, I have thought myself in duty bound to concentrate the whole power in one person. I have therefore resigned my office of governor,

appointing at the same time Görgey dictator of Hungary. But in conferring upon him all civil and military power, I nevertheless hold him responsible before God and history for the salvation of the country."

Whatever opinion may be entertained of the propriety of issuing this proclamation at such a period, if we consider the many misfortunes which at once beset Hungary, and the true position of Kossuth, we can find many circumstances which could serve Kossuth as a justification for his conduct.

Görgey, be it remembered, had been cunning enough to concert with Paskewitz, that Kossuth should be informed that he (Paskewitz) would not treat with any one but with Görgey; who, therefore, was able to say that he alone had the power of obtaining, through the generals of the Russian army, the most favourable pacification, and a general amnesty. Görgey also added, that the Russians only wanted to proclaim the Grand Duke Constantine, or the Duke of Leuchtenberg, constitutional King of Hungary, and that Russia would then, with the aid of the Hungarians, soon vanquish Austria.

Such a prospect held out, pleased the whole army and the ministers, who insisted upon Kossuth's resignation, with the view of saving the country. Kossuth could scarcely but be aware that the hypocritical General Görgey, soliciting the dictatorship, would soon become the imperious chief, but surrounded by an army fanatically attached to Görgey, tired of battles, marches, and defeats, and for the most part demoralized, what could Kossuth do ?

After Kossuth's departure from Arad on the 11th August, Görgey turned with his army to the right towards Világos, where he surrendered his arms on the 13th of the month.

We will give in another chapter further details of that frightful catastrophe. Let it suffice here to mention that this is the darkest page not only in the history of the last revolution, but in that of the Hungarian nation. It lost its constitution whose acquirement and perfection was the work of eight centuries, and which it defended against the despotism of the accursed and perjured dynasty of the Hapsburgs;—it also lost the last shadow of popular

freedom. The best men of the land were executed, the country reduced to misery and slavery, and finally abandoned to the wrath of the Austrians.

We entreat our readers not to believe that subsequent facts alone have influenced us in unreservedly condemning Görgey:—but when we bear in mind all that occurred previously to his surrender of arms, and its eventual consequences, it is indeed utterly impossible for any one,—however unprejudiced, or even prepossessed in Görgey's favour;—not to pass upon him the sentence of "*Guilty.*"

Presuming it to be admissible, that Görgey was deceived by the Russians; that they amused him with the idle hopes of a general amnesty;—still he, as generalissimo and dictator,—into whose hands the power of deciding over the destinies of a great people was deposited—committed an unpardonable blunder in laying down his arms before being in possession of proper guarantees for the stipulations entered into with the Russian general, and securing a full amnesty to his comrades. It required, indeed, the credulity of an insane man to surrender his

arms solely depending upon the mercy and generosity of the enemy !

But, on the other hand, it is very singular that if Görgey was really deceived, why they did not execute him, as they afterwards did Vécsey, Dezseffy, Kazinczy, Damianics, who, following his example, likewise surrendered their arms with their respective troops, whilst Görgey not only saved his life, but is enjoying both from the Czar of Russia and from the Austrian Kaiser, a pension.

Futurity must, if it can, justify Görgey's conduct, we now cannot. There is not in Hungary nor in the whole universe, we may say, a single man, who would not accuse him of treachery ; millions of maledictions rest upon his guilty soul. Fate had destined him to be the hero, the redeemer of his fatherland, but his evil genius urged him to be its destroyer.

Görgey's position after the surrender of arms at Világos, can be described in a few words :— After his comrades had been delivered by the Russians to the Austrians, he with Paskewitz entered Galicia ; most probably because he did not deem it safe to travel alone through

Hungary. From Gallicia he proceeded to Carinthia, and settled himself at Klagenfurt, where he leads, it is said, a retired life. He is there quite alone. He occupies himself with natural philosophy, but more especially with chemical studies. He has no intercourse with any one whomsoever, except, perhaps, with the Furies reproduced by the pangs of his conscience, which, during his sleepless nights, bring before his eyes, the spirits of his executed comrades, and other victims of blood-thirsty Austria. We leave him to the gnawings of his own conscience, and to that public opinion which has already judged him accurately.

It now only remains for us to give some descriptive explanation of the illustration, "*The Traitor's Dream*," which accompanies this work. The artist has caught the idea of representing Görgey as a criminal, whom the remorse of conscience is frightfully torturing. Our task of explaining the picture will be an easy one :

Görgey, who occupies the middle of the picture, is surrounded by the phantoms of a horrible dream. He is looking with horror upon a hideous spectre at his feet, which is

grasping him with its left hand, whilst with its right it brandishes a torch as an emblem of hell. The tail of a snake is winding itself around the legs of the traitor. We read the name of the first fratricide "*Cain*," whilst one of Görgey's feet rests upon a sheet of paper, on which the name of Kossuth is written. It was him alone he wanted to tread under foot, and to do so, he destroyed his country. "*Hungaria*" is seen by the side of Görgey, mortally wounded; but the avenging Nemesis throws the serpents of a gnawing conscience at the face of the horrified traitor. To the left of Görgey we recognise the cloven-footed tempter, Mephistopheles, wrapt in a cloak. He is seizing Görgey's arm; his physiognomy faintly resembles that of Görgey, as if it were that of a brother, or a reflection of the traitor's face. Farther off to the left of Görgey, we perceive over *Hungaria's* head the spirits of the executed minister, Csányi, of Count Louis Batthiányi, and of the government commissary, Baron Yeszenák, fixing upon him a menacing and withering look. In the foreground, to the right, a skeleton is issuing out of the ground, enveloped in an amply folded cloak,

a Calabrian-feathered hat on his skull ; in his left hand he carries a flag ; the right one is raised in the air to swear the oath of vengeance ; —it is Gíron, the executed commander of the German legion. Farther off, by the side of, and behind the traitor, we see a Honvéd officer, with his left arm in a sling, and the right one stretched out as if to drag Görgey before a court of justice, there to answer for his crimes ; then a Honvéd hussar, on a snorting horse, about to rush upon the treacherous chief with his sabre. It is, perhaps, intended for the same hussar who, in the battle of Comorn, on the 2nd July, with his sabre, struck Görgey on the head, and who, it is understood, was afterwards killed by the general. Behind Görgey, also, stands a dismantled cannon ; in his rear we see showering upon him balls, shells, bombs, and rockets, emblematic of so many missiles of vengeance ; at the feet of Hungaria is a torn scroll of paper, with the inscription “ *Constitution*,” which Görgey’s treachery destroyed. All this occupies the fore-ground of the tableau.


It is a black, gloomy, heavy night ; thunder

clouds with forked lightning in the distance, which faintly illuminates the surrounding scenery, representing the environs of Világos. We perceive in the distance to the right, a chain of mountains; a gibbet from which are dangling some corpses, almost disappearing behind the dim veil of twilight; they are those of the traitor's former companions in arms, the Hungarian generals, who on the 6th October were executed at Arad, viz., Pöltenberg, Nagy Shandor, Aulich, Török, Lahner, Knezics, Leiningen, Damianics, Vécsey, Ernest, Kiss, Schweidel, Dezsewffy, and Lázár. (The last four sentenced to die by strangulation, were, Austrian-like *pardoned*, viz., to be sent into eternity by the bullet.) Finally, we see the vulture, which has left Prometheus, to regale himself with the heart of the great criminal, surrounded by swarms of birds of prey hovering around the faithless chief.

Such is the happy conception of the draughtsman, which the supposed dream of Görgey furnished him with. Such, indeed, can only be the dreams of a man who has turned traitor to his native land, to the brethren who once

embraced him with love, and to whom he was bound by all which can be held sacred amongst men.

In the course of the explanation of other sketches we shall frequently have to make mention of Görgey, and that is why we have omitted in this sketch of him to describe more fully some of the most important moments and episodes of the Hungarian war of independence.



GUYON.

AMONGST the Hungarian heroes who distinguished themselves by their personal courage, punctual execution of orders, and exploits the most daring, Guyon deserves a distinguished place in our pages.

Richard Guyon descends from an ancient Norman family, which already in Hugo Capet's time produced several heroes. During the French Revolution, in the latter part of the preceding century, the Guyons, who professed royalist opinions, emigrated from Normandy, and settled themselves in Ireland, the birth-place of our hero. He left his home at the age of twenty, in order to enter as a cadet the Austrian military service, viz., the 2nd regiment of hussars, called the Archduke Joseph's regiment, where he was soon promoted to the rank of lieutenant. During the short time of his military service, he made the acquaintance

of the young and pretty Baroness of Splényi, whom he soon married, and then exchanged his military career for a country life.

Guyon leased an estate in the comitat of Barsh, where he, like most of the Hungarian land-owners, led a secluded life, meddling very little with politics. How little did those who knew him at that time, dream that he would be the hero of so many battles!

After the days of March, 1848, when the universal arming was proclaimed through the country, and the national guard organized, Guyon was elected major of the national guard, and as such acknowledged by the department of national defence. In the first battle fought against Jellachich near Pákozd, Guyon commanded the 2nd volunteer battalion of Pesth, which, forming the van-guard of the Hungarian army, was the first to fall in with the enemy. This battle gave evidence of Guyon's daring and intrepidity; for, whilst his battalion was, for a short time, withdrawn from the fire, he temporarily entrusted its command to one of his captains, and at the head of the Alexander and Nicholas' hussars effected

a brilliant charge against Jellachich's cavalry, which he soon disorganized and put to flight.

A fortnight after the last-mentioned battle, a camp was pitched at Kittsee,—about three English miles from Presburg,—forming the right wing of the Hungarian Upper Danube army. Guyon was its commander for a few days, but was soon obliged to cede its command, first to Emerich Von Tvánka, and next, (upon the latter being sent to Windischgrätz as Hungarian negotiator, and detained prisoner) to John Von Bárczay.

On the night of October 29th, 1848, the Hungarian army made its appearance before Manneswörth and Schwechat. Colonel Széter was the first who, with a battalion of infantry, and a squadron of hussars, made a nocturnal attack upon Manneswörth; by so doing he merely intended to *reconnoître*, and therefore, when he saw that the place was occupied by the enemy, retired. On the next morning when Bárczon was called to the centre, Guyon undertook the command of the right wing, composed of his own battalion, one battalion of Szeklers, a small detachment of hussars, and

two batteries of artillery. With these troops Guyon was the first who opened the battle against the Austrians, by an attack upon Manneswörth, which he so gallantly executed, that the Croats and Austrians were soon compelled to evacuate the place. He then most valiantly maintained his new position, until the centre having made a retrograde movement, the Hungarians on all points retreated: whereupon he too abandoned Manneswörth, and in consequence of the facing about, now became commander of the left wing.

The bravery Guyon displayed in this battle promoted him to the rank of colonel; but Görgey, who then was nominated general, did not invest him with any command. It was only about the end of November that he was entrusted with the mission of facing the Austrian general, Simunich, who was invading Hungary from the Moravian frontier. Guyon hastened thither, but in consequence of Major Koloman Ordódy's neglect, the enemy succeeded in escaping, the rear-guard only had an unimportant encounter with the Hungarians between Jablonitz and Nádas. But Görgey attributed

the escape of Simunich exclusively to Guyon, whom he already disliked, seeing in him a dangerous rival. Finally, on the 15th December, when the Austrians had invaded Hungary simultaneously from several sides, Guyon was again ordered to hold General Simunich—who had just repelled the said Ordódy from Nádas—in check, until the whole Hungarian army could effect a retreat, and gain a day's march upon the enemy. He was to join Ordódy at Tyrnau, and then to occupy the latter town until the night of December 16th. Guyon marched thither, where, with Ordódy, and the 2nd battalion of Pesth, his detachment would have amounted to 7,000 men, but upon his reaching Tyrnau, Ordódy had already left that place for Szered, and the just-mentioned battalion had not yet arrived, so that he scarcely mustered 1,700 men, with 8 pieces of ordnance, to face an enemy numbering 14,000 men, with 36 pieces of ordnance.

We cannot give the details of the battle of Tyrnau, let it suffice here to say, that the conflict had an unhappy result for the Hungarians; and Guyon was compelled to retreat

with his beaten detachment, only rejoining the main army near Comorn.

When Görgey, at the beginning of January, 1849, left with his army Buda-Pesth, Guyon commanded its rear-guard, which is the most honourable, but at the same time, the most perilous post in a retreat. Every moment Guyon was attacked by the enemy. He gave him battle at Ipoly-Sagh, and repelled him; he did the same on the 18th, near Shemnitz; and on the 20th, near Windshacht, on which day only Guyon's division was fighting. Thus, by Guyon's covering the retreat, Görgey's army safely reached the comitat of Zips, but the enemy was no longer in the rear, but in the front of the Hungarians. Guyon, therefore, was now obliged to advance the first with his division, and thus to form the van-guard. Görgey gave him such an order; for he well knew Guyon's intrepidity, which he especially evinced in the engagements his rear-guard had so gallantly sustained. He thus entrusted him with a post where every chance was against him; for the Austrian general, Schlick, had strongly occupied the mountain Branyiskó,

considered by him to be impregnable. It was confidently expected that Guyon would be repelled. On the 1st February, 1849, Guyon moved with his division, amounting to 3,800 men and 18 pieces of ordnance, from Leutschau, and marched to Igló, where he passed the night, and repelled a nocturnal attack of the Austrians. On the 5th February, Guyon reached Szepes Várallya, from whence, he on the next day, intended to cross the mount Branyiszkó. Görgey granted him three days for the carrying that position; he sent the brigades of Piller and Liptay after him, so that, should that position not be carried in three days by one division, it was to be tried with two. Whilst Guyon was thus marching forwards to accomplish a most perilous task, Görgey was giving balls at Leutschau, and laughing at Guyon's presumption in preparing to take that mountain position. The reactionists, and those functionaries who were for them, now assembled at Eperies, in the house of the pensioned colonel, Czvikk, to consult him as to the feasibility of the Branyiszkó position being taken by the Hungarians. He

unhesitatingly pronounced that position perfectly impregnable, saying, that one single battalion would suffice to repel the whole Hungarian army. It was under such unfavourable predictions, that Guyon reached the foot of the Branyiszkó mountain, which separates the comitat of Zips from that of Sharósh. The approaches to the mountain and its windings were occupied by the Austrians, according to the best rules the military art prescribes. Captain Schulz of the artillery was the first in advance with his guns: the road was excessively slippery, it being a hard frost, and everywhere so narrow, that only two guns could advance in front; but Schulz, encouraging his gunners, succeeded in spite of the most formidable artillery fire of the enemy, to reach a place, where he could take a position, and respond to the enemy's fire. This mutual firing began at 2 o'clock, p.m. The second battalion of Sohl, followed Schulz as an escort of his artillery; its soldiers were mere recruits unaccustomed to war, and when a couple of balls of the enemy fell into their ranks, they at once took to their heels, and abandoning the guns

they were to protect, ran down the mountain, the ammunition wagons and their guns following them. Schulz had hardly ammunition enough to hold his position more than half an hour; he then alighting from his horse, pointed his howitzers himself, and sent into the enemy a couple of shells, which so thinned his ranks, that he did not dare to advance towards the Hungarians.

Guyon, seeing the battalion of Sohl flying down the mountain, at once gave orders to fire with canister shot among the flying men; the artillery officer did fire, but merely with blank cartridges, which Guyon perceiving, commanded him to be in earnest, whereupon the canister shots brought the battalion to a halt. Guyon then approached some officers of the battalion, and pointing his pistol at them, called out: "*Will you advance, or die!*" Then, after having used his sword rather roughly amongst the soldiers, he spurred them with the following words: "*Onwards—double pay. Backwards—canister shots!*" Whereupon the battalion at last renewed the assault up the hill.

The conflict now began to be very serious;

the Austrians held their position with the greatest vigour, and in spite of the ravaging fire of the Hungarian artillery, eight times repulsed the storming Hungarians, and were themselves as many times repelled by the latter. Hereupon a happy idea struck Guyon: he took the trumpeters of the hussars, and of the artillery, to the infantry detachments, and ordering the drummers to remain silent, commanded the trumpeters to play the riflemen's march. Meanwhile the infantry took a circuitous path through the wood of the mountain, in order to fall upon the enemy's left flank. Upon hearing the rifler's march, the Austrians thought that a much greater number of assailants was advancing towards them, and as, at that very moment, they were simultaneously attacked from several sides, they began to lose ground; whereupon the Hungarians pushed on with their bayonets, dislodging the enemy one by one from his various positions, until he at last, after a contest of nearly five hours, took to his heels, and was pursued by Guyon, who at 8 o'clock in the evening reached Siroko, whilst the Austrians only halted at Eperies, which town

they likewise soon evacuated, hastening back towards Kaschau.

The next day, after the carrying of the Branyiszkó mountain, Guyon marched in pursuit of the enemy to Eperies, so that the first patrol of the Hungarian hussars, entered the town, when the Austrians were leaving it. The two brigades, Liptay and Piller, whom Görgey sent after Guyon, found the Branyiszkó already carried, and only joined Guyon at Eperies. Guyon now left Liptay behind with his brigade to await Görgey's arrival, only taking with him Piller, to closely pursue the flying enemy.

When Görgey learned the carrying of the Branyiszkó mountain by Guyon, he burst into loud laughter, and in a fit of ironical humour exclaimed: "We really have more luck, than good sense!" He envied Guyon his unplucked laurels.

Guyon meanwhile advanced towards Torna to meet the Austrian general Schlick, who had been defeated by Klapka near Hidas-Némethi, and had likewise evacuated Kaschau. He met him between Szilas and Szin, where a short

combat ensued between his van-guard, and the rear-guard of Schlick. The position of the Austrians was at that moment so unfavourable to them, that had Piller's column, which had to make a turn, reached in time the rising ground of the mountain near Jósafö, Schlick would have been on all sides surrounded by the Hungarians, and compelled to surrender; but Piller negligently lost half-a-day, only arriving when the Austrians had already reached the hills, and retreated towards Agg-Telck, into the comitat of Gömöre, and thus saved themselves from certain ruin.

Guyon was furious against Piller, and when near Miskóltz, he reached Görgey's main army, he insisted upon bringing Piller before a court-martial, and to have him shot; but Piller having given in his resignation, Görgey let him go without bringing him to justice.

Guyon now again became commander of the rear-guard, and was, together with Görgey, put under the commandship of Dembinsky, under whom he remained until his (Dembinsky's) resignation at Tiza-Füred.

Guyon was at Mezö-Kövesd, when Dembinsky's courier, who ought to have arrived thither on the evening of the 26th February, only reached him on the 27th, at 11 o'clock, a.m. The battle of Kápolna had already lasted one day. Guyon at once marched towards Kápolna, but his appearance on the battle-field was too late, for the Hungarians were then so worsted, that they were unable to continue the struggle with any degree of success; they were then contenting themselves with the defensive. When night set in, they abandoned all their positions and retreated to Mezö-Kövesd, where they took one day's rest, and on the next day marched to Eger Farnos; from thence to Poroszló, and crossed the Tissa.

At the time of Görgey's mutiny against Dembinsky at Tisza-Füred, Guyon, with his division, was the only one who declared himself for Dembinsky, and when Görgey succeeded to make his intrigues against the old Polish general triumphant, Guyon requested Kossuth to remove him from Görgey's army elsewhere. Guyon was one of those heroes who were the

first decorated with the Hungarian order of valour, of the second class.

Kossuth promoted Guyon to the rank of general, and entrusted him with the command of the fortress of Comorn.

Guyon was now to repair to the fortress of Comorn, besieged and surrounded by the enemy, a task which even to a man less known than he was, would have been very difficult. He left Deberczin with some of his suite in the middle of March, and was obliged to take a long circuitous route to cross the Danube, and for that purpose proceeded towards the Bóuska, where Count Casimir Batthiányi arrested him in order to detain him, that his temerity might not drive him into the hands of the enemy. He thus was compelled to make a retrograde move, and to take quite another way to reach Comorn, so that he spent a whole month without being able to enter the fortress, and only did so, when the victorious battle near Gross-Sarló had been gained by the Hungarians. Near O-Gyalla, he encountered a pretty strong infantry detachment belonging to the Austrian besieging corps, which, expecting no danger, had care-

lessly put its arms down. He fell upon it, took a tolerable number of weapons and some prisoners, but the latter he was compelled to release, as a whole regiment of cavalry was at his heels, obliging him to ride for two entire Hungarian miles through marshes and fields overflowed by the waters of the rivers Danube and Waag, through which the Austrians did not venture to follow him. Guyon by wading and swimming, managed to reach Comorn with his small troop of cavalry, where already Colonel Lenkey, as provisional commander of the fortress, had arrived, from whom he now took the command.

Görgey saw Guyon's appointment as commander of the most important fortress of Hungary, with an envious eye, and he soon by dint of intrigue contrived to have Klapka appointed in his room. Guyon thus persecuted by Görgey, was on the point of retiring from the army; and it was only by the most urgent request of Kossuth that he consented to accept the command of the 11th corps in the Bácska, which was first commanded by Perczel, and afterwards by Vetter.

Guyon then proceeded, about the beginning of June, to the southern army, where he soon had the opportunity of gaining new laurels of victory over Jellachich, whom he, near Titel, completely defeated.

As the campaign carried on in the Bácska, will occupy quite a distinct place in our pages, we shall not now enter into its details, especially as in it Guyon was not acting separately.

After Guyon, who was justly surnamed the lion-hearted Richard, had for two months been fighting in the Bácska, he was, towards the end of July, called to Szegedin, in order to join the main army under Perczel and Dembinsky. Guyon accordingly joined them with his corps, 11,000 strong.

Here a council of war was immediately held by Kossuth, in which besides Guyon, the Generals Dembinsky, Kiss, Aulich, Perczel, Mészáros, Lenkey, Schweidel, took a part. At the same time two couriers arrived at Szegedin, one of whom reported that Görgey had crossed the Tissa at Tokay, and was hastening towards Gross-Wardein, to join Dembinsky, whilst the other brought the alarming tidings, that the

Russians were already encamped near Kis-Telek, only twelve English miles from Szegedin. A quarrel in the council arose between Perczel and Guyon, in consequence of which, Perczel resigned his command, and his (Perczel's) uncle Nicholas, who had agitated against Görgey, was arrested by General Damianich, commander of the fortress of Arád.

Whilst the Hungarian generals were quarrelling, the enemy was approaching nearer and nearer to Szegedin, so that the Hungarians resolved upon accepting a battle here. Szegedin, it may be said, *en passant*, is one of the most favourably situated places in Hungary.

The battle was accordingly fought by the Hungarians between the last-named city and Szöreg. Guyon's corps was the only one which faced the enemy to the last, whilst Perczel's and Dembinsky's corps,—the first untrained, the second more than any other demoralized by continual retreats,—soon quitted the field, and the battle, though not a defeat for the Hungarians, ended nevertheless to their disadvantage, inasmuch as they abandoned all their favourable and strong positions, and instead

of continuing their operations on the line between the Danube and the Tissa, they limited them to the line of the river Marosh.

Guyon's corps had been, up to that moment, accustomed only to conquer. It had now lost much of its moral force and self-confidence, in consequence of its having more than any other suffered at Szöreg; coming in contact with Perczel's newly recruited corps, and with that of Dembinsky, it now marched thus ill-conditioned towards Temesvár, where that last unfortunate battle was fought, the final result of which was, the complete defeat and dispersion of the Hungarian army.

When the remainder of that army reached Facset, where Vécsey, with the greatest portion of his army despairing of the national cause, declared himself willing to follow Görgey's example by surrendering his arms, Guyon was one of the few Hungarian generals, who had sense enough not to put any reliance on the promises of perjured monarchs, preferring exile to the tender mercies of the Austrians. He followed with Bem, Dembinsky, Perczel, Mézaros, Kmetty, Stein, and Visoczky, the gover-

nor Kossuth to Widdin, and from thence to Shumla, where he remained up to the arrival of the Hungarian refugees.

Whilst Guyon still kept the field, and was on the eve of entering the Turkish territory, his wife was incarcerated by the Austrians, who did not blush to wage war against unprotected feeble women,—and it is uncertain what would have been her further fate had not Sir Stratford Canning interfered, and succeeded in obtaining her liberation from prison, and permission to follow her husband into exile.

The proposition to pass over to Islamism was likewise made to Guyon, but he declined it, for he did not like to be thought a man who would abjure his faith from fear of being delivered over to Austria. He afterwards, however, entered the military service of the Osmanic empire, and is still a Pasha, without having changed his creed. Guyon is now in Turkey, surrounded by his amiable wife and family, preserving his life to again devote it to the sacred cause of Hungary, for which he has so valiantly struggled, and which is proud to call him her adopted son.

Guyon's exterior is uncommonly prepossessing. He is not above the middle height; his features are regular, and courage, determination, and spirit are strongly impressed on them. He is well-made, and muscular, his nose rather long and curved, a fiery grey eye, and a full fair beard, are the prominent characteristics of his noble race. Guyon is one of the finest horsemen in the world. He speaks very good English and French, but German and Hungarian only imperfectly.

The picture before us represents one of his most brilliant exploits, viz., the carrying of the Branyiszkó mountain, on the 3rd February, 1849. It is the moment in which, rallying the flying battalion of Sohl, he encourages and spurs his men on to a new assault.

THE FIRST HUSSAR IN PESTH.

UNDER this title, we present to our readers one of the most interesting sketches of our work.

The Hungarian army, under the command of Görgey, Klapka, Damjanovits, Aulich, and Kmetty, had at the period to which we now refer been defeated in almost all its movements, and especially, from the total defeat it sustained at Kapolna, become thoroughly disorganized and brought to a dead halt at Tissa-Füred. At this eventful crisis, the Hungarian army crosses the Tissa at Tokay, throws itself quite unexpectedly upon the enemy, commanded by the proud, boasting prince, Windischgrätz, and beats him in five decisive battles. The God of justice had once more given victory to the Hungarian colours, the cowardly murderer of Blum and Sölls now fled before the patriot forces, but solaced himself by sending boasting manifestoes to the court of Vienna. It was,

then, at this period, that the main body of the Hungarian army took the direction of Waitzen, and stormed this town on the 10th April, 1849, Generals Damjanovits and Aulich were ordered with the 2nd corps to make a movement upon Pesth, as a foil for the enemy, in this they were supported by Colonel Asbóth, who advanced by the Szolnak railway. Jellachich and his Croats held the Rakós field, and the quarries near Pesth, and they had also possession of a long line of vineyards, interspersed by pretty villas belonging to the more wealthy of the inhabitants of Pesth. Waitzen having then been taken, a few well directed attacks sufficed to induce the hero Jellachich and his troops to beat a hasty retreat, and thus to leave the ground clear for advance.

The Austrian commander of the retiring troops, assured the inhabitants of Pesth, that if they would permit him to go unmolested, no harm should befall the town or the people. The deluded inhabitants acted upon this assurance, but they soon found out to their cost how an Austrian general keeps his word, the same evening, after the last of the Croats had passed

the splendid bridge of Pesth, a mine was sprung by the enemy, and the bridge was destroyed.

General Aulich's troops advanced nearer and nearer to the town, not knowing of the sudden retreat of the Austrians, he therefore marched with great circumspection, till at last one of his patrols arrived at the inner town, and one bold hussar galloped forward, and arrived suddenly at the national theatre. It was a bold deed, but not dangerous to the brave fellow, for as we have seen, the enemy had flown, and he found himself suddenly surrounded by a joyous multitude. The excitement of the people at seeing the Hungarian uniform again, knew no bounds. His horse was decorated instantly with garlands of flowers, and in lack of more flowers, the ladies threw the ribbons from their bonnets, handkerchiefs, gay shawls, etc., at him. One young, beautiful, noble, and patriotic lady, after having heartily shaken him by the hand, presented him, as a token of her joy and respect, with her costly bracelets. On the right hand of the bold and bewildered rider, we see an enthusiastic young man, it is

the brave patriot, Vásvaryi, who afterwards found an honourable death in Transsylvania.

Pesth now looked like a town inhabited only by people drunk from excess of joy. When Aulich entered with his troops they were received with all possible demonstration of gladness. The national colours, garlands, wreaths of flowers, gay ribbons, were seen everywhere, and the air was rent by the shouts, "*Elljen a Kossuth, Elljen a ház, Elljen a Sabatság!*"—"Long live Kossuth, hurrah for our fatherland, hurrah for liberty;" it was the pure, heartfelt joy of the people. The tri-colour, the sign of liberty, had displaced the hated black and yellow ensign of the tyrant, and floated gaily over the happy town.

The patriot could now press to his heart the liberator, the defender of his country. Every house was open, and offered rest to the tired warrior, or balm and nursing for the wounds which the enemy's arm had struck; and lastly, so many hearts long separated now met joyfully together, and told their tale of sufferings, of hope, and of love. Here a family met a father who, obedient to the call of Kossuth and father-

land had braved death on the battle-field, and returned now with his victorious brethren in safety and with honours; there a young man again clasped in his arms his betrothed, who had waited for this day in fear and anxiety for the beloved of her heart; again an only son embraced his venerable mother,—in short, language cannot describe all the joy, all the blessings, which this day had brought the people of Pesth. But look to the contrast on the other side of the Danube, where that part of the town called Buda is situate, there still was floating in proud defiance, the standard of Austria with its two colours of death and perjury!

The Hungarian army had gained other victories at Nagysarlo and Kémént, and had forced the enemy to raise the siege of Comorn, and the diet under the direction of Kossuth had not remained idle, but had answered by the declaration of independence the shameful Kremser constitution by which Austria had committed treason against the constitution of Hungary. This declaration of independence was publicly pronounced by the deputies in the reformed Protestant church, at Deberczin,

on the 14th April, 1849, and this period may be justly considered the point of the greatest glory of the Hungarian struggle. The Austrians were now beaten, and retiring in wild flight before the victorious Hungarians. The moral and physical power of the nation was strong and fully developed, foreign countries looked with admiration and sympathy upon the struggle, and the Germans and Italians waited anxiously for their expected liberators.

The Russians, although then cunningly hatching the plan of an intervention in favour of the despot of Austria, were still at a distance, and steamboats and railways not at their disposal, not only the fate of Hungary alone, but the fate of all the enslaved nations of the European continent, seemed now in the hands of the Magyar leader—Görgey, but, alas! it was not the hand of a friend of the people, the hero, the soldier wanted the heart of a patriot, and instead of marching direct upon Vienna, and to obliterate the name Hapsburg Lotringia from the list of the reigning dynasties, and offering the hand of good-fellowship to Germany, driving the polar bear back to his

lair, Görgey unfortunately and unaccountably halted, then marched his columns against Buda, occupied by about 5,000 Croats, who could have been easily kept in check by Aulich, with the 2nd corps.* Görgey also took 8,000 hussars with him against a mountain citadel, but omitted to order the heavy besieging train from Comorn to support them !

The details of the siege and storming of Buda are beyond the limits of this work, and besides they are well known by General Klapka's masterly description of the same, and also through Görgey's publication, we need therefore only mention here that Buda was stormed in

* What the real motive of Görgey was for such strange conduct, was then a matter of perplexing anxiety, though now what his purposes really were are clearly understood, and his character is correctly appreciated. Görgey himself has said in the work published by him, that he intended to be the arbiter between the Hungarian nation and the house of Hapsburg, and thus so save the constitution of 1848. To make this story plausible to the reflecting reader, requires more tact than Görgey in his work has proved himself to possess. He says that he opposed Kossuth at Gödöllő, and that he (Görgey) became very much dissatisfied when a courier of Kossuth reached him on the 17th April, 1849, at Léva, with a despatch informing him of the *fait accompli*. Görgey living under surveillance of the police at Klagenfurt, a cheated cheat, asserts very boldly that our patriotic struggle had been nothing but a fine midsummer night's dream. Görgey will surely not gainsay that such a dream must now be slept off after a lapse of four

gallant style by the Hungarians on the 21st May, 1849, in spite of a most obstinate defence, and that general Nagy Shandor distinguished himself most nobly. During this siege, Henzi, the Austrian commander at Buda, vented his spite against Pesth, by demolishing this beautiful town in a most brutal and useless manner. Buda was now in the hands of the Hungarians, but it had been bought dearly, for the country was lost already. The Russian hordes were in full march upon Panonia, which had only begun to revive under the rays of freedom. The events which subsequently occurred are recorded in the sketch of Görgey's career.

years, and particularly amongst the refugees staying in plain matter of fact England. But whatever may have been the secret spring of his conduct, we can only judge him by his deeds, and by the result of such deeds, and hence we can only call him "a craven traitor," and we do not regret at all that he did not succeed in his kind office as arbiter, even should the Austrian dynasty have rewarded us, the rebels, as munificently as she has done the Croats, her worthy adherents and supporters. Like master like man! It is utter nonsense to wish the world to believe that his intentions were to save the constitution, for should Görgey even have succeeded in treating with the Hapsburger, and should the latter have actually concluded a compromise, then Görgey as a man of experience, ought to have put the question to himself, has there ever been an agreement, a treaty, nay a solemn oath, which the house of Hapsburg has not found some excuse for not abiding by. Let history answer!—[Ed.]

MORITZ PERCZEL.

THE patriots and heroes of the last struggle for independence in Hungary, are proud to name one man as their own, who took a prominent and distinguished part in the great drama, and this man is General Moritz Perczel; uniting the patriot and the valiant soldier, he distinguished himself equally in parliament as on the battlefield. He has certainly been blamed by many for his rough and rude manners, but this rough and unpromising exterior concealed a brave heart filled with love for his country, and a spirit prepared for bold deeds. Following Perczel's course during the war, we shall find some of the most heroic actions, and if Görgey with his talent and courage had also possessed Perczel's noble heart, Hungary would have been free now, and the history of the house of Hapsburg would not have shown so many dark and bloody leaves; but let deeds speak for themselves.

Moritz Perczel was born on the 15th October, 1811, at Bonyhád, in the comitat of Tolná. His father, Alexander Perczel was a country gentleman, in good circumstances, and respected and beloved by all his tenants for his many virtues, although he was rather of aristocratic sentiments; government also looked upon him with respect as a staunch supporter of the dynasty for which he had even stood up in arms. The family descends from an old English family of the name of Purcell, which during a severe religious persecution emigrated, following the Archduke Matthias first to the Netherlands, and afterwards to Austria, where they became knighted by Emperor Rudolph, and afterwards they went to Hungary, their rank of noblemen being also acknowledged there.

The first education of Moritz Perczel was received under the superintendence of his parents, from the well-known Hungarian poet, Michael Vörösmarty, a liberal minded man, who early instilled his lively pupil with the best principles, and it could not fail that the clever boy soon made the best progress,

and developed qualities justifying the brightest hopes for his future. His education at home being finished, he was sent to the university at Pesth, where he devoted his energies to the study of philosophy and the mathematics. Already in the year 1825, signs could be observed of the movement which had begun to excite Poland, and which led to the Polish revolution of 1831. Perczel then an inexperienced youth took some part in this movement, but undetected for some time and happily not involved in the consequences.

When he found himself disappointed in his hopes for a regeneration of Poland, he looked about for another object to which to devote his whole energy, and although not of such a stirring interest, he was drawn to it by the most praiseworthy motives. Love of fatherland is the bond among all men of honour in every country; and thus the watchword of leading men in Hungary was the duty and necessity of upholding their nationality. The great struggle for national independence and for radical reform had already begun, in spite of the endeavours of the court of Vienna to calm

down the rising sea of discontent. The proceedings of the comitat sessions were watched by the whole country, and the younger generation particularly, took the liveliest interest in upholding the rights of the nation. Perczel, and many of his fellow-students formed a literary union to perfect themselves in the Hungarian language, and to support the distribution of books written in this language. Up to this time, the literary men of Hungary were more accustomed to make use of the Latin than of their native language in their works; and were thus very much like the learned of other countries in the sixteenth century.

Perczel was the first among his fellow-scholars who made use of the Hungarian language exclusively; and he also translated the *Anthology* of Professor Imre, from the Latin into the Hungarian. The rector of the university, a dependent upon the Austrian government, jealous of all attempts at liberty and nationality, suspected political tendencies in the endeavours of this union, and Perczel, therefore, with some more of the collegians, had to leave the university.

Thus prevented from finishing his studies, he entered the army as a cadet in the 5th regiment of artillery, garrisoned at Pesth. General Radetsky showed him particular favour; and the commander of the regiment, an intimate friend of his father, invited him often to his dinner parties, and favoured him with frequent marks of distinction.

Three years he was attached to this regiment, but, tired of the sameness of the service, he quitted it to return to his parents. He here continued his military studies, and translated or composed several works upon artillery and the art of fortification, which he designed for the use of the Hungarian military academy intended to have been established, but which the Austrian government found means to prevent. The Hungarian Society of Arts and Science honoured him by a letter of approval for one of his publications.

The news of the outbreak in Poland in 1831, excited the liveliest hopes in all Europe. Perczel was then only nineteen, but he felt himself roused to activity, he therefore, left the paternal roof without the knowledge of

his friends, determined to fight the battle for liberty and right, and convinced that the valiant struggle of the Poles would offer him a fair field for his activity. Five years previous, his thoughts had already been occupied by the idea of assisting this noble nation when the time for action should come, now when he thought he saw the realisation of his hopes, he could not stand by an idle looker-on. He hastened to Pesth, where he renewed his former acquaintance with the old comrades in his regiment, and had won over several hundreds to his intentions, but at the moment when they were about to take their departure, one of the party proved a traitor. The colonel of the regiment had Perczel immediately arrested, he was tried by a court martial, and condemned to be shot. The civil authorities of the town, however, took Perczel's part zealously, and protested strongly against such military dictatorship over civilians. In consequence of this, Perczel was liberated from the military prison, and delivered over to the county court of justice, where, soon after, a verdict of not guilty was recorded in his favour.

Shortly after this affair, which had caused a great excitement among the inhabitants of Pesth, Perczel returned to his native place, where he accepted an office in the civil service of the Tolna comitat. He now devoted all his attention to politics. The comitat sessions,—parliaments in miniature,—formed an excellent school for him. Perczel was not without considerable talent as a public speaker; his principles were clearly developed; he had unwearrying energy, and devoted all his faculties to the cause of liberty. He soon became one of the most active members of the opposition, and took a very prominent part at the elections of deputies, judicial officers, etc. His intelligence, and the personal sacrifices he made, which were often larger than the means he had at his disposal for the moment, were of great service to the liberal party.

In the years 1839-40, when this political agitation took a very serious aspect, he contended with great energy for the cause of reform, and fought long and hard in party struggles, which took place, and assumed almost the appearance of a revolution, as the government

thought fit to call armed force to suppress the agitation. At this time, Moritz and his two brothers, Alexander and Nicolaus, were brought to public trial, but during this trial, the injustice of the opposition party was so clearly demonstrated, that the government were forced to abandon the charge against the brothers, and a royal decree quashed the investigation. Perczel nothing daunted, continued to direct his attention to the social and the political advancement of his country. By his endeavours many literary societies were founded in the Tolna and Baranya comitats, and reading rooms, infant schools, and other establishments of a similar nature. At Senard, he established a lunatic asylum, and at Bonyhad, a Jews' school and reading room. By these endeavours, and the active part he took in the Protection League, the tendency of which we have already explained, he obtained the confidence of the liberal party of the Tolna county, in consequence of which, he was elected a deputy for this county, for the diet, in the year 1843. He soon became one of the most distinguished members of the extreme left. His warm tem-

perament frequently displaying itself during the debates, exposed him often to censure, but still he gained even a certain respect from his enemies by the bold front he assumed, and by the obstinate defence of what he believed right. Government listened to him with great attention, and Archduke the Palatine Joseph often invited him to the consultations he used to hold with the chiefs of the different parties. His eloquence found many admirers, and the reports of the debates mention frequently his oratorical influence.

The leading points in his political demands were the regeneration of the municipal suffrage, the re-organization of the comitat institutions, the preservation of perfect religious liberty, and the adoption of the Magyar language for all diplomatic and official purposes, instead of the Latin language, with due consideration for the Croatian nationality. The zeal and energy with which he watched the privileges of the towns, created for him a general feeling of gratitude, so that after the close of this diet, many of the towns conferred on him the honour of citizenship; among the first to

express their sense of the eminent services rendered them, were the towns of Stuhlweissenburg, Comorn, and Szegedin. An active member as he was of the Protection League, it followed as a matter of course, that he also took his part in the agitation against the new Austrian measure of appointing administrators to the comitats—a measure calculated to crush all power of resistance. To keep the field against this innovation, the liberal party endeavoured to gain the victory in the comitats. This was no easy matter, and led to a hard struggle, but at last, the liberals, by the utmost exertion, gained the upperhand. Perczel had a great share in this success, for by his indefatigable exertions, he gained the victory in the comitats of Tolna, Stuhlweissenburg, and Comorn, so that he could dictate the instructions about to be given to the representatives of these districts for the ensuing diet. As soon as he had helped his party to secure the victory at one election, he hastened to aid in a second, or third, placing his talents as a speaker at the disposal of the reformers, and contributing by his energetic

appeals to the duty and patriotism of his countrymen, materially to aid the success of the people's party. By the intrigues of his enemies, his own election as deputy for the diet, 1847-8, was defeated, but he nevertheless did not lose courage, but continued as he had begun, and insisted upon adhering to the instructions drawn up for the deputies.

The spring of the year 1848, brought a complete victory to his party, and gave Perczel an opportunity of showing that he could be as moderate and just in the hour of triumph as he had been ardent and impetuous during the struggle to obtain the people's rights. In April, Perczel was nominated Chief of Police, in which office he showed activity as well as prudence. He solved the difficult question, how to maintain good order during a time of great excitement, without interfering with the personal liberty of any one, and although his task was made comparatively easy, by the patriotic feeling of the people, and their confidence in the government, still the wise and just demeanour of the Chief of Police deserved all praise.

In July, 1848, Perczel was elected a representative in the diet, both by his native town and by Buda; he accepted the election of the latter. Up to this time, the best harmony had prevailed between him and the ministry, but now the short-sighted policy of the latter was not a match for the pressing demands of the times. As an example, we may mention the proposition, emanating from the ministry, to send an address to the king, promising to support him in the suppression of the Italian revolution, upon condition that he would give the Italians a constitution, and that he would assist the Hungarians to suppress the revolts of the Servians and Croatians. Perczel declaimed loud against such a proposition, and was supported by a small, though determined minority, which opposed the ministry bravely. However, this motion was passed by the diet. Perczel, consequently, gave in his resignation as Chief of Police.

Another time, during the session of this diet, he accused the Austrian officers, to whom the command against the rebellious Servians had been confided, of being traitors; the supporters

of government, in their turn, retorted upon him, and, being excited, he certainly did answer in language not exactly parliamentary. If he is to be blamed for the manner in which he answered his opponents, it must be acknowledged that he maintained his conviction with spirit and sincerity.

A certain count, Chotek, had taken umbrage at the remarks made by Perczel, and in consequence demanded satisfaction; a duel followed, in which Perczel was slightly wounded. His accusations were soon after proved to have been justly founded, for not only Bechtold, but also this same count, Chotek, went over to the enemy.

The danger becoming more threatening, government saw at last, that the army of the country was not strong enough to cope with the enemy, and permission was given for the formation of free corps; Perczel, like Kossuth, was quickly engaged in haranguing the people, and by his eloquence, he brought numbers to take up arms in an incredibly short time. Within four days, he had enrolled a full battalion, of which he himself took the command.

He was now nominated Government Commissary, with full power, and was sent to the army which had been slowly retreating upon Stuhlweissenburg before the Bann Jellachich. In the battle which now followed, the free corps of Perczel and his brothers, Alexander and Nicolaus, did good service, and contributed materially to the glorious success of the day. After the battle, Perczel was in command of a corps of about 4,000 recruits, and a few thousand badly armed national guards; with these, he was dispatched against the enemy's force, under Roth and Philipovics, who were ordered to follow as a reserve to their leader, the Bann Jellachich, who had so traitorously fled towards Vienna. Perczel's instructions were to cut them off from the road to Stuhlweissenburg, or to oppose their retreat towards Croatia. Perczel fulfilled his orders most satisfactorily; he masked his own intentions, by marches and counter marches, whilst he cut off all supplies, destroyed all the bridges he had to pass, and at last, the enemy was so hemmed in, that he had to surrender to Perczel, at Ozora. 9,000 prisoners, 12 cannons, and 8 standards,

were the fruits of this campaign of four days. Görgey, serving at that time under Perczel, with the rank of major, was guilty one day of a gross breach of discipline, Perczel very justly was greatly incensed on hearing of it, but as it happened that the consequences of Görgey's disobeying the strict orders given him, turned out rather favourable, he merely reprimanded him, instead of bringing him before a court martial; but from this time a great coldness took place between them, which afterwards increased to positive hatred. Görgey, particularly during the whole war afterwards, endeavoured to annoy and persecute Perczel wherever he could.

On receiving the news of the surrender to Perczel of the Croatian reserves, the diet voted the warmest thanks of the house to him. Perczel meanwhile continued his operations by marching against the Austrian generals, Nugent and Dahlen, driving them back across the river Mura, and forcing a passage over the rivers Kotori and Letenye in spite of the numerical superiority of the Croats and Austrians, who lost about 12,000 men dead and wounded,

6,000 prisoners, 3 cannons and 3 colours. Perczel then retired behind the Mura but crossed it again a few days after, and drove Nugent a second time over the Hungarian frontier.

These splendid actions, executed with so small a force, and in so short a time, gained for Perczel the rank of general. In November the same year he invaded Styria, and defeated the Austrians at Friedau. An order reached him here from government to march back for an attack upon Raab, and to effect his junction with Görgey's army, who retired into the interior hard pressed by Windischgrätz. After the unfortunate engagement at Bábolna, Görgey advanced by forced marches upon Bieske whilst Perczel marched towards Moor, where he received instructions to occupy the attention of the enemy in such a manner as to prevent his further advances. A similar order had been directed to Görgey, of which Perczel being informed, he took up a position waiting the attack of the Austrians, under the natural supposition that in case of such attack he would be supported by the army of the Upper Danube.

The Austrians advanced on the 30th December, and the battle was begun at 8 o'clock in the morning by an overwhelming force of 26,000 Austrians against 6,000 Hungarians. Unequal as these forces were, the Hungarians sustained the first shock bravely, and afterwards kept their position until about 2 o'clock in the afternoon, but Görgey treacherously not advancing to their support, they could sustain the unequal combat no longer, and were compelled to retreat with a loss of 600 prisoners and 3 pieces of artillery. This defeat was the more painful to Perczel as heretofore he had been accustomed only to conquer, and as the people not knowing the instructions he had received from headquarters blamed him for rashness. Two months later he appeared before the diet to justify his conduct on that occasion, and to remove any erroneous impression which might exist, that he had rashly and needlessly perilled the safety of his own forces.

After the battle at Moor, Perczel retired upon Pesth, where, at a general council of war held on the 2nd January, 1849, he received the order to retire towards the Tissa. He left

the capital on the 5th January, and marched behind the Tissa, closely watched by the Austrians. Here he re-organized and strengthened his army by new troops, so that he soon had about 17,000 men under his command. Not at all disheartened by his defeat at Moor; on the contrary, imbuing others with the same degree of fortitude and courage he himself so eminently possessed; he directed his whole thoughts to the defence of the country. A few weeks only had elapsed since the battle of Moor, when he was in the field again, ready to take the offensive on the first opportunity, to the astonishment of the enemy, who considered his army all but annihilated. His vanguard soon gave proofs of his being ready again for action by attacking General Oettinger one day at Szolnock, and the next day at Czegléd, when this general was defeated, and forced to retire on the road to Pesth.

Perczel's pride being hurt by the appointment of Dembinsky as commander-in-chief, and supposing this to have originated with the government from a want of confidence in his military skill, he resigned his command, put-

ting his troops under the command of Dembinsky, went to Deberczin, where an unexpected distinction awaited him. The Hungarian military cross of honour, was, on his arrival, presented to him by government as an acknowledgment of his merits; a similar honour was also conferred on Vetter and Guyon.

After the battle of Kápolna, he was applied to again to resume his command, but it was only after long and earnest entreaties that he agreed to take the command of the troops at the Bács Banat. He arrived at Szeged on the 17th March, but found only a small remnant of his former army, as the greater part were then serving under Vécsey and Damjanich. The country here had been completely over-run, and most terribly devastated by the Servians, and had been taken possession of by a great number of Austrian troops under Nugent and Theodorowich. The former blockaded Peterwardein, and extended his line of operations as far as Zombor, whilst the latter had pushed his advanced posts close to Szeged, and tried to effect a junction with Jellachich, who, at that time stood at Télegyhará. To oppose these

forces, Perczel had only 5 battalions of infantry and 2 squadrons of cavalry, besides a militia of 10,000 men, but all of them undisciplined, and therefore not of much service. In spite of these drawbacks, he put a bold face upon the matter, and attacked Theodorowich and his Servian troops at Szöreg, Ada, and Zenta; stormed 3 redoubts, and defeated the enemy, who lost 2 guns, several ammunition waggons, and nearly 500 prisoners. Perczel immediately followed up his advantage by attacking the Austrians at Verbáz, and cutting his way through their columns, he arrived just in time at Peterwardein, to save the important fortress from the fate which the treason of some of the officers had prepared for it. 90 officers, and 2 generals, who had either publicly or secretly declared in favour of Austria, were immediately expelled, and the command of the fortress was given to a brother of Perczel.

After this brilliant affair he again defeated the Servians at St. Iván Kula and Verbász taking two guns. On his approach to Zombor, General Mogat, who commanded about 6,000 regulars, retired behind the Dráva, upon which

the Hungarian general directed his march towards St. Tamás. The Servians considered this strongly fortified place impregnable, because it had withstood in the last summer all the attacks of the Austrian generals then commanding the Hungarians, but as it has been afterwards proved, these generals were traitors to the Hungarian cause, and most probably had never wanted to take the place. Perczel now, on the 3rd April, stormed the fortifications and after three hours hard fighting the tri-colour waved on the blood-stained ramparts. Several thousand Servians fell, 2,000 were taken prisoners, and 8 cannons and 3 colours were the trophies of this victory. Even had the garrison not been so numerous at this time as in the previous summer, still the conquest must be regarded as a great one, and one of the most splendid of all the victories of this brave general.

The country was greatly indebted to Perczel for this brilliant deed of arms, and it gained for him the highest esteem of the nation. The people were enthusiastic in their joy at the fall of this hated place, and cheered the victor

as the liberator from Servian butcheries and innumerable miseries. Thousands of fugitive families joyfully now returned to their homes. The destruction of this hated fortress* brought about various important results, many small fortresses surrendered immediately, such as Turia and Földvár, and the Servian inhabitants of the Bács district surrendered their arms voluntarily, upon which a general amnesty was proclaimed.

On the 7th April, Perczel stormed the so-called Roman wall; three days after he defeated the enemy at Káts; on the 11th, the Austrians tried to take revenge by a night surprise upon Villova and Mokrin, but the watchful Perczel again repulsed them, and shortly afterwards he brought the whole district of the Csajkáts under subjection to the government, with the exception only of Titel. As soon as this district had been regained for the country, Perczel endeavoured to substitute a liberal civil administration in lieu of the former military despotism, under which the

* St. Tamas had long been used as a political prison house, in which many a worthy patriot had been confined.—[Ed.]

people had suffered so long. The people joyfully accepted this change, grateful to their liberator. After this victory, Perczel turned towards the Tissa to attack General Theodorowich, and the Servians in the Banat. He first operated towards Töröck-Becse; took the fortifications at O'Becse and crossed the Tissa, whilst he so manœuvred as to conceal from the enemy his real intentions. On the 22nd April, near Kikinda, he defeated the so-called "holy army" of the Servians (which had been raised by Archbishop Prajacsics) to the number of 15,000 men, with eight pieces of artillery.

The "holy army" was put to the rout after a most fearful slaughter, leaving more than 2,000 prisoners in the hands of the victor! Pursuing his victorious career, Perczel next turned upon the Austrians under Theodorowich and Colonel Puffer, who had about 24,000 men, whilst the Hungarians counted only 7000; but, notwithstanding their superiority of numbers, the former were defeated in three consecutive battles; on the 24th April at Basahid, on the 26th, at Melencze, and on the 7th May at Uzdin. Insignificant as the Hungarian army

might appear in numbers, it thus became accustomed to warfare, and was victorious by its zeal and patriotic devotion to a good cause.

The ranks of the Austrians were sadly weakened by so many losses ; the troops were scattered in consequence of the many retreats they had had to make, and their general, with the remains of his grand army, sought shelter behind the Danube towards Syrmien ; whilst Perczel advanced upon Pancsova.

Six weeks only were occupied in accomplishing such results. A great part of the Banat, the whole Bács district and Csajkáts district, except Titel, had been won back ; and the rebellious Servians, about 100,000 in number, were now confined upon that narrow slip of land which lies at the junction of the Tissa with the Danube. Perczel now devoted all his attention to give the military frontier district in the Banat, a proper administration ; and as the population of this district was a very mixed one, he fixed upon the German language to be the official medium of communication.

During this campaign Perczel had also taken an opportunity to enter upon friendly relations

with Bem, the commander of the Transylvanian army, who had advanced to conquer the Banat. The two generals had several meetings, when the old Pole conceived a great liking to his young colleague, which feeling he retained until his death. In the midst of all these triumphs, the news reached Perczel of the appointment of Görgey to be minister of war, besides leaving him in the command of the army of the Upper Danube. Perczel, who was perhaps quite as ambitious as Görgey, but who had a patriotic heart in his breast, was filled with great indignation, as he had long previously accused Görgey of treason, of which he was firmly convinced; but perhaps, because he was rather violent in his expressions when excited, no credit had been given to his warnings. He certainly was greatly irritated to see Görgey, whom he considered his inferior in point of military capacity, raised to such an important office. A second time, therefore, he sent in his resignation, but the ministry succeeded in moderating his anger, and in gaining his services again for the benefit of his country. About the middle of May, he returned from

the Banat to the Bács district, where he met not only his Austrian opponents, but also the Bann Jellachich, who had gone south with an army of 12,000 men after the Austrians had suffered the great defeat at Isaszeg. Perczel now despatched courier after courier to government to obtain reinforcements, as the enemy, previously superior to his own force, had become overwhelming by the junction with Jellachich, but the Minister of War did not send a single man to his assistance. The enemy's cavalry alone was equal in numbers to the whole force of Perczel, an advantage which was very considerable in a flat country like that where Perczel now operated. This brave general, however, managed to maintain his position against the united forces of the Serbians and Austrians wonderfully; he even succeeded several times in defeating their attempts to cross the Tissa or the Danube. He thus kept them at bay, if he did not gain any decisive victory over them. An Austrian division besieging Peterwardein, he attacked them suddenly on the 4th June, and with great impetuosity carried five of their redoubts,

thrown up between Karlowitz and Kamenitz, took 3 cannons, spiked 14 more, and killed about 1,000 men. Three days after, he attacked Jellachich, near Káty, who had marched from Titel in order to cut off the retreat of the Hungarians in the direction of the Francis Canal. This attack would not have been made by any cautious commander, it was boldness verging almost on madness, but Perczel was partly forced to it from dire necessity, and he ventured upon it partly from his trust in another run of "good luck." The Hungarian army, weakened by former losses, and contending against an enemy of fourfold their number, was repulsed, as might have been expected, although the troops fought with all possible bravery. The Hungarians, however, retired in good order. The loss of men upon this occasion was greater than Perczel had sustained in any of his former battles. The following day, the Austrian columns tried again to cut off his retreat; Perczel, however, repulsed them, and entrenched himself behind the canal, where assuming a determined attitude, he showed a bold front to the numerous force of the enemy.

News reached him here that the government had now thought proper to accept his former resignation, upon which he left the seat of war hastening to Pesth, whither government had transferred the seat of their councils.

But Perczel was not now to remain long inactive. Görgey had suffered heavy losses on the Upper Danube, and stood against a superior force of 200,000 Russians, which completely over-ran the country. General Vetter, who, after Perczel, had taken the command of the army of the south, had moved his troops behind the Tissa.

At this crisis, government again appealed to Perczel, charging him with the organization of a new army on the Tissa. Perczel forgetting every personal offence at the appeal of his country, hastened towards Czegléd to commence this new labour. Within eight days he had already formed several battalions of infantry, and a cavalry brigade of 4,000 men; this was now the third corps which he had organized since the beginning of his military career!

Uniting these troops to those of Visoczky and Dezseffy, he had now nearly 35,000 men

under his command, of whom the greater part however, were armed only with scythes. Notwithstanding these disadvantages, he succeeded in driving the Russians from Deberczin and Tokay, and he then advanced towards Hatvan for the support of Görgey. On the 26th July, his cavalry had a serious affray with the Russians at Tura, in which his troops were defeated. Whilst Görgey now marched towards the north, the Austrian-Russian army under Haynau, advanced upon Szegedin, where the government was at that time sitting. Perczel, therefore, received orders directly to hasten for the protection of this place. Great differences unfortunately prevailed now respecting what plan of operations to adopt, until at last, Dembinsky was elected commander-in-chief of all the Hungarian forces, and he retired upon Temesvár, after the enemy had forced the passage of the Tissa.

The government then appointed Bem, who was recalled for this purpose from Transsylvania, as commander-in-chief. Bem met Perczel at Rékás, and offered him a command, but Perczel would not accept it; he simply agreed to take a part in the battle as a volunteer. The

same day that Bem joined the army, the Austrians attacked the rear-guard under his command, whereupon Bem resolving to give battle, was totally defeated. Perczel collected eight squadrons of cavalry, and a few field pieces, and endeavoured to cover the retreat; he at first succeeded well enough, but towards the evening, when the troops were nearly exhausted from hunger and fatigue, the enemy suddenly made his appearance whilst they were in a narrow defile, the Hungarians were compelled to give way; a general confusion ensued, and a very great number of men were lost. Görgey's treason destroyed every hope of success for further resistance. General Perczel therefore left the country and went by Orsova into Turkey, where he joined Kossuth and his companions, and shared with him the two years of detention, or imprisonment, as it might be called.

After their liberation from Kuthaya, thanks to the interference of the British government, Perczel stopped some time longer in Turkey on account of the illness of his wife; he subsequently arrived at London a few months later than Kossuth, and is still residing there.

THE HONVÉDS.

OUR readers will have noticed that the appellation, "Honvéd" has been frequently made use of in this work, in speaking of the operations of the Hungarian army, and we think this a proper place to give a distinct definition of this word. Honvéd, as a general term, frequently applied to the army, is a word of Magyar origin, it is composed of "*Hon*,"—home, fatherland,—and "*véd*," a defender, and means literally, "defender of his home." Although, therefore, this word in its true signification, might be applied to the whole of the Hungarian army, it has most generally been used in speaking of the infantry only; whilst the other portions have been respectively described as cavalry, hussars, or artillery. We take this opportunity to introduce to our readers some of the most prominent subordinate characters in the struggle of independence, and also to

make them acquainted with the internal system of the Hungarian armies.

Before the year 1848, the Hungarian army was under the command of the High Council of War at Vienna. Hungary, together with Transylvania, Slavonia, and Croatia, furnished a contingent of fifteen regiments infantry of the line,—each regiment consisted of eighteen companies,—twelve regiments of hussars, of four divisions each, and eight squadrons, and five battalions of grenadiers, of six companies each. The military frontier district, properly speaking a province of Hungary, furnished in times of peace a contingent of thirty-seven battalions; in war times this force was considerably increased.

According to Metternich's dastardly policy, to keep one nation in check by another nation, these troops were stationed in garrisons in Italy, Bohemia, Moravia, and Galicia, whilst Hungary was occupied by troops of these nations. From the first moment when Hungary called the Hapsburg dynasty upon her throne, it had always been one of the chief conditions of the Hungarian constitution, that the native

troops were never to be drawn from the country, but not one of the thirteen Kings of the House of Hapsburg had ever respected this condition; and in the year 1848, when this condition was most distinctly stipulated for in the new constitution, sworn to by the King, this paragraph was always evaded or interpreted by the Austrian authorities in a most perfidious manner, and thus it was that at the commencement of hostilities, the disposable force of the Hungarians numbered only 15,000 infantry, and 7,000 cavalry!

The Servian insurrection in the south, soon after the king had sanctioned the new constitution, and the danger threatening from the Bann Jellachich, required, however, a far larger number of troops on the part of the government than was available. Most of the Austrian regiments had been drawn out of the country in time, and the few which were still garrisoned there were not at all disposed to side with the Hungarians, warned as they had been by secret instructions from the Ministry of War at Vienna, and misled by their officers as to the real bearings of the question. On the other

hand, the native Hungarian regiments were mostly commissioned by Austrian officers, and it was only their brave national spirit that kept them true to the cause, in spite of all the intrigues and endeavours of their leaders. The formation of a general national guard became a pressing necessity, and the men thus enrolled, under the colours of their country, were named "Honvéds," *i.e.* "Land Defenders."

It was intended at first to form ten Honvéd battalions of 1,200 men each. The country was divided into certain districts, each of which was to furnish one battalion, and recruiting parties were distributed accordingly. It was expected that the agricultural labourers particularly, considering the important changes in their favour, and the privileges which the new constitution had granted them, would muster in strong numbers for the defence of their country and constitution, and this anticipation proved quite correct. The formation of the different corps progressed rapidly, and the flower of the Hungarian youth, of every class, or rank, hastened to be enrolled among the Honvéds. The ten battalions were to be commanded by Colonel

Szeth, the commanders of the battalions to be nominated by the king, the officers by the Palatin, with the consent of the war office. Some of these commanders, particularly General Damjanich, and Count Lázár, distinguished themselves prominently, and gained great honour in the late war.

The first president of the committee for the formation and equipment of these levies was Baron Baldacci, who afterwards proved a traitor to the country. He was nominated to this office by the court at Vienna, and it is thus no wonder that the drill and the equipment, etc., of the troops, was not conducted with such energy and regularity as the circumstances demanded. Mészáros, the Hungarian secretary-at-war, sanctioned this delay, and even stopped the preparations altogether for some time, as he very foolishly, in his blind confidence in the rectitude of his colleague in office at Vienna, allowed himself to be persuaded that in reality there was no danger to be apprehended from the Bann or the Servians. Even the 1st and 2nd battalion of Pesth, which marched into the field in the beginning of June, was only half

equipped and very badly drilled. Instead, therefore, of being useful, they were in the beginning more a hindrance to the regular army, which was the more to be regretted, as the rebellion in the south, and in Transsylvania, prevented the proposed concentration of all the forces near Szegedin, and made it impossible to draw the Szeklers from their country, they then having enough to do to defend themselves against the rebellious Wallachians. Thus the 15,000 infantry of the line, the 10 Honvéd battalions, 2 regiments of Szeklers, and 70 squadrons of cavalry, altogether about 36,000 men, were the nucleus of the afterwards so renowned great Hungarian army. The artillery at first consisted only of the 5th regiment, which happened to be garrisoned at Pesth; the quick progress which the formation of this corps made may be chiefly ascribed to the circumstance, that many well-educated young Hungarians, and a very great number of experienced foreigners, entered as volunteers, and that during the war a selection was always made, of the most intelligent and best qualified men for this branch. The want

of guns, ammunition, and train wagons, in consequence of the small number of artillery, previously kept, was at first a considerable difficulty, but soon assistance came from all sides, and it was put on a very respectable footing. Besides the arms in the hands of the former "Imperial" troops, about 30,000 to 40,000 muskets were found in the several depôts, and were quickly distributed among the Honvéds and national guards.

Meantime, the danger from the rebellion in the south increased, as well as the fear of an invasion on the part of Jellachich. Government determined, therefore, to march the national guards and other volunteer corps, who had originally only enrolled themselves for a space of three months, and who were mostly recruited from the comitats of Vas, Zala, and Somogy, they were now ordered towards the Drave, there to join some of the regular forces under the command of Oettinger, Melczer, and Teleki, and to oppose the invasion of Jellachich.

On the opening of the diet in July, Kossuth carried a resolution to open a loan of sixty million guilders, and to raise the available forces

to 200,000 men. But instead of strictly carrying out this latter resolution, the minister of war confined himself to strengthening the old regiments, and to putting them under the command of former imperial officers, misled, no doubt, as he was, by the flattering promises and the polite notes of Count Latour.

Daily the danger grew more threatening, in consequence of which the ministry in August issued an order for organizing four free corps of about 800 men each, to consist both of cavalry and infantry, and the Majors Görgey, Ivanka, Kosztolanyi, and Marjassy, were nominated commanders of the same. The rendezvous of the four corps were at Pápa, Waitzen, Szölnoek, and Arad. The Committee of Land Defence, also raised at this time two other battalions, named the corps of Hunyadi and Czriny.

The army of observation at the Drave, consisted of only a few regulars, but of a very great number of militia men, and had successively three different commanders-in-chief, until at last it was placed under the command of the Palatin Stephen, and after the flight of this arch-duke and arch-traitor, Field-marshal

Lieutenant Moga took the command, and led the forces first to Presburg, and from thence to the Laytha.

As soon as the diet heard of the invasion of the Bann having really taken place, they immediately ordered the issue of the paper money, and the augmentation of the different armies; permission was also granted for the formation of different free corps, one of which was formed by Söll, the command of which was therefore entrusted to him.

After the cowardly flight of Jellachich from Pakós, Perczel and Görgey were ordered to observe the movements of the Croatian reserves under Roth and Philipovics. These reserves having laid down their arms at Ozorá, Perczel marched with his division to Csaktornya, and Görgey went to the army on the Upper Danube, the commander-in-chief of which he had been nominated after the battle of Schwechat. The ministry having resigned in September, Count Batthiányi was charged with the direction of the different offices, and thus also with the ministry of war, which office was at the time much neglected. Meszarós was with the

army; the secretary of state, Colonel Meltzer, resigned his place, and Batthiányi was very unfortunate in his choice of candidates for the various offices, as for instance in selecting Colonel Nadosdy as president of the council of war, a man who was not only unqualified for such a place, but as it was afterwards proved was quite unworthy of such confidence.

The organization of the new army thus progressed but slowly. A few battalions were sent into the field, and several of the free corps agreed to be enrolled among the Honvéds, and to serve during the whole time of the war; many of the counties, among which, Szabólt and Borsod were the first and most active, also equipped battalions ready to take the field. Upon the second resignation of Batthiányi at the outbreak of the revolution at Vienna, the Land Defence Committee took the office of the war ministry into their own hands. The military arrangements after this began to wear a very different aspect, the more so as Kossuth devoted special attention to this department. He collected immediately several thousand men, irregular militia,

and sent them to the army of the Upper Danube ; he also took energetic measures to strengthen both the cavalry and infantry regiments, and to provide them with suitable clothes, arms, and provisions. Görgey supported Kossuth well in these measures, for he knew from his own experience the mistakes and the abuses of the former war administration, and was thus enabled to point out the best means for remedying the evils felt.

Although threatened from all sides, the nation managed by her devotion, and by her energy, to keep the foe in check wherever he attempted to cross the frontiers. It was not possible always to oppose him a sufficient number of regular troops, practised in warfare ; for the greatest part, the armies consisted still of Honvéds, volunteers, and national guards. The total number of all the troops at this time were about 100,000 men, the greater part of them neither well-drilled nor properly armed, and with these drawbacks contending against a far more numerous force of well-practised old troops, but wanting the animated spirit of men fighting for hearth and home.

On the advance of Windischgrätz, the government retired from Pesth to Deberczin, and all the armouries, cannon foundries, stores, etc., were transported to Gross Wardein, but those parts of the country still in possession of the Hungarian armies, were abundantly rich in all kind of provisions, and the recruiting was everywhere continued with the greatest energy and activity.

The Austrian commanders in Transsylvania, taken by surprise by the quick development of affairs, were soon forced to evacuate this province. Bem, commander-in-chief of the troops there, soon defeated the enemy at all points; he and Csányi, took the necessary steps to provide for the wants of the Transylvanian forces, more troops were enlisted, and the Szeklers flocked now in numbers to the army.

By degrees the army had so much increased in numbers, that in May, 1849, it counted 106 battalions of infantry, and 4 of sharp-shooters, besides the 19 old imperial battalions; 12 regiments of hussars were complete, and 6 additional regiments, such as Hunyadi, Léhel, Mátyás and others, were in formation. The

whole forces were arranged under nine chief divisions, of which the 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 7th, and 8th formed the army on the Upper Danube; the 4th and 6th, the army of the south; the 5th, the Transylvanian army, and the 9th, the army of the north.

Having evacuated Pesth in January, 1849, Görgey retired upon the district of the mountain cities, where at Kaschau, he joined again the 1st corps which were at that time in Upper Hungary, under the command of Colonel Klapka, he was also reinforced from the south by the troops under Vécsey, after which, all the available forces united at the Tissa to support the intended offensive movement. These troops were now commanded in rotation by Dembinsky, Vetter, and Görgey. The latter commanded during the glorious campaign which ended with the storming of the fortress of Buda.

After Görgey had taken charge of the ministry of war, his first care was to introduce the necessary unity in the command, and perfect equality in the management of all military departments. He ordered all the troops to be upon the same footing, the former imperial

regiments were changed into Honvéd battalions, the Polish and the Italian legion formed separate corps under the command of their own elected officers. The Polish legion included all arms of the service, infantry, cavalry, and artillery, and were commanded by Wisoczki, Bulharin, Torznicki, and Count Poninski; the Italian legion was composed almost entirely of infantry, and was commanded by Colonel Count Monti. Perfect order and regularity was established in the management of the public stores and funds; magazines were erected in all parts of the country, and many alterations took place, all tending to forward the discipline, and consequently the efficiency of the army,—alterations which would have been crowned with better success if the shortness of the time for preparation, and the necessary and frequent changes of the seat of government had not thrown obstacles in the way. The army was also greatly augmented—so that, in August, it numbered 147 battalions, 4 divisions of pioneers, and 6 divisions sharp-shooters, the latter mostly employed in Transsylvania; also 18 full regiments of hussars, and lastly, 400

guns, with 10,000 men and 7,000 horses. Besides these, there were also two independent corps under General Kmetty and Colonel Kazinczky, the latter with about 10,000 men.

The many changes, accidents and difficulties to which the army was exposed during the whole of the struggle, make it almost impossible to give a correct number of their numerical force at any time, but we think we do not err, if we take the total number at the latter time, in all parts of the country, to have been between 130 and 135,000 men.

At the outbreak of the war there was no uniform and general arrangement for the smaller nor for the larger bodies of troops. The strength of a free corps or a new battalion or regiment was of endless variety. According to the new arrangement each corps-d'-armée consisted of three divisions, two of infantry, one of cavalry. Each infantry division had five battalions; the cavalry division sixteen squadrons, and a proportionate addition of artillery, engineers, pioneers and train.

The numerical strength of each corps was fixed at 12,000 men, and the previous division

of it into brigades was done away with ; the battalions now received their instructions direct from the commander of the whole division. The divisions were generally under the command of colonels or generals ; an infantry division consisted of five battalions of six companies each. The battalion counted 800 rank and file, and was generally commanded by a major or a lieutenant-colonel. A cavalry division had four regiments of four sub-divisions each, commanded by a staff officer and divided again into two squadrons, commanded each by a captain, and numbering each 160. In the beginning of the struggle the artillery was divided into batteries of six guns, afterwards eight guns were to be the number ; but this arrangement was not followed out in every instance ; the size of the guns varied from three pounders to eighteen pounders, exclusive of the besieging park.

The reader has thus a short descriptive sketch of the composition of the Hungarian army, and our artist furnishes us with, in the "*Honvéd's Farewell*," one of the most beautiful sketches of a scene which, during the struggle, might be

witnessed in almost every family. The agriculturist left his plough; the mechanic his workshop; the tradesman his store; the student his college; the artist his study; in short, every one worthy of the name of a true Magyar hastened to the standard; nor did the Germans remain behind the Hungarians. Thus it was that the Vienna academic legion, originally 180 strong, entrusted at the beginning with the defence of the island of Czepel, were afterwards engaged in covering a park of artillery towards Miskolcz, and then fighting bravely under Bem in Transylvania. The greater part of these brave Spartans found their death before Hermanstadt; their memory will be sacred to every true Hungarian!

The German legion, under their leader, the valiant Colonel Gyron, fought also bravely for Hungary's independence; one division of the body, commanded by Major Weisz, distinguished itself particularly at Waitzen, on the 14th July, 1849, in a brilliant engagement against a greatly outnumbering Russian force. The brave Gyron fell into the hands of the Austrians, after the surrender of Görgey, and

was by them hung on a gallows in Pesth, in October, on the same day, and at the same hour, when the noble patriot minister, Czány, and Baron Jessenack, died the death of martyrs by the hands of the executioner, victims to the cruel and murderous disposition of Haynau.

A third German free corps was the battalion of the so-called Tyrolese rifles, formed at Pesth in July, 1848, by J. Söll, of Tyrolese—brave sons of their free mountains, and excellent marksmen. This corps was commanded by J. Söll, with the rank of captain, but the originally small number having increased considerably, after a splendid affair at Sumerein, near Presburg, Söll was nominated major, and the corps was formed into a battalion. Four companies of the same took a most active part, as the vanguard, in the celebrated winter campaign over the Carpathian Mountains; the 5th and 6th companies were attached to Klapka's division, until the junction of the armies at Kaschau. Söll fell a prisoner of war into the hands of the Austrians, on the 6th January, 1849; and a few weeks later, Windischgrätz condemned him to death on the

gallows, at Ofen. Söll had a noble spirit, and was a brave soldier; he was the intimate friend of the editor of this work, who served in his corps. May these few records preserve to posterity the memory of an honourable man. The editor may never see again the lonely grave of his departed friend, and how many dear friends and brothers in arms has not every Hungarian had to part from and to mourn for, but to cherish the memory of such friends is a sacred duty!

The editor wishes also to say something in honour of this brave corps, of which Görgey in his work, seems to insinuate that it had been the worst battalion of his army. No officer or soldier of this troop will certainly ever trouble Görgey for a certificate of good conduct. It is, indeed, to be wondered how Görgey came to make a present of his own charger to the commander of this the worst corps in the army, as an acknowledgment, for the bravery and courage shown by his men under very trying circumstances. The reader may also be surprised to learn that Görgey selected this very battalion to form the vanguard

during his march through the Carpathian defiles. Of this "bad battalion," the first commander fell into the hands of the Austrians, who executed him; the second died the death of the brave on the battlefield, the ball not hitting him in the back; and of the 1,000 men, forming the battalion, only a skeleton of 200 was left when Görgey surrendered, the rest had bled and died for fatherland, whilst Görgey now rests himself comfortably (?) on his laurels in Klagenfurt. Yes, Mr. Arthur Görgey, after the judgment in your work, and considering also what you there have stated respecting Kossuth, Bem, Nagy Shandor, Guyon, Perczel, etc., the editor must thank you in the name of his old comrades, most of whom fell as becomes soldiers, before the enemy.

HUNGARIAN HEROES IN CHAINS.

THIS chapter, and the illustration belonging to it, may be taken as a counterpart to the last. It represents a scene from the period after Görgey had laid down arms at Világos.

In the last chapter we described the position of the agricultural population before the revolution of the years 1848-9; we propose now to introduce some sketches which will explain the bitter hatred which every Hungarian bears from his infancy against the Austrians.

The German emperors, at the period of the Middle Ages, made themselves hated by the other nations of Europe through their constant endeavours to conquer and bring them under their subjection. Not content with enslaving only their own Teutonic race, they sought to enslave all, and amongst those most subjected to such constant warfare with the Germans, were the Magyars. In the fifth century, Attila, king

of the Huns, (the original Magyar race) was at war with the Germans; so also in the tenth century was Arpád and his successors. The emperors, Henry III., IV., and V., tried in succession to conquer the Hungarians. Peter the Hermit, Volkmar, Gottschalk and other crusaders, having received permission from the Magyar king, Kóleman, for a free and unmolested passage for their troops through his land, robbed and plundered on their march in the same manner as they did afterwards at Palestine. Frederick of Babenberg, Duke of Austria, surnamed "the warrior," plundered Béla IV. of the crown jewels, when this unfortunate monarch was seeking an asylum with him against the invading Tartars; and he devastated afterwards even those parts of the country not invaded by the Mongols. Another Frederick, (the IV., German emperor,) stole the celebrated original crown of Hungary, and when the Hungarians offered to redeem the same, he at first tried to cheat them in the bargain, by substituting a false one pretty well imitated! The Hapsburg dynasty during three centuries inflicted so much misery upon


Hungary, entangling her constantly in broils and wars with other nations, cheating and draining the country by every possible means that the long glimmering spark of hatred was at last blown into a consuming flame by the perfidy and perjury of the court and the camarilla. Hence originated the war of independence. The people of Austria's German hereditary crown lands, Moravia, Steyermark, the Tyrol, and the Saxons in Transsylvania, were all, with a few honourable exceptions, the willing and active tools of the dynasty. Among those worthy to be named as exceptions we ought particularly to mention the brave Viennese and the men from the Zips—a county mostly inhabited by Germans. After the unfortunate end of the struggle and also during the war, the executioners and gallows' propagators, Haynau, Windischgrätz, Welden, Hentzi, Ramberg, the traitors Berger, Rieber, Bechtold, Oettinger, Puchner, Blomberg, Merz, and many others were for the most part Germans who made the dynasty, if possible, still more hated by the cruelties and crimes perpetrated by them.

To the honour of the Hungarian nation and

the army it must be stated here, that never in any such fierce war was there a more kindly disposed and less cruel militia, than the Honvéds. The Austrian prisoners, the soldiers as well as the officers, were treated in a kind manner; they generally were allowed as much personal liberty as was possible under the circumstances; they were well attended to, and received pay according to their rank, to provide necessaries or comforts for themselves. The Hungarian prisoners on the other hand, had to beg in the streets for their sustenance, the officers were treated mostly like robbers and criminals—many of them, those most obnoxious to the Austrians, were, as has been stated, executed; among others, the excellent major of the Tyrolese rifles, Söll, Major Ladislaus Baron Mednyánszky, Captains Gruber and Baldini. Posterity and history will sit in judgment over such deeds. We shall never forget such scenes as we witnessed during this war—scenes which powerfully contrasted the native cruelty of the Austrians with the kind dispositions of the Hungarian patriots.

The pictorial illustration to this chapter is

no exaggeration. It is a group of Hungarian prisoners: to the right of the foreground, a true son of his country, a hussar; to the left, a wounded infantry officer; in the background, a militia man, a soldier of the Polish legion, and a man of the brave battalion of Czriny. Although they are all in chains, they march with the proud bearing of men, satisfied that they have done their duty, whilst the accompanying Austrians bear the mark of hirelings, —they feel secure, and are satisfied because they have their victims chained and in their power. Each with his hand resting upon the trigger, is ready to shoot his prisoners down like dogs, at any movement indicating an attempt at escape. The scene is only one of many thousands similar to it which occurred. The original of this sketch was drawn by a highly talented artist, Allemand, for the Emperor of Austria, but at the expedition of the Hungarians from Comorn to Dotis it fell into the hands of the hussars; afterwards it came into the possession of Lady P * * * , in London, who kindly allowed the editor to take a copy of it.



BEM.

THOSE who have written of the Hungarian war, 1848 and 1849, and judged the merits of the most prominent among the leaders of the Hungarian army, have often put the question, which of them deserved to be considered as the greatest.

Görgey's treachery is a stain in his glorious career, otherwise we should consider him as the bravest of all of them.

Perczel showed great courage and patriotism, and did wonders of bravery and heroism, which will never be forgotten by any of his countrymen, but his want of knowledge of military science and tactics, made him less apt for the office of a commander-in-chief of a large body of troops.

In the person of the greyheaded Polish hero, Bem, we recognize at once a most skilled general, a brave soldier, who fought with the

highest courage and perseverance, and evinced even in the most critical positions, both boldness and skill during the war for the sacred rights entrusted to him to defend. He deserves in every respect the highest rank among our noble heroes, however much some people, especially a not inconsiderable portion of his own countrymen, may try to lower him in the eyes of the world.

We will not here enter into further details as to his life, and his former career, previous to the Hungarian campaign of 1849. Suffice it to state, that Joseph Bem was born in the year 1795, that he received his education in a military academy, that he distinguished himself first under Napoleon, as officer in the artillery, and that in the year 1831, he fought in the Polish revolution as General of artillery, in which capacity he was known to all as one of the most valiant heroes of his country.

He alone saved the Polish army from utter destruction in the battle of Osztrólenka, through one of those bold and daring attacks of his artillery, which he executed with such masterly skill, and in which no other general neither of

former or modern times has ever surpassed him.

Bem seemed to be made for a soldier, nature itself seemed to have destined him for such a perilous career ; war was his very element, in it he could live and breathe freely, he sought it wherever he could, for the clashing of swords, the whistling of cannon balls were like music in his ears ; war roused his mental energy, and freed his whole character from the weakness and the imperfections into which he might have fallen through the drowsiness of every day life, just as the sudden thunderstorm purifies the heavy atmosphere.

During his eighteen years' exile, he fought in different countries, wherever an opportunity presented itself, and although he did not always defend the purely democratic principles, yet he never fought for the interest of the common enemy of his country, the bitterly hated Emperor of Russia.

Bem had not been on friendly terms with the Polish refugees in France, especially not with Wisoczky and the ultra-democrats who were constantly trying to cast suspicions upon

him, and to vilify and lower his character. They saw in him nothing but a fortune-hunter, they said he never was a decided friend of his people, never a true Pole; but a man who, though always ready to stake his life for the restoration of Poland, yet was never guided by real love for his country, by truly democratic principles, but one ready to sacrifice everything for his restless ambition. However this may be, Bem never became a traitor of the cause to which he had sworn, and he carried his deep-rooted innate hatred against Russia down to the grave with him.

The revolution in March, 1848, which had been like a thunder-storm hanging over the horizon, suddenly broke over the East of Europe, and shook the thrones of absolutism to their foundation. The terrified sovereigns in their difficulties and their helplessness, threw themselves into the arms of the people, loosening their chains, though only with the intention to fasten them more firmly and permanently, as soon as they should have succeeded in again securing the reins of government. It was then that Bem was for a short time restored to his

country, and led, up to October, 1848, a retired and quiet life, at Cracow.

From here the Hungarian government called him again into activity, as they had perceived during the expedition of Jellachich, that not only were there in the Hungarian army many traitors in favour of Austria, but also their own generals could no longer be depended on, since already Bechtold, Berger, Oettinger, Telecky, and Puchner had in the most shameful manner outraged the cause of their country. On the other hand, the younger officers in the Hungarian army were as yet but inexperienced, and possessed but little knowledge of warfare. The government, therefore, tried in other countries to find generals suited for their purpose, especially among the Poles, who had fought in the war of 1831, and they very soon discovered that Bem would be of all the best fitted and the most worthy to take the high post of a general of the Hungarian army. On the day, therefore, of the murder of the Austrian minister of war, Latour, at Vienna, the 6th October, Paul Szirmag, of the Hungarian government, was dispatched to Bem, then at Cracow, to

engage him for their service. Bem was willing to follow him, and he immediately with Szirmag set off for Vienna, where the inhabitants were just then making every possible preparation for defending themselves against the united armies of Jellachich, Auersperg, and Windischgrätz. On his arrival, Bem entered immediately upon his new sphere, and took some inferior post in the army of the besieged, though not without encountering many difficulties, as he was but little known there. However great were the courage and the perseverance shown by some portions of the besieged, yet it was to be expected that Vienna would be lost through the despondency which reigned generally through lack of confidence of the leaders of the revolution in each other, from a want of military tactics displayed in the defence, and lastly, to some extent, through want of subordination and discipline. Already before the arrival of Bem, the greatest blunders had been committed, the preparations were deficient, every chance for counteracting the plans of the besieging army had been lost sight of, many opportunities for strengthening their army

overlooked, in fact, the most necessary things had either been neglected, or entirely forgotten. Bem was surprised, for instance, to find on his arrival at Vienna, that they were short of ammunition stores. But these were soon after supplied to him from Presburg, through Ujhazi, the government functionary. Whilst the leaders of the besieged quarrelled among themselves who was to be commander-in-chief, everybody desiring to command, and nobody willing to obey, the Generals Giron and Frank tried to bring accusations against Bem, and Fenner Von Fenneberg against the then commander-in-chief, Messenhauser. The enemy had in the meantime obtained the most important advantages in such a manner, that the besieged were very soon driven back into the centre of the town, and could only continue the struggle by erecting barricades. The Viennese, especially the remaining portion of the academic legion, also the people themselves, and a part of the national guard did wonders of bravery under Bem's own command. Bem was everywhere, he rushed like the common soldier into the midst of the cannon-balls that poured upon him, he gave

orders, encouraged the soldiers, and very often went himself and loaded, pointed, and fired the guns with such masterly skill, that his shots told most frightfully upon the ranks of the enemy. But the struggle was only carried on energetically where he was himself, but where his energy could not reach, there was but little zeal, and the enemy very soon obtained the victory. The imperial army took possession of the suburb called the Landstrasse, whilst Bem in the famous star redoubt, as it is called in that part of the town, which is known by the name of the Jägerzeil, still poured death among the besiegers. Such was his courage and boldness, that he said to one of the officers of the national guards, as we heard it ourselves, when he entrusted to him the defence of some dangerous position: "Sir, you will defend this post as long as possible, and even when it is no longer possible you will still defend it."

The enemy attacking him in the rear from the suburb Landstrasse, his position became untenable, and the defence had to be given up.

The town at last surrendered on the 30th October, after they had in vain been waiting

for reinforcements from the Hungarians, whose army had been defeated at Schwechat. The besieged did not surrender without having made one more desperate though fruitless effort for defence.

The escape of Bem from Vienna is described in different ways. Some say, he fled in the disguise of a fruit woman; others, that he was laid in a coffin and thus carried beyond the outposts of the enemy's army, where a coach awaited him which brought him to Presburg. From here he proceeded to Pesth, where he arrived on the 7th November, and immediately placed himself at the disposal of Kossuth for the approaching war.

Bem had hardly arrived at Pesth, when that faction among the Poles, who also in former times had always been hostile to him, began their intrigues against him. A young fanatic Pole, named Kolodzecki, seemed to have made it his principal object to get rid of Bem. Not knowing Bem personally, he first enquired on entering his room whether it was Bem that stood before him, and on being answered yes, he immediately drew a pistol and

fired at him. But it was decreed in the wise providence of God, that Bem was not to fall through the hands of this traitor, and God spared his life for other important events. The wound he received in the forehead was not at all dangerous. The malefactor was taken prisoner, but upon Bem pleading on his behalf, he was condemned to a short imprisonment only, from which however he made his escape.

Bem now laid before Kossuth and the Hungarian government his plans how the war with Austria should be carried on. But there seemed to be on the part of the government a want of confidence in him, and it required all the influence of Kossuth to prevail upon the government to trust him again with a post in the army. Kossuth, therefore, appointed him upon his own responsibility, commander-in-chief of the army in Transsylvania; an appointment which proved to be a most fortunate one.

Though we entertain the highest respect for the talents of Bem as a general, yet we must confess, that he possessed more tactical than strategical skill. He was famous for the wonderful results which he often achieved with

comparatively small forces at his command, deluding the enemy by a well planned "coup-de-main," weakening and even ruining him without fighting a battle. He possessed courage and skill for a guerilla mode of warfare, and well understood how to get out of scrapes and danger himself, and to endanger the enemy's safety even when he himself had been defeated; but he was less skilful in carrying on warfare on a large scale, or in taking at one glance a wide range over the whole field of battle. Wherever he could not be present himself, the troops were generally without any orders, and entirely left to shift for themselves.

However, he was fully competent to discharge the duties now assigned to him. At the head of a small body of troops full of boldness like himself, he carried on a sort of guerilla war with really wonderful skill. If instead of his little corps, which, before he took charge of it, was in a state of demoralization, he had been entrusted with the command of a well-disciplined army provided with everything requisite, and if instead of a constant war of factions in Transsylvania, he had had to carry on a regular

war, perhaps he might have been less successful, and history would have recorded his name with less praise. He led a small body of troops, of all the most undisciplined, (and who previously had been constantly defeated) in the course of a few weeks from victory to victory, he took possession again of a country almost wholly occupied by the enemy's armies; in fact, he soon gained the most glorious victories over the boasting Austrians and their allies at Gaalfalva, Tiski, Hermannstadt, Klausenburg, etc. For all these brilliant results we are entirely indebted to him.

But we will place the reader at once upon the scene of action, where Bem gained all his laurels.

Trannsylvania, the sister country of Hungary, had possessed for centuries past her own sovereign rulers, who even in the latter times of the Hapsburg dynasty reigned separate from those of Hungary. But the laws of Trannsylvania being somewhat similar to those of Hungary, the native population, though but weak in comparison with the Saxon and Wallachian portion of the inhabitants, had been successful

in uniting Transylvania with Hungary under the name of the "Union;" and, thus she ceased to be considered as a province separate from Hungary. But in the south, the Austrians were not less successful in sowing dissent and discord among the Wallachians and Saxons. They threatened the Saxons, and with them the less enlightened Wallachians, in case of their becoming allies of the Hungarians, with the entire annihilation of their nationality, nay even with the total destruction of their race. Austrian emissaries tried constantly to make those of the Saxons which were less in favour of the cause of Hungary, believe, that the only object in view with respect to the agitation in Hungary was, to deprive the Wallachians, and especially the Saxons, (who occupied the more cultivated parts of the country, of their land and their property, and the nation at large of its schools and churches, nay, to endanger even the lives of the population. The Saxons were credulous enough to communicate their fears to the Wallachians, who fancied themselves in like danger, and thus the Saxons formed an alliance against

the so-called common enemy with the very party they most detested. Very soon hostilities took place, in which the fanatic Wallachians more especially, who were carried along by blind prejudice, committed the greatest cruelties against the Hungarian part of the the population. The towns were ransacked, the churches desecrated, and whole families of Hungarian noblemen extirpated by the most shocking atrocities, villages were burnt, the lands devastated, and the lives of the Hungarians were endangered in every possible way. The government were not able to prevent these cruelties, which the Austrians first aided in secret, then openly. The Hungarians had neither a well organized army, nor even a body of armed men to send into the field against the numerous regiments of Austrians who were stationed in Wallachia; and though they succeeded in bringing together a few thousand badly armed peasants, who had been enrolled as volunteers, they wanted honest leaders. Partly from this cause, being under the command of such treacherous officers as Baldacci, and partly in consequence of the badly planned move-

ments of their commander, Catona, they were soon driven out of the country.

In consequence of the battle of Deés, at the end of November, 1848, where the troops of the Hungarians under Catona were entirely defeated, and were only saved from total destruction through the extraordinary bravery of the small but courageous Vienna legion, Transylvania fell completely into the enemy's hand. Catona had been obliged to retreat to Nagy-Banya, on the Hungarian territory, and this town was likewise about to be given up to the enemy, when Bem arrived, accompanied by Beothy, the government functionary, who had been appointed as a commissioner to be at Bem's service when he might want him.

Bem took the command of the remaining troops, which a short time before had amounted in all, to about 16,000 men, but he weakened them by discharging all the country people, because he would have none but regular soldiers. With the troops thus left to him, he prepared himself for an immediate attack upon the enemy. The first decisive battle was fought by him against the Austrians at Csúcsa, on the

18th and 19th December, when, through his vanguard, about 3,000 men under the command of Colonel Riezkó, he obtained a complete victory over the Austrian army of 6,000 men, under General Wardener and Colonel Urban, who had to retreat towards Klausenburg. In the meantime, Colonel Czecz had, near Sibó, attacked the Austrians under Binder; but, as the forces of the latter were much superior in numbers to his own, he retreated in good order upon the main corps under Bem. Bem had, however, fully gained his object, which was to separate the two armies of the enemy, and his skilful movements now allowed them no time for again becoming united. In fact, having at this time received a reinforcement of troops, so that his army mustered 11,000 effective men with 18 cannons, he ventured an attack against the city of Klausenburg, which was then in the possession of Wardener. Bem stormed the place, and Wardener retreated towards Gálfalva and Nagy Enyed, where his army joined that of Puchner. Bem only remained a very short time near Klausenburg and then began to pursue Urban, who had

retreated in a northerly direction, and who, except some few trifling skirmishes, never accepted battle. After a short engagement at Leckenze on the 1st January, 1849, Urban was thrown back upon the frontier town of Bistritz, and was very soon compelled to leave this place also in the hands of Bem. Bem began only on the second day after, to pursue him further, though he was close upon his heels, and the rear of Urban was but two hours in advance of Bem's vanguard. Only a few battalions were ordered to pursue the enemy, besides a small number of volunteers, who had received Bem's consent to join his troops. This force was rather small, and it seemed hazardous to pursue the retreating enemy, who was so much stronger in number, through a territory which offered the greatest advantages for the latter. In the midst of a severe winter, the Hungarians had to climb up mountains, some of them of great height; the country was covered with forests and thick-grown underwood, presenting to the enemy many favourable opportunities for ambuscading, and for attacking Bem's troops in the rear, therefore it was impossible

for the latter, owing to their small number, sufficiently to reconnoitre the country around. As Bem crossed the Bukowina frontier, one-half of his troops, who were most of them Szeklers, left, and refused to follow him any further. Every day the number of his men became less, many died on the march from fatigue and the intense cold, others returned of their own accord, so that at last, when the enemy had been brought to a stand, the remaining force of Bem consisted only of 2,000 foot, one division of horse, and two cannons, the latter of which were but of little use to him. It was on the 5th January, near Watra Dorna, that Bem came upon the enemy, who was prepared to make a powerful resistance, and only retreated after a severe engagement, on which occasion Urban's travelling carriage, together with his hat, fell into Bem's possession, these Bem sent to Kossuth as tokens of his victory. Bem seemed almost inclined to pursue the beaten enemy still further, which he, however, hardly could do without acting entirely contrary to the orders of his government. He therefore turned back and took his route over Nászód.

The advance had been very dangerous and fatiguing already ; the return was much more so. The roads had been made impassable by the deep snow which had fallen, and those of the country people who were hostile to the Hungarians, had, moreover, barricaded the roads at different places, and it was only after having lost much time that Bem succeeded in overcoming all these difficulties ; and on the evening of the 10th January, he arrived again in the neighbourhood of Bistritz in a very exhausted state. He now collected all his forces at Bistritz, and leaving only a small garrison behind under the command of Colonel Riezkó, he marched against the main body of the enemy's troops under Puchner, who commanded about 14,000 men. In the battle of Gádfalva, on the 16th January, 1849, Bem with only 7,000 troops put Puchner to flight. In this engagement, Bem was almost in danger during the heat of battle, of having his head cut off by an Austrian cavalry officer, called Herzberger, first lieutenant in a regiment of light horse, or as it is called in the Austrian service, "*chevaux-légers*." Bem hastening forward alone at the head of his troops,

as he always used to do, it happened that during a skirmish between some cavalry which he witnessed, the above-named officer in a fit of fool-hardiness singled him out, and rushed with his drawn sabre from the midst of his own regiment upon Bem, who was attended at the moment but by very few officers, determined as he thought at one stroke to fell the chief of the rebels. Bem never carried either pistols or a sword, but only a small riding whip; and he would undoubtedly have lost his life, if at that very moment, Colonel Mikas had not hastened to his assistance, who, in warding off the blows, wounded the Austrian officer several times, so that he was obliged at last to declare himself a prisoner.

Bem, on this occasion, far from losing his usual calmness and self-possession, looked at the courageous Austrian when he was being led away, with an approving smile, and said, "I wish I had many such soldiers."

The enemy had been completely routed, and retreated with the greatest haste. Bem pursued with vigour, as in order that the victory might be really attended with decisive results. it

was necessary not to allow Puchner a moment's rest. Puchner, indeed, was unable to rally, and was driven back as far as Hermanstadt. All the intermediate places, especially Medgyes, which was a most important place on account of its large stores of provisions, fell into the possession of Bem.

The army of Transsylvania now regained its former self-confidence; the soldiers saw that they could gain victories, if commanded by an experienced general, and this confidence in themselves became greater every day, and did not even diminish, when afterwards they suffered great losses in several battles. Whilst previously, under inexperienced or treacherous generals, they trembled at the fire of the guns of the enemy, they now rushed right up to the mouth of the cannon under the hottest fire. It now no longer needed the order which Bem had issued one day, that the infantry were to reserve their fire till within a distance of only fifty paces from the enemy; even this distance appeared to them too great now,—the first volley given, they preferred, henceforth, to rush upon the enemy with the

bayonet, and to throw everything down before them.

Bem's chief object now was to take Hermanstadt, (which was the central seat of the Austrian Saxon camarilla,) and Cronstadt, after losing which Puchner would have nothing left him but to make his retreat into Wallachia. Whilst advancing upon Hermanstadt with only 7,500 men, Bem sent orders to Colonel Beöthy directly to send after him the 8,000 men with 20 cannons, which had been directed upon Klausenburg as a reinforcement for him. Beöthy, however, neglected this order and kept these troops by him. Bem calculated positively upon this division, thinking it impossible that his orders could have been disobeyed; he, therefore, continued his march, and on the morning of the 21st January, he arrived before Hermanstadt, when he immediately began the attack.

Without in the least doubting Bem's military talents, we must confess, however, that the chances of this attack were at the first glance badly calculated, and proved unsuccessful through the impetuosity with which it had been

undertaken. Not only was Bem waiting for the above reinforcement, but he did not know at the time that he begun the attack, whether Colonel Czezy, who was to have attacked the town from the other side, was already arrived at his post. He arrived too late, just when, after having made the most powerful exertions, Bem had begun to retreat. Hermanstadt was the most important point in Trannsylvania, and the enemy would naturally make every preparation for its defence. Bem could not, therefore, but expect the most violent resistance, and he should have known, as well as the army and the population around it knew, that the town was not only defended by fortifications from without, but also from within, by barricades, ditches, etc. It seems that all this had been lost sight of by Bem, or he had considered it as a mere trifle, perhaps over-rating his own strength, and undervaluing the power of the enemy. During the dense fog of the morning, which completely concealed the town on this most disastrous day, Bem's force advanced in such precipitous haste, that they did not perceive the enemy being so near, until the first

Austrian guns were fired, by which Colonel Mikes was killed by the side of Bem, and the horse of Count Teleky was shot under him. The attack upon Hermanstadt had to be executed quickly, so as to make an impression upon the retreating enemy, and Bem was quite a master of this kind of warfare, but yet in this instance he acted with great imprudence, not having even provided himself with sufficient ammunition ; this was another cause why he was obliged to retreat. Puchner pursued Bem most vigorously, as he felt anxious to gain a complete victory over him ; but it was just in the most difficult positions that Bem showed his great military skill. He retarded the progress of his pursuers by a few batteries in such an effectual manner, that his army could not only retreat without being farther molested, but even succeeded in occupying an advantageous position near Stolzenburg. Here Bem was attacked on the third day, and defended himself with the utmost bravery. His own presence at the batteries, which were advantageously posted, supplied the place of many thousand troops. Before Bem, however, could again venture an

open battle he wanted those troops which Beöthy now refused to send him. To obtain this aid, he went himself to Klausenburg, after having placed the main body of his troops under the command of Colonel Czeecz. But Beöthy was just as obstinate as Bem; he absolutely claimed a body-guard for his own use, which Bem would not grant on any account, he would only allow him one company for the protection of the town; saying he could not spare soldiers merely for the personal service of the government functionary. Both disputants, therefore, wrote to Kossuth, Bem requesting that he would either send to Transsylvania a commissioner of a more peaceable temper, or none at all, as he could get on quite well without one; Beöthy complaining on his part, that Bem defied the civil authorities. Kossuth perceived well enough, that two such fiery persons as they were, could not well live in peace together, and would in the end, perhaps, cause disturbance among the people, wherefore he appointed Csány in the place of Beöthy; the former having been a soldier himself, could agree better with Bem; he knew better than

Beöthy how much a military chief could claim, and how far he had a right to go. As regards Beöthy, Bem had a feeling against him, because he considered him as the cause of his defeat before Hermanstadt.

On the 4th February, Bem was attacked unexpectedly by the entire force of Puchner, near Viz Akna, where he had marched with a detachment of 2,000 troops, under the erroneous supposition of meeting there the 8,000 men commanded by his colonel, Czecz. When Bem perceived his mistake, it was too late to retreat, and he was therefore obliged to accept battle. The Hungarians fought like desperadoes against the enemy, whose army, though seven times as numerous, could only after a persevering struggle, maintain the field,—forcing Bem to retreat. Bem here gave a wonderful instance of his bravery and boldness. His infantry having been extended in a long line of skirmishers, had been compelled by an overwhelming force rushing upon one of their batteries, to abandon the same, seeking shelter behind it. Bem noticing this, and not being able to rally again the fugitives, rode up to

the enemy at the moment that they were going to take possession of the guns, and shouted to them, lifting his whip menacingly: "Leave these guns alone, ye rascals, else you shall learn to know me; I'll have you massacred, every father's son of you." The cuirassiers stared at him in astonishment, and Bem exclaimed, "Don't you know me? I am Bem, beware, and be off." Bem's name had already become famous among the Austrians; and, seeing him now before them in person, they neither thought of securing him nor his guns, but stood quite inactive for a moment. However, Bem would, perhaps, have had to pay dear for his daring, if at the critical moment, before the cuirassiers recovered from their astonishment, Teleky and Bethlen had not come to his assistance with their cavalry. During the retreat through Viz Akna, the immense number of baggage wagons almost entirely blocked up the road, causing a frightful confusion. It was here that the Hungarians lost almost the whole of their artillery, and that the greater portion of their infantry were put to the sword, by the pursuing cavalry of

the Austrians. Only one battalion escaped, and that in a miraculous manner; and, moreover, did the enemy considerable injury. One-half of this battalion was far in advance of the remaining companies, all on a sudden then the Austrian cavalry came up. The rear-companies of the Hungarians perceived that they would not be able to resist such a force, they therefore threw themselves flat upon the ground till the enemy had passed them, in hot pursuit of the companies in advance. Then Bem's soldiers quickly got up again, and attacked the cavalry in the rear, who thus stood between two fires. The pursuers by this lost a great number, and with great difficulty escaped from utter destruction, whilst the companies of the battalion were united again. The Austrians had, however, broken through the centre of the Hungarian army. The left wing being cut off from the main army fled towards Maros Vásárhely; the right wing, commanded by Bem in person, hastened to effect a junction with the corps of Colonel Czecz. This retreat, with scarcely 1,500 men, and 2 guns, proved again Bem's unsurpassed bravery, and his dar-

ing genius. Continually pursued by an army of about 14,000 men, he extended his handful of men into one continued line of skirmishers, and marched in this manner for several days, in order to deceive the enemy respecting the number and strength of his forces. At Mühlbach, almost entirely surrounded by the enemy, and having been three times summoned to surrender, he yet succeeded in making his escape, reaching Piski, where his reinforcements met him, and a new aspect was immediately given to affairs. Bem now, at the bridge of Maros, turned upon his pursuers. A bloody struggle ensued, and continued with varying success from dawn of day until late towards evening, when at last Hungarian bravery gained a splendid victory, and the fate of Transsylvania was for the present decided.

Bem now in his turn pursued the enemy for awhile, deceiving them by marches and counter-marches and attacking them every now and then, when least expected ; but at last his presence was wanted in the north, Urban having entered Transsylvania at Bistritz. With a force of 6,000 men Urban had succeeded in

forcing the Borgo Pass, and had from there advanced as far as Bistritz, where he fell upon the Hungarian corps under Colonel Riezkó, who, after a most heroic resistance, was completely beaten. The brave Riezkó himself lost his life in this engagement. Bem hastened with only 3,500 men to stop the progress of the victorious Austrians; he attacked them on the 25th February, and drove them back into the Bukowina, from whence he thus, a second time within the last two months, dated his reports to Kossuth of victory gained.

Whilst Bem thus with his small body of troops drove the enemy away from the north, the main body of the Hungarian army under Colonel Czeecz was stationed in the south to observe the movements of Puchner, and Bem after having defeated Urban, joined these troops at Mediasch, where he arrived just in time to lead in person the whole army, now re-united, against the enemy. The latter made an attack upon Bem's troops from several points at once, but contented themselves with manœuvring without engaging in a general battle, and retreated towards evening. The

next morning the combat was resumed, the victory being at first claimed by both sides; but at last the Hungarians being tired of useless manœuvring, made an energetic attack with the bayonet, and gained a complete victory over the Austrians. Bem who always used to be in the immediate neighbourhood of the artillery, had on this occasion taken his post near a battery, when a shot fired by him from a howitzer had the effect of igniting one of the enemy's ammunition carts, and exploded it with a fearful result, its contents telling a frightful tale among the ranks of the Austrians, scattering death and destruction just at the moment when the furious Honvéds rushed upon them with their bayonets. This caused complete confusion among the enemy, and they soon took to flight. Puchner after this defeat retreated on the road towards Hermanstadt, from whence, however, he soon received a reinforcement, thus enabling him the following day to make a fresh attack in which he was more successful. The Hungarians exhausted by their great exertions the preceding day were unable to resist the vigorous onslaught of so

many fresh troops, although they defended themselves with the greatest heroism, yet in the evening they had to leave the enemy in possession of the battlefield.

We now come to a period in the struggle, remarkable for a manœuvre, which will reflect the glory of all ages upon the greyheaded general, Bem, for the genius, energy, and courage displayed by him, in carrying into effect the movement to which we refer—this is the conquest of Hermanstadt.

After Bem had been beaten at Mediash, he retreated to Schäszburg, an insignificant little town, north of Hermanstadt, and which, although fortified both by nature and art, was nevertheless ill-adapted for a long defence. The troops having arrived late at night, after a long and fatiguing march, were not allowed any rest, but had immediately to entrench themselves. The morning after the defeat at Mediash, saw Bem within the new-built entrenchments, which especially on the side of the road towards Mediash, became stronger every hour. Bem continued this work uninterrupted. For many miles round no enemy

was to be seen ; the patrols brought every day news that the enemy had left the high road, and to all appearances, had also left Mediash provided with but a very small garrison. Bem continued his entrenchments unremittingly, and the enemy seemed almost to be taken in by this trick. At last, the desired moment arrived. On the 10th March, Bem called his troops together, and paraded about 10,000 men on the plain, close to the suburbs of the town, and then marched off quickly with them against Mediash. Taking possession of the town, he granted his troops a few hours rest, and then pushed onward again by forced marches. Enjoying only short intervals of rest, barely sufficient to prepare a meal, or refresh the tired body, the troops were hurried forward from village to village, from town to town, till at last they suddenly arrived before Hermanstadt. The Austrian government had entrusted the defence of this place to 4,000 Russians, who it was said had been called to their aid by the Saxon population themselves. Puchner had set out with his whole army for Schäszburg. The engagement began about 5 o'clock in the

afternoon, and was short, but bloody. The Hungarians maintained the field, although they had to drive the Russians everywhere, from the entrenchments, at the point of the bayonet, and had to conquer every inch of ground with blood. In the night, the Hungarians entered the terrified town as conquerors. The Russians had taken flight, but only after a great loss of prisoners and wounded, making their escape through the Rothenthurm Pass. Meantime, Puchner, misled by Bem's entrenchments thrown up across the high road, had tried by the mountain paths to get into the rear of the Hungarian army, and by surrounding them on every side, (as he supposed), thus to end the whole war at one stroke, by which he considered Bem would be fairly caught. When it first became known at Hermanstadt that the Hungarians were advancing, the deluded people, knowing of Puchner's intended manœuvre, and not at all doubting its success, imagined that the troops which arrived before Hermanstadt, would be the wreck of the Hungarian army which the victorious Puchner was driving before him, against the Russians, thus to bring them

between two fires. The inhabitants, therefore, thus completely deceived, were discussing the supposed great victory of the Austrians, when the Hungarian cannon balls began to boom along their streets. But how great was Puchner's astonishment when, on his arrival before Schäßzburg, he neither found Bem nor his army, but only a small detachment which had been left behind to complete the delusion, and who could just tell him that one had outwitted the other, and that the bird, Bem, had flown! It was quite impossible now to overtake Bem, for the latter having judiciously calculated upon Puchner's manœuvring so as to enclose the Hungarians, had thereby gained a whole day's march upon him. It did not, therefore, seem advisable to Puchner now to pursue the high road, and to gain Hermanstadt by the mountain paths was altogether impossible; nothing therefore was left to Puchner, in order to effect a safe escape, but to try to gain the Rothenthurm Pass as quickly as possible. On his way thither, the distant roaring of Bem's cannons, bombarding Hermanstadt, indicated clearly enough to

Puchner what would be the fate of the town ; Bem's batteries he knew must be its death-knell, and it was so, for after the fall of Hermanstadt the dominion of the Austrians in Transsylvania was at an end.

It was in and around Hermanstadt that the Hungarians fought for the first time against the Russians, and gave them striking proofs of their bravery. Although, long before the attack against Hermanstadt there had been a report that a Russian army of 8,000 men was encamped, under General Engelhardt, at Hermanstadt and Cronstadt, yet nobody would believe it. Now, the Hungarians had had ocular demonstration of the fact of this breach of international law by the Austrians ; and this fact proves that the Russian intervention was, for the Austrians, a matter of necessity, and that it would have taken place, even had the Hungarians not declared their independence, which it is worthy of note, was not done till about one month after this battle.

After the fall of Hermanstadt, Cronstadt surrendered without resistance. Bem had now only to do with an enemy that was in a state

of complete confusion and disorganization. He attacked the combined forces of the Russians and Austrians first near the Rothenthurm Pass, and then, which was his last attack on Transylvanian ground, at Feketehalum, where he defeated them, and compelled them to fly out of the country altogether. Puchner fled into Wallachia, where he was disarmed by the Turks, as it was their duty to do.

The Saxons of Transylvania, and especially the inhabitants of Hermanstadt and Cronstadt, were quite terrified at Bem's victorious career; they were afraid lest he should treat them after the manner of Windischgrätz or Haynau! But Bem understood his task and his position with regard to Transylvania perfectly well, and instead of altogether alienating the hearts of the inhabitants, who certainly looked with very little favour upon the victors, by treating them in a cruel or harsh manner, he tried to win their affections by kindness and generosity. Instead of giving Hermanstadt up to plunder, or destroying it altogether as had been anticipated by the inhabitants, he was content to levy a reasonable contribution, and proclaimed

at the same time a general amnesty and full pardon for all that had passed. He even abstained from compelling the sons of the Saxon families—his bitter enemies—to serve in the army, as we see from an answer given by him to a Saxon deputation of the citizens of Hermanstadt, and who had waited upon him, to request that he would not levy any conscription for service in his army. He answered laughing: "Don't be afraid, gentlemen, the rations are too dear, I cannot afford to give them to any but brave people."

The Hungarian government at Deberczin was, in spite of his brilliant success, very dissatisfied with Bem, because, as they asserted, he usurped all the civil power in Transsylvania, and dealt far too gently with the Saxons and the enemies of the Hungarians. Without, however, officially blaming this successful and brave general for so doing, they promoted him to the rank of field-marshal-lieutenant, and sent him as an acknowledgement of his services, the order of military bravery of the first class.

Bem had achieved in the short space of only four months wonderful results. A badly

disciplined and demoralized army he had changed into a courageous and victorious body of troops; he had taught his soldiers, that they must conquer if they would only faithfully obey the commands of their generals; he had inspired them with enthusiasm for the just cause in which they were embarked. He had not only gained a sister country for Hungary, but had conquered what had been an important stronghold of the enemy, for such was Transsylvania. He had in fact accomplished his task; the whole campaign was almost finished. No enemy was to be seen in the whole country, except in the fortress of Karlsburg, which he besieged immediately. After having made the necessary preparations, he commenced a complete re-organization of his army, to which volunteers now flocked from all sides.

The amnesty that had been granted to the Saxons had far more beneficial results, than if Bem had resorted to harsh and stringent measures, for all cities and districts now sent declarations of homage to the new Hungarian government at Deberczin. The declaration of

the independence of Hungary, and of union with the mother country, was everywhere received with the greatest enthusiasm. The authorities of both Hermanstadt and Cronstadt repelled with indignation the accusation brought against them that they had requested the Russians to enter their country,—a report which had been most industriously circulated by the Austrians,—and they protested solemnly against any intervention of Russia on behalf of Austria.

In April, the Transylvanian army, which at the time when Bem set out from Nagy Bánya hardly mustered 9,000 men, and afterwards even only 11,000, had increased to near 30,000 men, in consequence of the numerous recruits that had enlisted, especially from the district of the Szeklers; and the army had also come in possession of a numerous park of artillery, by Bem's retaking the cannons that had been lost at Viz Akna, and which the Austrians and Russians had been forced to abandon before Hermanstadt; and also, by means of the cannon foundry established by Major Gábor Aron at Kérdi Vásárhely.

The command of this fine corps was now given to Colonel Czeecz, who was promoted to the rank of general; whilst Bem marched with 8,000 men into the comitat of Krassó, in Hungary, took the town of Lugos from the Austrians, and then commenced a fresh campaign in the Banat, in which he was equally successful as in the preceding one. Puchner had, through the intervention of the Russians, collected a new force in Wallachia, entered the southern parts of Hungary, and taken possession of the Banat; it was, therefore, his old adversary again, whom Bem hastened to conquer. Bem first threw him out of his position at Weisskirchen, next he drove him out of Oravitza and Szaszka, and forced him to retreat through Mehadia, as far as Orsova, which also Puchner was unable to defend, and therefore crossed the Danube, thus being a second time driven out of the country. This campaign, short as it was, gained Bem new honours, and inspired both his friends and his enemies with the highest estimation of his abilities. In the meantime, Perczel too, had not been less successful, and during his bloody campaign in the

Bács comitat, he had obtained most signal victories over the Raitzen, and the Bann Jellachich. He raised the siege of the fortress Peterwardein, stormed the so-called Roman entrenchments, and took St. Tamás, a place, which at the beginning of the revolution, had been besieged in vain, and the taking of which had been long considered impossible. He thus established a connection between his own army and the troops of Bem in the Banat, so that Jellachich, whose position between the two had become more dangerous every day, and who had been beaten sometimes by Perczel, and sometimes by Bem, had at last to retreat to the entrenchments at Tisel and Perlaszváros. On the occasion of one of these victorious engagements, Bem, in a humourous mood, wrote a most laconic report of the victory gained by him: "Bann-bum—Bem."

The campaign in the Bács comitat, and in the Banat, continued during the months of May and June; it was at this time that the Hungarians took the fortress of Arad after a nine months' siege. Having found at this place a numerous besieging park, the Hungarians forth-

with proceeded to lay siege to Temesvár, which they carried on with great energy for some time under Bem's own direction.

So many victories having thus been gained in the south, and Görgey having been also successful in the north, his army being advanced as far as Raab, it was anticipated that the already tottering power of Austria would, in the end, be completely broken down, and that she would no longer think of offensive operations in the field. But in this emergency she applied to the Russian Autocrat, and his hirelings were promptly marched to her assistance, in accordance, no doubt, with a previous understanding.

In the month of June, then, the Russian hordes entered Hungary on three sides; 24,000 men, under Paniutin, joined Haynau, near Presburg; the main body of the Russians, under Paskiewitch's immediate command, entered Upper Hungary, driving before them the corps of Dembinsky, which scarcely mustered 14,000 men; and a third corps, commanded by Lüders, entered Transsylvania. Bem's presence under these circumstances was

more required in Transsylvania than in the Banat, he therefore immediately proceeded to Transsylvania, there to take the command against the Russians.

The latter, however, had already taken possession of the important Pass at Borgo Brund, the garrison of which had in a most cowardly manner retreated several miles into the interior. Bem exasperated at such cowardice led these troops again towards the Pass; the enemy gave up the position almost without resistance, seeming to attach little importance to maintaining the same. Bem pursued, but having advanced only a few miles, he fell into an ambush of the enemy, and his troops were dispersed. Bem himself was in danger of being made prisoner. From this moment his good fortune seemed to have forsaken him, for except in a few trifling skirmishes, he had almost always the worst of it against the overpowering number of the Russians. There were two great errors into which he was constantly liable to fall—too great confidence in himself, and too slight an opinion of the power and resources of the enemy. He believed that he could do everything with a so-

called coup-de-main. This was one chief cause of his ruin. At Schäszburg, for example, he thought he could defeat the enemy with only a small force of cavalry and artillery at his disposal. Without waiting for the reinforcements which he had ordered up, and which were on the march, he expected by one of his usual impetuous attacks to decide the fate of the day. But the enemy was stronger than it had been reported to him, his cavalry was dispersed, the greater part of his artillery was taken, and he himself escaped only with great difficulty, his horse fell in a violent encounter he had with some pursuing Cossacks, and he was thrown off into a ditch by the side of the high road. He felt too weak to raise himself and remained there until he caught sight of a hussar, who had been lost from his squadron, and was now galloping back to join it again, swinging triumphantly round his head the lance of a Cossack whom he had disarmed. Bem called out to him with all his remaining strength, "Hussar, help me out of this mess, I make you an officer." The hussar reached him down the lance, by means of which Bem scrambled out of the ditch. He

returned to his officers covered with dirt and mud, in a state in which they could hardly recognize him. The effects of this tragi-comic scene was increased when he drew out his pocket handkerchief, held it up with two fingers and said, addressing the parties present, "Gentlemen, that is all I have brought back with me." And it was really so. He could collect but very few followers, and therefore hastened away to bring together a fresh army. The inhabitants of Great Wallachia had offered their assistance to him a short time before the invasion of the Russians; they had also promised the Hungarian government that they would either send a numerous body of troops, or else organize a revolution in their part of the country, whereby either the Russians would have plenty to do to defend themselves, or the people would hasten *en masse* to the assistance of the Hungarians. For this purpose Bem went himself to Wallachia, but he had very little success, and was obliged to hasten back to his own army, who had in the meantime collected again, and who fought with their usual courage, but not with the same success as before. Her-

manstadt was lost ; Bem stormed it again with his brave troops, and was in the act of rejoicing at his triumph, when he saw the Russian troops in the most precipitous haste make their retreat towards the Rothenthurm Pass. But they now rallied again and returned reinforced by a fresh body of troops. The Russian infantry advanced as firm as a rock against the destructive fire of the Hungarian batteries—they seemed almost invincible. It was in vain that Bem threw himself foremost into the hottest fire, to set his troops an example ; the Hungarians gave way, and he found himself at last in the centre of the town, which had already been taken possession of by the enemy, forsaken by almost every one. All his aides-de-camp had either fallen by his side, or had been separated from him ; his cavalry had been dispersed or killed ; only a small body of resolute Polish Uhlands-Lancers—galloped to his assistance. Ready to sacrifice their own lives, they cleared a way for him through the streets. Having reached the open fields, he again joined his troops, who had thought him lost. Once defeated in such a decided manner, his army

could not so easily be brought together again. Bem therefore was soon driven back as far as Mühlbach, where he resigned the command of his army, or rather the wreck of it, for it was nothing else, to Colonel Stein, and then hastened to Hungary to be present at the battle of Temesvár.

It was now quite indispensable that all the Hungarian forces should be united. Vetter, therefore, was called back from the Bácska; Perczel and Dembinsky, after having sustained heavy losses in the battle at Szöreg, left their very favourable position at Szegedin, and marched to Temesvár to give battle to the Austrians, in the sure reliance that Görgey would likewise join them there, and in good time, so as to decide the victory in favour of the Hungarians.

The result showed that the selection of the battlefield at Temesvár, within sight of a fortress then in possession of the enemy, was a most unfortunate one. Görgey had laid his plans before the council of war, then assembled at Szegedin, and Dembinsky having declared himself in favour of this plan, was ready to set

out from Temesvár to attack Arad, but it was Bem chiefly who forced the battle. The combat was begun on the 8th August, but without any decisive results, and there would have been ample time to set off in the direction of Arad, which was only a march of six hours, and where Görgey had just made his entrance, but Bem, who just at that critical moment arrived from Transsylvania, insisted upon a general battle; this took place on the 9th August, and was most disastrous to the Hungarians.

Though the Austrians were stronger both as regards number of troops and artillery, the contest lasted a long time and was for a while doubtful, both parties fought with the greatest rage against each other. Bem stationed himself close by the artillery, but, unfortunately, as they were short of ammunition his skill was of no avail; some of the batteries soon ceased firing. The enemy now rushed with fury upon the Hungarians, the cavalry took to flight, and filled the infantry with despair and consternation. Soon the flight became general, and this defeat was the most unfortunate ever sustained by the Hungarian

army. Bem fell from his horse wounded. The number of dead, wounded, and prisoners, increased every hour, and it was with great difficulty that the remnant of this fine army, formerly so courageous and so victorious, dragged themselves as far as Lugos.

The streets and squares of this little town, and the fields and villages around it, were soon crowded with the sad remnants of the different corps. A rumour spread among the discouraged and famished troops, that Görgey intended to surrender, or that he had already done so ; this served only to increase the general confusion. Hundreds of officers resigned their commissions of their own accord, and whole bodies of troops refused at once to serve any longer and left their colours. Nobody was sufficiently energetic to put a stop to such cowardly and unworthy conduct. Bem was almost the only one who had not yet abandoned every hope ; he asserted that the cause need not as yet be given up in despair. He, therefore, addressed a proclamation to his former army in the Banat, and who also had served under him in Transsylvania. "There is a rumour," said he, "afloat, but without any

foundation, and only evil-disposed tongues try to confirm it, that Görgey has surrendered. Do not believe such a report, but even should it be true, we muster as yet an army of 80,000 men, with 150 guns, whoever is willing to fight for his country, let him come and join my standard, I shall hold out unto the very last, and I shall not yield as long as there is *one* true Hungarian who is willing to fight at my side." Bem's plan was to collect all who were still willing and able to bear arms on behalf of the sacred rights of Hungary, and with them to join the corps of Vécsey and that of Kazinczky, who, together, still mustered about 60,000 men. With these troops, he proposed to march to Dobra, and thus to transfer the seat of war into Transsylvania; but all his efforts were unavailing. The alluring proposals of Görgey, respecting a capitulation, whereby all differences would be settled peaceably, had greater influence over the minds of the troops, than Bem's warlike proclamations. Only a very small portion of the army followed Bem to Transsylvania, and these, the most of whom were Szecklers, seemed to follow him only because

they thought they would be nearer home, Görgey having made them all believe, that by capitulating, the whole army would very soon be dismissed to their own homes.

When Bem arrived at Dobra, Stein, with his small corps, mustering scarcely 1,500 men, had been driven back beyond Déva, and Transsylvania, with her army, was lost for Hungary. Notwithstanding, Bem collected here all the scattered fugitives from Hungary, joining them to his corps, and tried by all possible means to persuade his troops to make a last desperate effort, in order either to bring victory again to their colours, or at least to obtain an honourable capitulation. But it was of no avail, Bem even found himself compelled to bring up artillery against his own infantry, who tried in masses to go over to the Russian camp. At Lesneck, a Russian commissioner came to Bem demanding him to surrender, but Bem refused to enter into any negotiations, until the enemy should have evacuated the position of Piski. This was done, and on the 18th August, Bem entered Déva, and commenced negotiations, in consequence of which an armistice of twenty-

four hours was agreed to. The Russians, thinking that they had all the troops before them, who were not included in Görgey's capitulation, and that the Hungarians might venture an attack, sent for reinforcements from the interior of the country, the Austrians advanced in the rear of the Hungarians, and the Wallachians, who were still in arms, occupied the left flank, so that the poor, hard-pressed Bem, had scarcely a few feet of soil left, on which to parade his troops. However, he was apparently quite calm and careless about anything when he sat down at the well-served dinner table of the postmaster of Déva, ostentatiously wearing all the decorations denoting his high military rank. It was already afternoon, and Bem was still sitting at table in full uniform, whilst all those around him were dressed in private clothes, fully prepared for flight. They began to shake their heads in a suspicious manner, and some even went so far as to suspect Bem of some treacherous scheme respecting the higher officers. In the meantime, he had already given his orders to make the necessary preparations for a journey, one or

two squadrons of Uhlans had been ordered to the door, and when these had drawn up, he gave his last instructions to the officer appointed by him to negotiate with the Russians respecting the capitulation, and then merely said to his suite—"Follow me, gentlemen." Few knew where he was going, but those who had confidence in him, followed him willingly, and would have done so had the road led to imprisonment or death.

The news that Bem had taken his departure spread in the whole camp like wild-fire. Nobody knew properly where he had gone; and he had purposely kept it a secret. He followed in his travelling carriage for several miles the high road to Hungary, when he alighted and sent the carriage forward. He then mounted a horse, proceeding across the mountains towards the frontier by a foot-path, which was known to but very few even of the natives of the country.

Those who saw his suite with the small escort which had been joined by a few resolute officers, hastening along the road, covered with the dead and wounded of the army, could but

too well read in their countenances, the inward struggle that moved the hearts of these men, when they looked around them. Besides Bem and Guyon this small body counted a few other excellent men, such as Colonel Balogh and several others who felt deeply interested in the welfare of their native country, and had now to witness its utter ruin. It was a most heart-rending scene. A great number of scattered half-starved and helpless troops met their eyes for many miles; some who would rather surrender in Hungary than in Transsylvania dragged their weary limbs thither, whilst others, pursued by the enemy, returned from Hungary. They had taken off the cannons from the gun carriages and had made these into vehicles, upon which whole groups might be seen seated, beating their horses unmercifully to hurry them along. Costly articles, carriages, arms, ammunition chests, lay scattered in the fields, nobody cared for anything except to save his life and liberty.

Every hill-top or elevated position in the whole district was occupied by the Wallachians, who closely watched the movements of

the fugitives as they went along on the high road, and all who were only in small groups, were taken prisoners by them. Bem however very soon disappeared from their searching looks by taking the afore-named mountain path, which at last brought him where he wanted to be, but not without being exposed to endless difficulties, fatigue and privations, so much so that he himself and his suite were almost wholly exhausted. Bem now suffered so greatly from his wounds, that he could not endure to sit on horseback, but had to be conveyed in a cart drawn by oxen, a more comfortable carriage could not be used, as the nature of the paths would hardly admit of any vehicle at all, and though all the others were well-mounted, yet it was hardly possible for them to travel more than a few leagues every day in these impassable places. On the third day, the fugitives arrived after a very fatiguing march, at Ruskberg, where they were treated by the inhabitants in a most friendly manner, especially Bem and his staff, who met with a most hospitable reception in the house of Mr. Maderspach, well-known from the shameful treatment

his wife had to undergo from the hands of the Austrians. Towards evening, they continued their march, when they reached the village of Merot on the frontiers of Wallachia, where they saved General Kmetty from being given up to the Austrians. Kmetty and a few of his officers had tried to force their way from Fascet to the Eisernen Thor Pass, but they had been detected and arrested and were detained at Merot. The vanguard of the Polish Uhlans accompanying Bem, had just entered the village, and under cover of the dark, had passed themselves off for Austrians. The village bailiff received these pretended Austrians in a most friendly manner, and immediately initiated them into his secret, that he had taken a Hungarian general prisoner. "I am glad you have come," said he to them, "a few days since we took a Hungarian general with twelve other officers, I intended to send him tomorrow into the camp as prisoner, I am glad now that I can entrust this duty to you."

The Poles, far from undeceiving the bailiff, praised his zeal, and offered to take charge of the prisoners at once. They were, therefore,

immediately delivered up to them, when the Uhlans at once gave the bailiff to understand who they were, and arrested him and a few of his followers, among whom was a Wallachian priest, who had proved himself to be a most inveterate and cruel enemy of the Hungarians.

We now quote the words of one of these officers, who thus describes the dangers to which the fugitives were exposed during their flight:—"Our brigade had just arrived at Fascet, when the troops stationed there dispersed in the direction of Arad. All exertions of the brave general, to restrain his hitherto courageous and well-disciplined soldiers from following the bad example set by the other corps, were utterly fruitless. The general, who had always been the foremost on the battlefield, and the last on the retreat, had them drawn up in line; haranguing them, he pointed out to them the danger to which they would expose themselves. But the soldiers now would not listen to any expostulation, and as the general was unwilling to deliver himself up to the enemy in such a disgraceful manner, he devised

a plan to save himself. It was not without great grief in being so bitterly disappointed by our division, that we left them, and took the road of the Eisernen Thor Pass, which we still fancied in the possession of the brigade Sazaar. By lonely footpaths, we at last carefully approached the high road. Here we perceived the enemy's camp in the direction of Karansebes, their videttes soon espied us, and made preparations for arresting our progress. The general then ordered to leave carriages, horses, and all the baggage behind, and to hasten towards the nearest mountains. With great difficulty, we climbed up a very steep hill, through briars and brushwood. We could distinctly see a troop of the enemy's cavalry pursuing us, but the difficulties of the thick forest were too great for them, and after much fruitless exertion, they at last gave up their attempt, in the hope, no doubt, that we could not escape them in the end. After many wanderings, we at last reached this village.

“Here we demanded a guide to show us the way across the frontier. But though we promised the people a liberal reward, they stead-

fastly refused our request. Every one exhibited hostile feelings towards us; though, as we were well armed, none of them dared to attack us. After a great deal of entreating,—the bailiff, who could speak German, and with whom, therefore, we could have conversed much easier, being absent,—a tall stout fellow offered to serve us as a guide. The people, who had in the meantime exchanged peculiar looks with each other, the meaning of which we could only understand afterwards, followed us out of the village with no friendly spirit. Our guide was sulky, and seemed almost intentionally to lead us the very worst roads. In the course of conversation on the way, we happened to mention the name of Kmetty several times; but we did not suspect that our guide was noticing this name. At about half an hours' journey from the village, we came to a steep mountain of difficult ascent, across which lay our road. After a very fatiguing march, and when we just reached a small height, our guide suddenly made us understand that he could not go with us any further on account of the road being impassable during the night.

We therefore were forced to bivouac there till morning.

“About daybreak we proceeded on our journey, but had scarcely gone a few yards when we heard a shot and a ball whizzed close by my ear; soon a second and a third shot were heard, and immediately a heavy fire was opened upon us from the thick brushwood, so that we were obliged to make use of our arms. Our enemies soon appeared in large numbers from behind the brushwood, and rushed upon us most furiously, for our shots had told upon them. I, myself, and a brother officer were also slightly wounded, and we soon saw that any further resistance on our part against such large numbers would be perfectly useless; we therefore offered to surrender. After our arms were deposited some distance before us, the peasants came nearer to us, looking suspiciously and timidly around them. They first took our arms, and then with anxious haste seized our persons and after having pinioned us, brought us back to the village. Here we were immediately received by a magistrate, who had formerly served in the Austrian army,

whilst our guide, who, directly after the attack upon us, had made his escape, evidently to come here, stood by his side. We were not only stared at in a most insolent manner by every one present, but were also plundered of all we had. The magistrate knew that Kmetty had the rank of general, and it was in vain that we tried to persuade him that he was only a captain. The guide seemed to have overheard our whole conversation on the way, and to have reported it word for word.

“After a most minute interrogatory, during which we had to hear the grossest language and most insulting threats, we were at last thrown into a dark and damp room. Our gaolers now held a second search, and deprived us of the few articles which they still found upon us.

“Here we were left for a whole day without food, and had to breathe the most pernicious vapours with which the room was filled. In the evening, we were again summoned before the chief, were searched a third time, and threatened to be shot, if we did not at once give up any money or property, which might

still be in our possession. Unfortunately, one of our servants had still a few silver coins concealed in his boots; he was searched, and this money being found, he was sentenced to death. They took him to an open plot of ground, whither they compelled us to accompany him; he was made to kneel down, and one of the guards placed himself before him with his musket cocked, thereupon the general threw himself between the unfortunate culprit and his executioner, and thus covered the former, ready to sacrifice his life for him. This saved the man; for the judge, seeing that the general was determined to save the prisoner at the risk of his own life, took good care not to insist upon the execution, in order that he might deliver General Kmetty alive into the camp of the Austrians. They therefore took us back to a small wooden hut, where we were again left for a long time without food, and where we had so little room, that we could only squat down. A short time after, there seemed to arise a dispute amongst our guards, which continued during the night and the next day, and which, it appeared afterwards, was the cause of our

lives being spared. In spite of the express command of the magistrate, to deliver us up as prisoners to the Austrians, the villagers insisted that we should be put to death ; only they could not agree as to the mode of execution. Some were for hanging us, others demanded that we should be shot, and again, others would have the hut set on fire in which we were, to burn us alive. We were, indeed, doomed to witness through a hole in one of the planks, the preparations for this monstrous act of cruelty. We tried to burst open the door, but in vain. They heaped up straw from without, and were already bringing torches, when, at last, the remonstrances of a few prevailed over the rest, and induced them to desist from this crime, the consequences of which they began to dread, as some uncertain rumour had just then reached them, that Bem was approaching with a large force. These rumours of Bem's approach were gradually confirmed, and this caused us not yet to despair. At last, by our united exertions we succeeded in breaking down the door, but we got into the open air only to be immediately secured again. Some of the people armed with

axes and scythes took us between them, and marched us into a deep ravine, into which a torrent falls, making a stupendous noise, sufficient to drown any cries for help which we might make. There we remained in immediate expectation of death, their sharp axes and scythes constantly glittering over our heads up to the time of the arrival of the Uhlans, (the supposed Austrians,) to whom we were given up."

Under similar danger had the fugitives now to continue their road to Wallachia. In order that they might not be subjected, like Kmetty, to another sudden attack, Bem resolved to take the minister of the village and several peasants as hostages with him, and to serve at the same time as guides to the frontier. Here they received some money and were sent back to their homes.

The road through the mountains is rough and very fatiguing. Whatever baggage loaded on carts they had taken so far along with them, they were obliged now to leave behind or else pack it on the horses. The deeper they penetrated into this mountainous country the greater

were their difficulties. They were soon really in distress; for as they had not been able to procure sufficient provisions in the last village which they had passed, and as there was not a house nor even a miserable hut to be seen in this barren and unproductive region, they soon began to suffer from hunger. The barren soil did not even yield grass or moss for the starved horses. Many horses fell down dead before they even reached the highest summit of the mountains, and even that was scarce one-half of the journey; others soon became unfit for further use, and had to be left behind. With difficulty the fugitives climbed up one mountain after the other, and dragged their weary limbs from rock to rock on narrow footpaths by yawning precipices. Bem, although suffering great pain from his wounds, set the best example to all in meeting these difficulties; indeed, when in danger, the weakness of his body seemed to be altogether forgotten by him. He was seen on his horse always at the head of the troop, the white feather of his hat, like that of Henry of France, was ever among the foremost.

After long wanderings, they arrived at last quite exhausted in the little town of Baja de Rama, on the frontier of Wallachia. Here they felt most of anything the want of coined money, for they had almost nothing but Hungarian paper money. They were, therefore, obliged to barter their arms, horses, jewellery, and whatever they had been able to save, for provisions. Bem, who had always shown the most generous disinterestedness, was without either money or other property. Under these circumstances he hastened to Thurn Severin, to arrange with the Turkish commander, stationed there, for furnishing his companions with the necessary provisions. After they had sufficiently recruited their strength, the fugitives followed their leader. At Thurn Severin, close on the banks of the Danube was the encampment of the other Hungarian fugitives who had arrived earlier from Orsova and by the Rothenthurm Pass, Bem with his escort joined them, having first been given in charge of a division of Turkish troops, into whose hands they had to give up their arms. Soon after the Turkish soldiers were saying their evening prayers,

which they did whilst a monotonous tune was being played, and during a confused beating of drums. The devotions being concluded the officers mustered the fugitives. They counted them several times, and having at last satisfied themselves as to their actual number, they asked every one individually, whether he did not feel desirous to return home again, and some tents and provisions were distributed among them. This was the first reception they had from the Turks.

On the next day, they all proceeded, escorted by strong detachments of cavalry and infantry, into the interior of the country, towards Kalafat. This Turkish escort, commanded by a Bim Paschi (a major,) had to provide the necessary rations for the whole column, and to take all requisite steps for procuring what was necessary. They marched very quickly, but at short stages, made a halt to rest themselves, when they piled their arms, smoked their pipes, the major taking his quickly prepared coffee, after which they jumped up again, and continued their rapid march without any attention to dressing their lines. This was

the same from early morning till late at night. They then halted, and generally bivouacked in front of the houses. Provisions were rather scarce, and the escort was often obliged to resort to severe measures to obtain them from the peasants. After a three days' march, the fugitives reached Kalafat, where they crossed the Danube, to be sent to the Turkish fortress Widdin.

As our object is not only to describe the career of our hero on the battlefield, but also the state of affairs during the period of his exile, it will be necessary to make our readers acquainted with the general position of the Hungarian exiles in Turkey. Though Kossuth had never thought that this war would end in the way it did, yet he had the forethought to secure the protection of the Turkish government in case any of his countrymen should be compelled to take to flight, and he had demanded of the Sultan, that they should be allowed a safe passage through Turkey to France, or any other part of Europe. The Sultan having guaranteed this, Turkey became, after the disastrous end of the revolution, an asylum for them from the

Austrians and Russians. The Porte had stationed her troops on the frontier, partly for her own defence, and partly as a protection for the fugitives, who were received by her, and who, for their greater safety, were taken into the interior of the country. They were then encamped close under the walls of the fortress of Widdin, as in consequence of the diplomatic negotiations on the part of Austria and Russia, against which the Porte was too weak to make any opposition, none of the fugitives were allowed to enter any other part of Europe. They were to be detained at Widdin, until Austria and the other powers of Europe should have decided their fate. Meanwhile, the Porte undertook their maintenance. Only very few were allowed to live in houses in the town, a permission which was liable to be recalled at any moment. Both the soldiers and the servants of the civil service were arranged according to their former rank in Hungary, and received their rations on the same scale as the Turkish troops. These rations consisted of bread, meat, salt, butter, rice, and firewood. As to quantity and quality, the stan-

dard allowed by Turkey was much better than many of the Europeans, who are accustomed to a sufficient supply of good food, would think. But as the Turkish officials soon began to act in a fraudulent manner in the distribution of these articles, the fugitives suffered much from want; disease and pestilence consequently began to rage among them.

The rations were distributed according to rank, by the following scale :—From a private to a lieutenant received one; first lieutenant two, and captain four; a major eight rations per diem, and a general thirty-two rations. This proportion was so unjust, that whilst the superior officers had an over-abundance, the private soldiers and sub-officers had barely enough to keep themselves from starving. Private soldiers were afterwards allowed to receive their rations in money if they wished it, instead of in kind as at first.

The long encampment—for they stayed three months at Widdin—the want of clothing, the changeable climate, and the obnoxious vapours in this marshy district, caused many

diseases, and a great many died in consequence. These bodily ailments were increased by inward mental sufferings. From their fatherland they received the most distressing accounts respecting Haynau's bloodthirsty executions. The result of the diplomatic negotiations was such, that there was not the least hope left them, that they would ever be able to make their escape to any of the more civilized countries of Europe. It was rumoured on good authority, that they would all of them be given up to Austria. This rumour was almost confirmed, and in addition to this it was asserted that the Sublime Porte would only grant her protection to those who would be willing to embrace Islamism. Bem and Kmetty, from erroneous views and in the hope of a fresh war, were the first who took this step, and induced by their example others, who were too weak-minded to form an opinion of their own, followed their reprehensible course. Kossuth and the members of the late government had no influence in the affairs of their fellow-sufferers, and Bem was the only one who made his appearance regularly in the camp.

The leaders were disunited among themselves, and the different bodies of troops likewise quarrelled with each other, confusion, despair and anxious expectation were therefore to be seen everywhere.

Meantime, the Porte showed the most determined resistance to the attempts made to induce her to violate the pledge given to protect those, who had placed themselves under her protection, and she at last declared most solemnly, that she would in nowise give up the fugitives, even if she were threatened with war. This declaration of the Porte brought fresh life among the fugitives, who had already given themselves up to despair. Kossuth, with his suite, now appeared in the camp to console them, and to rouse them from their despair, though unfortunately he flattered them with the idle hope, that they would very soon return again in arms to their own native country.

As the Austrian government could not, in spite of every influence used by them, succeed in obtaining the extradition of the fugitives, they tried another mode to get them into their

power. They sent General Hauslab as a plenipotentiary to Widdin, to invite the privates and non-commissioned officers, under the miserable pretence of an amnesty, to return to their country. Some were exasperated at the cunning and baseness of such an attempt, and General Guyon tore his proclamation off the walls of the town, and was also successful in rousing the indignation of others against Hauslab; at last, however, Hauslab persuaded the greater number of the fugitives to return in the boats he had brought for them. Only a body of 800 Poles, from 300 to 400 Hungarians and the Italian legion, which latter afterwards returned to their own country, together with Kossuth and a few generals, remained in Turkey, and these formed the so-called Hungarian emigration.

The severe season having set in now, those who remained had dwellings in the town allotted to them, and received their rations as before, but their condition otherwise was in no way improved; Kossuth, however, constantly flattered them with the hope of a better future. The question, what to do with the fugitives, had not yet been fully decided at

Constantinople, and the exiles were thus in constant fear of being further removed into the interior of the country. Their fears were soon confirmed, as the Pasha of Widdin had received an order to send all the remaining fugitives to the fortress of Shumla, for which purpose some clothing and a small sum of money were distributed among them. They were transported in three divisions, on wagons expressly provided by the government, and under a strong escort. The Italians were sent off first, to Adrianople, next the Poles, and the Hungarians, to Shumla.

In Shumla, a great portion of the fugitives remained for a whole year. The Turkish authorities had through all sorts of promises filled their minds with vague hopes, that they would all have facilities given them to earn an honest livelihood, and that they would be better provided for. Hitherto, their supply of provisions had been most scanty, chiefly through the fault of the authorities, who took advantage of this opportunity to enrich themselves. For the general government had not only issued a proclamation to the whole nation to receive the

fugitives in an hospitable and kind manner, but also the army and the district authorities had received strict orders to show them all due respect, to afford them every assistance, and to grant them every support that lay in their power. But in spite of this order, they were, through the selfishness and the avariciousness of the government officials, deprived of many privileges which the general government had really conceded to them. As, for instance, a great number of officers had their horses taken from them under the pretence that they should be sent by ship from Kalafat to Widdin, and there be returned to their respective owners. Many never saw their horses again, nor did they receive the sums which the Porte awarded to them as compensation. On their arrival at Shumla, those who had embraced Islamism were not quartered in the same barracks with the other Poles and Hungarians, whilst the officers received lodgings in the town free of expense.

The commissariat department having been badly managed, causing great dissatisfaction among the soldiers and sub-officers, Kossuth

urged that the higher officers should sacrifice a small portion of their rations in favour of the former; this, however, was to be only a matter of voluntary contribution, no one was to be compelled to the reduction. Kossuth's proposition was accepted. Casimir Batthiányi placed his full allowance, and Kossuth and most of the superior officers the greater portion of their pay, for the benefit of the privates. By this arrangement, the common soldier received a small addition to his pay, whilst the sub-officers had theirs nearly doubled. This was the distribution among the Hungarians. The Poles were not in such a favourable position, as they had but few staff or field-officers among them; they therefore clubbed together at their barracks. These arrangements were almost the only signs of life and unity in the emigration, except this, there seemed to reign perfect apathy amongst the whole, every one wandered along his own path without interesting himself much about his brothers in misfortune—their spirits were broken! In consequence of the question respecting the ultimate fate of the fugitives being

still undecided, they were now more strictly watched than before, and though they were allowed to walk about the town, yet none of them durst show themselves in the outskirts or beyond the range of the fortress.

Kossuth and Batthiányi, although not in open hostility, still were not exactly on friendly terms with each other. Perczel and Kossuth had never agreed well together, the former especially by his haughty conduct kept the breach constantly open. Bem had shown coldness to Kossuth since the last events in Hungary. Mészáros and Dembinsky only were on good terms with each other, and as were the leaders so were the other members of the emigration, there was amongst all a want of that harmony together which under such circumstances was so very desirable.

Thus the winter passed away, and towards the end of it came the order that they were to be sent into the interior of the country. Kossuth presented two memorials to the Porte, in which he pointed out that such a course would be unwise, and that her close union with Hungary would be an important means of checking

the increasing influence and power of Russia over Turkey. But it was in vain. On the 8th February, Achmed Effendi arrived at the fortress not only to announce the decision of the cabinets of Europe and of his government as regards the refugees, but at once to see the same carried into execution. Kossuth and twelve of the most compromised, were ordered to be sent to an indefinite exile at Kutahaja, Bem and several more of them were sent to Aleppo.

We cannot adequately describe the effect this decree produced upon Kossuth and his companions. It was a bitter disappointment of their hopes. Kossuth left Shumla on the 15th February, 1850, followed by the prayers of his countrymen who expected never more to meet him again. We now turn again to Bem, who likewise very soon took leave of his companions. The greyheaded hero having for the last few months enjoyed perfect ease and quietness, his health and strength were restored, his eyes had gained all the fire of former times, and no one thought that death would so soon close them. He had lately been zealously studying the

Turkish language, the habits and customs of the country, and especially the state of the Turkish artillery, as he expected very soon to be called again to the sphere of action. His services were indeed soon wanted, but not for a long period, and not in the way in which he expected, namely, in a war against his old enemy Russia.

At Aleppo, the place of his exile, a plot had been laid by some fanatics, to slaughter all the resident Christians there. Their shops were plundered and destroyed, and a number of them killed by a large rabble of the Turks. The troops under the command of an officer who had made common cause with the rebels had retired to their barracks. In this emergency the governor of Aleppo appointed Bem commander of the troops. Bem quickly made his arrangement. He dispatched Kmetty and Stein each with a separate body of troops, to protect the foreign consuls and the Christian authorities; whilst he, at the head of another resolute detachment, threw himself into the midst of the furious mob. By his energetic interference, the revolt was quickly suppressed, and the mob dispersed in all directions.

This was his last act. Soon after this event death overtook him. He fell from his horse whilst taking a ride in the outskirts, and four days afterwards, on the 8th December, 1850, died from the injuries received. His last words were: "Poor fatherland, so then I can after all not liberate thee from the hands of thy tyrant." His body was washed and embalmed according to the custom of the Turks, and 4,000 troops under the command of the Pasha of Aleppo, formed the funeral cortège. A plain sarcophagus of white marble points out his resting place.


Thus was fulfilled the dream, which it is said he had three times, namely that the year 1850 would be the year of his death. The hero was doomed to die in a strange country and on a sick bed, instead of dying on the battle-field according to his most ardent wishes. Peace be to his ashes and a blessed memory to his name.

Our portrait of Bem is one of the most beautiful of the series, both as regards the general idea, and its execution. It represents our hero on his death-bed. The likeness is most striking,

more so than is generally the case with portraits on so small a scale. We can notice the strong, full features of his manly countenance. His light blue eye, full of ardour, and indicating the energy of genius and the nobleness of his nature. When Bem felt the hour of his death approaching, he did not fear it, he shrunk not on the battle-field, when it was every minute before him. But it was painful for him to depart without having accomplished the task he had set himself. We have recorded his last words, indicating his feeling on this subject.

When the shadow of death dims his eyes—when the world lies like a yawning precipice at his feet, he seizes the hand of the friend, who sits at his bedside, a man in the flower of his years. The dying hero seems to entrust to him the duty which it had not been possible for him to fulfil. In his last moment, he exhorts him, and warming, he lifts his hand to point to the symbol of freedom, with the device “*in hoc signo vinces.*” He seems to say, “It is a sign from a better world—under this banner of freedom alone, you, my son, can conquer—be not disheartened because you see me dying whilst

the altars of the goddess of freedom are being destroyed, and in the possession of the despots. The time will and must arrive, when she shall enter again the dwelling of men!" Inhabitants of the country which afforded him a resting place, stand around, seized with the solemnity of the moment. They look mournful and with reverence upon the hero of many a battle-field, whose fame is spread beyond the sandy desert, and who had been pursued by a despotic power into this remote corner of the earth. With anxious care and sorrow they watch his last beloved looks;—he is gone! Wearied by the toils of this world, he has joined his fellow-labourers now in the heavenly kingdom, who will live for ever, as long as God rules the universe. The memory of their deeds and of their fate will enflame succeeding generations whenever the day of liberty shall appear. No, Bem is not dead, he still lives in the hearts of the nation for whose freedom he fought, he will live there, even after centuries shall have passed away.



KEMÉNY.*

HAVING in preceding chapters spoken of some of the most eminent generals who distinguished themselves in the last Hungarian war, the hero of Piski, Wolfgang Kemény, shall now occupy our pen. His extraordinary bravery, intrepidity, his chivalrous spirit, and faithfulness in the execution of the orders of his chief, to which a great part of the success and victories of the Hungarian army in Transylvania is due, demand it from us.

When we learn from the military history of Napoleon, that the adventurous, daring and chivalrous Murat, decided by his brilliant charges of cavalry the battles fought by the great emperor, when we see that the mere name of Dunois was sufficient to spread terror in the

* The reader may, perhaps, peruse this Sketch with the greater interest on learning, that the same has, for the most part, been taken from the Diary of Kemény, which from particular friendship the latter gave to the editor to make use of.

ranks of the enemies—when we think of Robert Bruce with the intrepid Black Douglas at his side, we are struck with the similarity of Kemény's military exploits to theirs. Kemény, who, under Bem, was next to him in the most important moments of the struggle, the terror of the Austrians and Wallachians, whom they equally dreaded with the Polish hero, Bem.

Wolfgang Baron Kemény, of Magyar-Gyerö-Monostor, was a descendant of one of the few ancient Hungarian families, who have been in possession of their estates ever since the first conquests under Arpád, at the beginning of the tenth century, and were from the Kabos and Mikola families, who produced during the regime of Arpád several great heroes, amongst whom may be specially noticed Simon Kemény, who sacrificed himself to save the life of the great governor, John Hunyad, by allowing the Turks to believe that he was Hunyad, and suffering death in his stead. This took place at battle near *Amselfeld*, about the middle of the fifteenth century, by this deed Kemény immortalized his name in the history of Hungary. Toward the end of the seventeenth

century, one of the ancestors of our hero, John Kemény, was duke of Transsylvania, he fell in a battle against Michael Apafi, (his rival, and last duke of Transsylvania), and the Turks, near Nagy Szöllös, in Transsylvania. After his death, the house of Hapsburg succeeded to Transsylvania as hereditary land. On the mother's side, Wolfgang Kemény descended from Francis Count Vesselényi, Palatine of Hungary, under Leopold I., in the seventeenth century. As the Roman poet laureat says—

“Est in equis, est in apris
Patrum virtus, nec imbellem feroces
Progenerant aquilæ columbam;”

So also there is no wonder, that the offspring of such heroes should himself have been a hero, when the opportunity arrived to fight for his country.

Wolfgang Kemény was born in Transsylvania in the year 1798. After having completed his studies at the Protestant High-school in Great Enyad, the glories of the battle-field took possession of his soul, he therefore entered the regiment of Kienmoyer Hussars, No. 8,

where he was soon promoted to the rank of an officer, and took an active part in the campaigns of 1813 and 1814 against Napoleon. Although in the Austrian service, he was nevertheless a true Hungarian in heart; and upon advancing in years, his conviction grew stronger and stronger, that the Austrian army was nothing but a machine in the hands of an arbitrary power, only employed to crush constitutional life and liberty.

In 1825, he quitted the military service, retired to private life, and devoted himself to husbandry. His principal aim and favourite study now, was to acquaint himself with the laws of his native country. He soon perceived that Austria and the rulers of the Hapsburg dynasty had only kept, among all the promises made to Transsylvania, one single one, viz:—“I shall give you a German general for your commander.” Such a state of things determined him to strengthen the liberal party in Transsylvania by his adhesion.

In the year 1834, he was returned deputy to the Transsylvania diet, where he, together with Nicholas Vesselényi, Zeyk, Wolfgang

Veer, Dominicus Count Teleky, and his uncle Dionysius Baron Kemény, belonged to the radical party. He was afterwards several times returned to the diet, as the government, in spite of his legitimate claim, and of his being repeatedly proposed, never, on account of his liberal opinions, appointed him *Regalist* (Incumbent.)*

In order to be better able to devote himself to the cause of the people, and to gain extended influence, he abandoned his country-life and took up his residence in Torda, a second-rate town in Transsylvania. Here he struggled with inexhaustible zeal against the domineering comitats and town-bureaucracy, (who in that place formed the servile court party,) by never neglecting a single opportunity of overthrowing them; and he, indeed, succeeded so well, that their influence upon the nobility was entirely destroyed.

Kemény was the first who, after March, 1848, dared despite the bureaucracy, to uplift the banner of union between Transsylvania

* The government has the right of nominating several members of the diet "*Regalists*," in Transsylvania.

and Hungary, a bold and dangerous attempt. Hereupon, he was soon appointed by the new Hungarian ministry, and with the approval of the Archduke Stephen, then Palatine of Hungary, major of the national guard of the comitat of Torda. He soon, though with great difficulty, succeeded by his unwearied activity, to introduce among his men, (unaccustomed to military service,) discipline; subordination, and a proper military spirit, which was afterwards crowned with the most brilliant results.

When the war of Hungary broke out in the Bácska and the Banat, Kemény was one of the first to endeavour to excite a battalion of the 2nd Szekler border regiment to leave the boundaries of their country, to fight in Hungary for their native land. But the Szekler soldiers,—who were secretly led to believe by the circulation of false rumours, that the Hungarians would lead them on to slaughter, and then betray them, for a long time refused to move. At length, however, they cried out: “Well, we will go, but the *Shiny-collars* (meaning the superior officers of the national

guard with their silver-laced collars) must also come with us." It was only through Kemény's self-possession, his well-known probity, and good renown, that the battalion was prevented from open mutiny. The men at last consented to march to Hungary, when he promised them, upon his honour, that in the hour of danger he too would be present to fight for their common fatherland. He honestly kept his word, and the Szeklers were overwhelmed with joy, when they afterwards had to combat under him as commander.

After the outbreak of the Wallachian revolt in Transsylvania, October, 1848, Kemény saved with his battalion of the national guard, several towns and villages, from the devastating hand of the rebellious Wallachians.

On the 12th November, some Austrian troops with 15,000 Wallachians entered Felvintz and on the next day approached Torda itself. Kemény was immediately at hand to defend the town to the last, but many of the cowardly "black and yellow" comitats and town municipalities preferred to parley and negotiate with the enemy. They dissuaded the national guards

from adopting any defensive measures, and the town most emphatically protested against Kemény's plan, declaring rather to surrender, than to expose it to be burnt and devastated; hence negotiations with the enemy were carried on. The Austrians claimed the delivery of the rebels; in vain the inhabitants insisted that they had no rebels among them, reminding them, at the same time, that the union was sanctioned by the King himself, and that if they took up arms, they did so in virtue of the orders of the government from whom they obtained the weapons: the Austrians, however persevered in their claim. At last the citizens hoped to obtain a general amnesty by the delivery of Major Kemény; the latter seeing to what end those negotiations would lead, jumped upon his horse, put himself at the head of his battalion, and asked the national guards whether they would follow him? 600 of them at once volunteered to do so, and leaving Torda, Kemény repaired with them to Klausenburg. With this small phalanx, and with the 11th Honvéd battalion, commanded by major Bánffy, he fought on the

16th November, near Szamosfalva a successful battle against Urban.

But, meanwhile, at the very moment of the success of the Hungarian arms, Klausenburg, unknown to the military commanders, surrendered to the enemy; and the two before-mentioned majors with their troops, were compelled to leave the town, on the 17th November, and to retreat to Csucsá.

From that moment, Kemény became a thorough warrior; his men were formed into a Honvéd battalion, and he appointed their commanding major. He afterwards took part in almost all the battles fought in Transylvania. Being ordered to march with his battalion to Sibó, on his way thither, he was attacked by 2,000 regular troops, and 15,000 Wallachians; but he so well resisted in the encounter, that the next day, with the reinforcement he then received, he entirely routed the enemy, and put him to flight. He now returned to Klausenburg, where he acted under Bem, whom he then saw for the first time.

Bem at once recognized in Kemény a brave and intrepid soldier; he honoured him with his

full confidence, employing him wherever a desperate blow was to be struck. He well deserved this confidence. He distinguished himself at the head of his battalion in every battle, and particularly at the battle near Bisztritz, against Urban. At the battle, near Gálfalva, Bem had the opportunity to do full justice to Kemény's valour and bravery; he then gave him his unlimited confidence, and afterwards entrusted him with the commandership of his rear-guard.

When Bem was beaten near Hermanstadt, and only 1,500 men and the artillery were left him, it was Kemény who hastened to his relief, arriving just in time to reinforce his position, and indeed to maintain it with the best result; by this act, he so won Bem's entire love and esteem, that he instantly promoted him to the rank of lieutenant-colonel, and ever afterwards kept him at his side.

After the battle of Stolzenberg, Bem's forces were considerably reduced, for, expecting some reinforcements from Hungary, he employed detachments of his troops elsewhere; but those reinforcements being impeded in their march through the Zarand Pass, did not arrive for

several weeks. Thereupon Bem ordered Kemény with the 11th battalion, numbering 900 men, and 100 horse of Mátyás hussars, with 4 pieces of ordnance, to go to meet those reinforcements. Kemény was obliged to make his way thither through a land occupied by the enemy; he left Hermanstadt and Karlsburg in his rear, and continually fighting, reached Déva, where he combated against combined Austrian troops and Wallachians amounting to upwards of 10,000 men, and then joined the troops advancing from Hungary, 4,000 men strong with 18 pieces of ordnance.

When Bem retreated, after the defeat near Viz-Akna, he met with Kemény near Piski, between Déva and Szászvaros. He left him there with the 11th battalion and two companies, altogether 1,100 men, and the above-mentioned hussars, with three guns, saying to him: "The bridge of Piski is Transsylvania herself; if the bridge is lost, Transsylvania is lost!" With his 1,100 foot, 100 hussars, and 7 guns, Kemény now took a strong position. He was soon attacked by the Austrian troops, of 15,000 men; he fought during a day and a

half, not once moving from his position ; finally, he even repulsed the enemy by a furious charge of bayonets. Upon the retreat of the Austrians, he sent two companies of infantry in pursuit of them, and endeavoured to out-wing them, whereby he took several wagons of ammunition. The Austrians then had recourse to their usual stratagem, that of hoisting the white flag. Kemény taking that as a signal of surrender, rode on to them, and ordered them to lay down their arms. Upon their asking him who he was, he exclaimed, "I am Bem !" presuming that that name would make an impression upon them as Poles,—they being battalions of Bianchi's and Siokovich regiments,—instead of that, however, they suddenly surrounded him on all sides, and it was only his presence of mind that saved him. With the swiftness of lightning he unsheathed his sword, struck at random, and succeeded in opening a passage through their ranks. He now, on reaching his troops, renewed the assault against the bridge, with one company of the 11th battalion, commanded by the brave Samuel Inczédy. A furious onslaught now ensued, in which two

battalions of the enemy perished to a man ; but during this contest the Hungarians lost all their pieces of ordnance, two cannons excepted, and were repulsed, when the Austrians succeeded in again rallying themselves. Meanwhile, Bem arrived, and the bridge of Piski was stormed anew, and re-taken by the 11th Honvéd battalion ; whereupon the enemy began to fly, halting only twelve miles from Hermanstadt.

Such was the brilliant manner in which Kemény performed his mission at the Piski bridge, and which saved Transsylvania. He thus rigorously kept his word pledged to Bem, at the time he (Bem) gave him the order we have before quoted, which pledge was this : “ Either the bridge of Piski will not be lost ; Transsylvania not lost ; or every man will perish.” Every third man of his troops was either dead or wounded. The military history of all nations can scarcely produce so brave a contest as that at Piski. Both the country and Bem signalized the valour of Kemény : the first, by exchanging the military decoration of the third class, bestowed upon him after the battle of Sibó, for that of the second class ; the

second, by appointing him irresponsible commander of Klausenburg. But Kemény was not allowed to remain long at his ease, he was soon again obliged to face the enemy. He directed the siege of Karlsburg during six weeks, with a corps of only 3,000 men, by whose aid he boldly met every sally from the fortress, as well as repulsed the Wallachian chief, Yanku, in the very face of the garrison, who had hastened thither to its rescue.

Bem now sent Kemény with 4,000 men into the defiles and the mountains of Transsylvania, where he again inflicted considerable losses upon the Wallachians, and repeatedly defeated them, although they had surrounded him on all sides, and had continually harassed him. At length, all provisions and all means of supplying the same were cut off from him by the enemy. In this juncture, he received the news of the invasion of the Russians, and at the same time Bem's order to join him immediately with his troops and guns. He was, therefore, compelled to execute a retreat, which he did through a Pass of about eight English miles in length. He required two hours only, to

open himself a way by the side of a destroyed bridge; and, at length, the brave and valiant Forró rendered the road passable.

His men, from fatigue, and hunger, were so far reduced and exhausted that they nearly succumbed to the overwhelming superiority of the enemy, when Kemény, seeing their wavering, approached them to revive in them the still, but very feebly, glimmering spark of heroic spirit. He well knew that they could only be acted upon by moral impressions;—he, therefore, threw off the decoration adorning his breast, which he had received for his Leonidas-like exploit at Piski, saying, “The bravery of the 11th battalion gave me this mark of distinction, and now its present cowardice compels me to cast it away!” Whereupon the battalion, animated with a newly-awakened courage, rushed with their bayonets upon the enemy, and forced him to take to his heels. Thus again was saved the honour of the Hungarian name.

This expedition of Kemény so terrified the Wallachians, that they were more and more impressed with the conviction of their inability

to withstand the Hungarians, a conviction, which induced them to enter into negotiations with the Hungarian government for a treaty of peace; the Wallachian chief, Yanku, at the same time promising the Hungarians a corps of 10,000 auxiliary troops against the Russians.

When Bem was afterwards defeated and repulsed by the Russians at Segesvár, Kemény hastened to his assistance with 4,000 men; Bem left him with 500 men and 4 pieces of ordnance at Maros Vásárhely to keep the Russians and Austrians, approaching from Szászrégen and Akasfalva, during twenty-four hours in check, to enable Bem to get in advance of them on their route to Mediash and Hermanstadt. The whole forces of the Russians and Austrians amounted to 25,000 men. Kemény succeeded in deceiving the enemy in harassing him by little engagements, and in arresting his progress during forty-eight hours, thus leaving Bem plenty of time to retreat in perfect security.

Having accomplished his mission, Kemény with his small troop withdrew to Klausenburg, in order to join Kazinczy. But he waited for

Kazinczy's arrival up to the last day of August in vain ; an army of 30,000 strong was on its way to Klausenburg, partly from Torda, and partly from Maros Vásárhely. In the evening of the last-mentioned day, Kemény sent orders to all the troops stationed in the neighbourhood, to concentrate themselves at Bánffy Hunyad, whilst he himself, with 150 horse and 2 cannons, remained in Klausenburg till late at night, to defend the town against an attack of the Wallachians. He then assembled 200 commissioned officers who were without troops, and formed them into a detachment ; as to the carriages, with the women and the baggage, he sent them to Somlyó. The officers were much displeased with such an arrangement, and plots against Kemény were soon concocted. They accused him of abandoning Klausenburg because he did not wish to expose his house and relatives to the dangers of a contest. But Kemény treated with disdain all such calumnious accusations, and marched with his troops to Sibó, where Kazinczy had just arrived. The latter now resumed the command of the newly arrived troops, and appointed Kemény

chief of his general staff, and Alexander Gál as commander of a part of the troops.

Immediately afterwards, a Russian officer, acting as negotiator, brought Kazinczy a letter from Görgey, advising Kazinczy to follow his example, and to surrender his arms, not, however, to the Austrians, but to the Russians, whose chivalrous behaviour he exalted to the skies. He allured Kazinczy with the idle hope, that every officer would be allowed to enter the Russian army, retaining his present rank. Kazinczy was simple enough to believe those assurances, and offered Kemény the rank of a general, but the latter smilingly rejected the offer with the following words: "It would be much better for *you* now to be a private soldier than a general." However, all the officers, after a long discussion, resolved to follow Görgey's advice and example. Meanwhile, another Russian negotiator arrived. Both officers and men then hastened to the Russian camp, to lay down their arms, and to trust to the mercy and justice of a Russian despot. Kemény, however, learnt that it was secretly arranged, between the Russians and Austrians, that the weapons

should be given up to the latter. Of this Kazinczy was also informed, but not a word escaped his lips about it. In the evening, before the surrender of arms, many of the men came to Kemény, in whom they still had full confidence, especially the Poles, to ask him for his advice, as to what they were to do. He advised them to fly as soon as possible, and upon their asking him why he did not do the same, he replied that he was bound by his word of honour, but that they would still hear of him.

The following day Kazinczy and Kemény, accompanied by a numerous suite of officers, rode towards the Russian camp, the latter meanwhile telling his servants, that should he not after a short lapse of time make his appearance at his castle, they ought to ride, as did the Poles, to Szathmár.

Thus 150 officers on horseback rode to meet the Russians at Sibó; the troops were already perceived from a distance, but Kemény drew the attention both of the officers and Kazinczy, to the fact, that the approaching troops were not Russians but Austrian hussars; whereupon he rode with his aide-de-camp towards

them. Kemény was asked whether he came to surrender. He replied; "No, we come ready to fight!" He now rode back and said to his comrades; "Gentlemen, we are betrayed; it is not the Russians but the Austrians who are coming to disarm us. They once succeeded in deceiving me with their white flag at Piski, but I shall not fall a second time into their snare. I therefore release myself from my word pledged unto the Russians, to surrender my arms to them, and not to the Austrians, and I moreover release every one of you, who is not deprived of reason, from such a promise." Upwards of 100 officers followed him, with whom he rode to Szathmár, and thus escaped the Austrian hangmen.

When in the Szathmár comitat, he effectually escaped the pursuit of the Austrian blood-hounds. The Austrian government made every imaginable effort for his apprehension; the gens-d'-armes of Transsylvania ferreted in vain all the corners of that land to find him. After this, Kemény remained hidden in Hungary for ten months, still hoping that Bem would succeed in persuading the Sublime Porte

to make an invasion into Hungary. But, as is known, he was deceived in his hopes; he, indeed, knew but little what had happened in Europe, being compelled to go from one hiding-place to another, and by so doing he, in March, 1850, contrived to conceal himself, with twelve Honvéd officers, in a vast marsh of the Szathmár comitat, at a time when the Austrian government was most zealously seeking him. This marsh, or rather lake, was the well-known *Ecsedi-láp* in Hungary. Its length is about sixty by seven English miles. Here once stood a fortress, which in ancient times was considered impregnable, and which was called the Gibraltar of Hungary. But he could not remain here for any length of time, as both the Wallachian villages, Great and Little Majtén, were required to assist in the general search. Kemény and his officers, however, eventually succeeded in fighting their way out, but during four entire hours, they were obliged to wade through ice, water, mud and snow, frequently up to their breasts, occasionally coming to spots where no human being before had been able to penetrate. At

length, Kemény, with his friends, reached a house, where they had a short rest, and then continued their route.

In July of the last-named year, when two Austrian battalions were ordered to make a minute search in the districts, and Kemény was secretly informed of the state of things, both in his country and in Europe,—when all hope had vanished of an early insurrection against Austria, he left his native soil for foreign countries. By his sagacity, prudence, and circumspection, he succeeded in deceiving the Austrian spies. Unmolested he passed through Galicia and Cracow up to the Austrian frontier, and then to Hamburg, from whence, after a short stay, he proceeded to England—afterwards to Paris, and finally back to England.

Besides the distinctive honours bestowed upon Kemény by the national government, he obtained, on the same occasion when the ladies of Klausenburg presented Bem with the sword of Rákoczy, a club called “Buzogany,” which once had belonged to John Kemény, with the inscription “Kemény János, 1680.”

Only lately Kossuth appointed him chief of the Hungarian emigration in London ; and he enjoyed the greatest confidence and popularity among his compatriots in England.

His open countenance was calculated to inspire unlimited confidence, and well he was entitled to it. His features bore the type of pure Magyar origin, of the Mongolo-Caucasian race ; he was 53 years old, rather short in stature, but full of activity and liveliness, and his physiognomy at once betrayed every emotion of his noble soul. He possessed many amiable qualities: his sincerity, and the absence of all pretension, without, however, derogating from his dignity, prepossessed everybody in his favour. He belonged to that class of emigrants who, after the revolution, lost all their estates and other properties. He was very justly called the Father of the Emigration.

The accompanying picture represents Kemény in one of the most important moments of his active military career ; it is the battle of Piski. He is standing upon a beam of the bridge, (which has become historically so famous), at the very instant when the brave 11th battalion,

bayonet in hand, storm and take the bridge. Firm, and like a beacon amidst the foam of the waves, we see him standing with his drawn sword, encouraging his men with fiery look and voice of thunder. He seems to be the target for all the enemy's bullets, still not one struck him—*Audaces fortuna juvat*. A light cap covers his head, and a Hónved coat his body. We see him standing Ajax-like, giving his orders, encouraging both by his word and example. In the foreground to the right, pierced by a bullet, is a Honvéd, who, though in the agony of death, still inflicts a stab with his bayonet upon an Austrian soldier cowering at his feet, reminding us of the history of that Highlander, who, after having been pierced with the spear by Robert Bruce, managed to lift himself up just enough to be able to thrust his dagger into the breast of the royal hero's steed. The artist has chosen the finest moment of that battle; the picture is crowded with Honvéds: it is the first assault with the bayonet, and the beginning of the contest representing a grand onslaught.

After his flight from Hungary, Baron Ke-

mény lived for some time at Paris, but on Kossuth's arrival in England he came over to London and was nominated by Kossuth President of the Hungarian emigration. What he had been to his ill-fated fatherland, as a patriot and wealthy noble, that he was now to his exiled countrymen, as a father and friend. Beloved and honoured by all, he was generally spoken of by the appellation "the father." Early in January, 1852, God in his wisdom thought proper to call him from this world, he died of a broken heart whilst his secretary was in the act of reading to him an article of a London newspaper, which contained a most unjustifiable attack on him, the man of strictest honour. * * * * A few days later the bereaved Hungarian emigration followed the plain coffin of their father to his resting place, we fervently hope not the last,—the tears in the eyes of the brave showed the sorrow of their hearts. Yes, the noble sons of Panonia, who had not been unnerved on the bloody battle-fields of Buda, Kápolna, Hermanstadt, Comorn, etc., were filled with deep gloom and sorrow, when the beloved remains of Kemény were delivered

into the arms of mother earth, and from the bottom of their hearts they pronounced the vow, "Father Kemény, in our next struggle we will follow faithfully the example set us by you."

This notice was due to the memory of a brave and noble patriot, the pride of his nation, and the ornament of the Hungarian army. He was a staunch friend to General Bem, whom he has followed far too soon for his sorrowing compatriots.

The editor of this work places this tribute upon his grave, as a token of sincere esteem and gratitude to his friend and benefactor.

KLAPKA.

GEORGE KLAPKA, one of the youngest of the Hungarian generals, and also one of the most talented in the late national army, has, we feel fully assured, not yet finished his task. A better future is reserved for him, and this patriotic man, this spirit devoted to liberty, this trusty brother in danger, will carve himself out a path, and be, we trust, a star of first magnitude on the bright horizon, which certainly one day will spread over the liberated nations of Europe.* We, therefore, do not propose to give a biography of his youth, leaving that for a future historian, we will only observe here, that George Klapka is the son of a much respected magistrate in Temesvár, and received his military education at the academy for engineers, at Vienna. His teacher was

* If we may trust the signs of the times, we think that event is not far off.—[ED.]

the talented, noble-hearted Lahner, afterwards general in the Hungarian service,—a man, who in the kindness of his heart saved by his energy, together with the valiant Nagy Shandor, the lives of hundreds of the miserable Croats, when the victorious Honvéds stormed Buda, and were very much inclined to settle accounts with the heroes of Brescia, the willing tools of Jellachich. Lahner and Nagy Shandor reaped their reward for this act of kindheartedness in the manner so peculiar to the Hapsburg dynasty, viz: both died the death of other patriots, on the gallows, on the 6th October, 1849, at Arad. They rest in peace; the Hungarian nation will always bless their memory as martyrs for a sacred cause, when she will have curses for the memory of their hangman, Haynau, who now also stands before the Grand Judge of the universe. May the creator of the world, who directs the sun, moon and stars in their path, who separated the land from the water, who ordered, “let it be light,” whose voice is thunder, who speaks in the lightning,—may he, we pray, have mercy upon the murderer of his brothers; may

he enlighten the hearts of our deluded tyrants, by the divine rays of liberty; and the nations will build temples of gratitude where now stand the block, the axe, and the gallows, and they shall praise the God of truth, hope, and brotherly love.

The kind reader will forgive us these reminiscences, remembering the proverb: "That out of the fulness of the heart the mouth speaketh." Return we now to the subject of this sketch, Klapka, whom we first meet in the war for Hungarian independence as a captain of artillery, at Comorn, and soon after as colonel, at Tokáy, measuring his strength against General Count Schlick, who boastingly declared after the battle at Kaschau, which ended so unfortunately for the Hungarians, "to drive reason into the Magyars, I want *neither* guns, nor muskets, nor swords, I shall arm my soldiers with a good lot of cat-o'-nine-tails." It was only a few days after this memorable speech, that this worthy defender of the house of Hapsburg, ran off so quickly *with* guns, muskets, and swords, that this warlike movement of his, rather resembled the chase of the hare—the

Austrians playing the hare, the Magyars the hunters.* Schlick was so quick on his legs, that the Hungarians certainly were not able to catch him, the less so, as a Pass on his road, which ought to have been occupied by the Hungarians, had been left open from some unexplained cause; as we do not consider this work a proper place for recriminations, we shall not, therefore, refer further to the Hungarian officer who has, and we think justly, been blamed for this gross omission. At Tokáy, the glorious career of Klapka was begun, of which we now propose to give a faithful sketch.

General Schlick having invaded the north with 15,000 men, and defeated General Meszáros on the 4th January, 1849, at Kaschau, the government being just on the point of removing from Pesth to Deberczin, sent an order to Klapka to take the command of Meszáros' corps. Klapka hastened to do so, and

* True to our principle, to be just even to our enemy, we must observe here, that Count Schlick was of all the Austrian generals considered the most noble-hearted, if such there could be in such a cause. Schlick's memory, however, is at least not branded in Hungary by executions of prisoners of war, women flogging in public places, or other amusements of victorious Austrian generals!!

had three victorious engagements with the enemy, thereby succeeding in defeating the attempts of Schlick to force the passage over the Tissa. The first engagement took place on the 22nd January, at Tarcal; the second, on the 23rd, at Bodrogkeresztur; and the third, on the 24th, near Tokáy. He now took the offensive, understanding that Görgey was still engaging the enemy in the district of the mountain towns. Schlick's corps retiring unexpectedly quick on all their lines upon Kaschau, Klapka concluded that Görgey would then have left the mining district, and would be operating in the rear of his opponents; he therefore hastened his advance upon Kaschau as much as possible, to prevent Schlick from throwing himself with all his force upon Görgey, after whose defeat he would, no doubt, again have turned upon Klapka. On the 5th February, the army of the Upper Danube stormed the Pass at the Branyiszkó, and marched now in the rear of the enemy, but was detained for some time at Lemesán, the pioneers working with difficulty in throwing a bridge over the Tarca. In the meantime, Klapka,

at the head of his vanguard, forced, on the 8th February, a passage at Hidas-Nemeti, over a bridge which had been already fired by the quickly retreating Austrian rearguard. Thus threatened in back and front, Count Schlick was forced on the 9th February, to evacuate Kaschau, and to retire towards Torna, upon the line of operations of the bulk of the Austrian army. The troops of Görgey and Klapka reached Kaschau on the 10th February, and the junction of the army of the Upper Danube, and the corps of the Tissa, now strongly reinforced, was happily effected.

Although Schlick effected his retreat before the eyes of Klapka, his purpose being evident, still Klapka could not intercept his plans, as the bulk of his own army could only follow by slow marches, and his vanguard was already greatly fatigued by forced marches. Waiting therefore the arrival of his other troops, he made his dispositions for an energetic pursuit of the flying enemy.

On the 10th February, he directed one-half of his army upon Enyiczke and Nagy-Ida, whilst the other half reached Hidas-Németi,

and two divisions of the army of the Upper Danube arrived at Kaschau. He proposed, on the 11th February, by a forced march, to advance near enough upon the enemy to be able to reach him on the next, or at the latest, on the second day following. General Dembinsky, however, who had meanwhile been entrusted with the command-in-chief of the Hungarian troops, sent him an order immediately, by quick marches, to retire with the whole army upon Miskolcz. This order only reached him on the 11th February, and Klapka obeyed the same day, leaving the pursuit of the enemy to the corps of Görgey.

Dembinsky had decided upon taking the offensive against the Austrians, and in pursuance of this plan Klapka was now charged to advance along the high road to Pesth, and to unite his corps, now the 1st, on the heights of Poroszló with the 2nd corps, and then to march upon Gyöngyös. On the first day of the great battle of Kapolná, one division of Klapka's army, commanded by himself, stood at Sirok, the other held a position at Aldöbrö, Tótfalva and Kapolná; General Schlick

forced a defile at Sirok, and Klapka's own division, being outnumbered by the enemy, had to give way, and after the loss of the narrow Pass was forced to retire upon Verpelét. The division of General Pöltenberg being directed hither by Dembinsky, the two divisions now united for the purpose of disputing the passage of the Tarna with Schlick, who advancing from Sirok by St. Maria, appeared on the morning of the second day, 27th February, on the right shore of the Tarna, opposite to Verpelét.

Schlick, however, forced the passage and threw the two divisions back. Klapka hastened to Erlau to bring his retiring columns to a stand; he succeeded in leading them back into the battle at the very moment when an Austrian column was threatening to outflank the right wing of the army. Whilst the battle was still raging he received an order to take the command of the left wing.

After the battle, Klapka's corps was ordered to go into cantonments at the village Eger-Tarmos, but again attacked in the night during their march for these quarters, by an overwhelming force, he was thrown off this route,

and retired upon Poroszló. The enemy seemed bent upon his destruction, following him again and exposing him repeatedly to a most destructive fire of artillery; he was thus forced further to retire after a most obstinate resistance. After this exceedingly unfortunate affair he was ordered to place himself in advance of the grand army retiring across the Tissa.

Arrived in Tisza-Füred, he joined his own and the staff officers of other brigades in their complaints against Dembinsky, in consequence of which the latter resigned the command. It seemed, however, that in this instance Klapka had been rather led by the clamour of his officers than that he had exactly acted from his own conviction. After Dembinsky's resignation, and shortly before the army was again put in motion, Kossuth promoted Colonel Klapka to the rank of a general, and as such he now led his corps against Szolnok.

The great Hungarian army now advanced along the railway against the capital, Windischgrätz endeavoured, therefore, to entrench himself at Gödöllő, there to await the attack of the army marching on the Gyöngyös-Pesth road.

This line of operations was, however, crossed by two little rivers, the Zagyva and Galga, whose swampy shores were a great obstacle to an advancing army, Klapka proposed, therefore, that the 7th corps only should march upon the Gyöngyös high road for the attack, and that the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd corps should march from Gyöngyös upon Arokszállás and Jász-Berény, so as to outwing the right flank of the enemy's position at the Galga. This project was received favourably at head quarters, and the 2nd April was fixed on to commence the movement. The 7th corps having gained the important victory at Hotván, Klapka reached Jász-Berény on the 3rd April. Being informed that the Bann Jellachich had been seen that day marching his army along the railway from Alberti to Pillis, he, Klapka, left his encampment early in the morning of the 4th April, to advance upon the most direct road over Tapió Bicske towards Pesth, thus to cross the line of march of the Bann towards Gödöllő, and, if possible, thereby to prevent his junction with Prince Windischgrätz. General Damjanich followed in support of Klapka's corps. At the

commencement of the battle, Klapka's troops wavered, but Damjanich having brought up his men, the army at last gained the distinguished victory of Tapió Bicske. This was quickly followed up by the engagement at Isaszeg, when Klapka attacked the enemy at noon. The struggle was severe and bloody, his troops were almost exhausted, and ammunition also became scarce; but Klapka, firmly convinced that a victory could be gained, encouraged his soldiers to renewed exertions; the struggle lasted till late at night, and was at last ended by Klapka and Aulich storming Isaszeg.

On the 7th April, a council of war was held at Gödöllő, where it was resolved to raise the siege of Comorn, and Klapka was ordered to march with Damjanich by the shortest road from Gödöllő to Waitzen, and to storm this place in case he should find it occupied by the enemy, then to continue his march over Rétság, Nagy Oroszi, Ipolyság to Léva. According to this order, the two generals took Waitzen on the 10th April. Klapka's part in this attack was to make a masked march round the town, and to take up a position on the high road from

Waitzen to Veröcze, the only line of retreat left open to the enemy. In the meantime the 3rd corps had to occupy the enemy's attention in front till Klapka should have succeeded in his manœuvre. The enemy, finding himself threatened from behind, gave up the town, though not without an obstinate resistance. After the town had been stormed, Klapka continued his march towards Levenz with the 1st corps. Having crossed the Grau on the 18th April, the battle at Nagysarló raging on the 19th, Klapka had to watch the enemy's movements on the high road towards Neutra and Surany. Finding himself opposed to a greatly superior force, he sent for the 3rd corps for support, but before this could reach him he had a hard struggle with the enemy; but he sustained the struggle most gallantly, contributing his share to the victorious result of that day, the credit of which was no less due to him than to General Damjanich, who had the chief command. The enemy sustained a most signal defeat, and was brought nearly to destruction.

Both generals continued their march on the

20th towards Comorn, and on the 22nd, they drove the enemy from the left shore of the Danube. Klapka occupied with his corps the *tête du pont* of the Waag before Comorn. On the 26th April, the first division of the Hungarian army advanced, when the Austrians being taken by surprise by a brilliant attack upon their position, they retired in great haste, first upon Raab, and afterwards towards the frontiers of Austria-proper.

Görgey, in the meantime, had been appointed minister-of-war. Comorn being liberated, he, Görgey, anxious to direct the unfortunate siege of Ofen himself, ordered his friend Damjanich to represent him for a time in the war office. In consequence of a severe accident which happened this general on the eve of his departure on this errand, and which disabled him for a long time, Klapka was provisionally charged with this office. He went to Pesth on the 29th April, and inspected closely the preparations which the Austrian general, Henzi, had made for the defence of Ofen, and which were continued with great energy and judgment. Klapka convinced himself that Henzi would

hold out to the last, and offer a desperate defence ; he, therefore, immediately acquainted Görgey, who was marching upon Buda, with the result of his observations. Görgey, however, was not deterred from his purpose by this report of Klapka, but still holding his own opinion, he marched onward. Klapka left Pesth on the 2nd May, and reached Deberczin on the 3rd ; Mészáros then resigned the office of minister-of-war to Klapka. Mészáros was a man of undoubted honour and integrity, who had taken the office in the year 1848, by the special command of the King, and had ever remained faithful to his country's cause. He was not without talents, but he wanted the energy and circumspection which were required of a minister-of-war at such times. He was unlucky, both as a minister and as commander of an army. He had held the office so long against his own inclination that he was very glad to resign it into the hands of Klapka, who was not only a younger and more energetic man, but as an experienced and successful warrior was well fitted for the office. Klapka's first act as minister-of-war was to issue a decree

to the commanders of the different corps,* who had up to this time acted mostly on their own responsibility and quite independent of the war ministry, as well as of the orders issued by Kossuth. This decree, unfortunately, made rather a bad impression upon the respective parties, who fancied that the ministry might gain an influence which would become dangerous to their own ambitious aspirations. At the outset of the Russian intervention, the Hungarian forces amounted to about 135,000 men with 400 pieces of artillery, which were only half the strength of the enemy. Klapka felt that by such a numerical preponderance of the enemy, the nation would be brought to the brink of destruction if the utmost energy was not put forth. He, therefore, proposed to call out a levy *en masse*, and to organize the same in the following manner: All men between 18 and 30 years of age were to assemble at certain appointed stations, from whence they would be despatched to fill up the deficiency in the different battalions or reserves, or be formed into additional corps. If this proposition had

* *Vide* "Kossuth," page 91.

been followed out with energy and impartially, the Hungarian forces would have been raised to double their number. All men above the age of 30, not enrolled in any corps, capable of carrying arms, were also to be organized and drilled, that at the first necessity they might be able to fall with advantage upon the enemy. Strong parties of flying detachments were to occupy the frontiers, to keep the enemy constantly on the alert at several points. Thus prepared, the soil of Hungary would have offered to the Russians graves and churchyards, instead of a new battle-field. Kossuth appreciated the soundness of this proposition, but he was, unfortunately, not sufficiently supported by his advisers.

The arrangements of Görgey, who tarried with his 30,000 men before Buda, excited the suspicion of General Nagy Shandor, who considered it necessary that the government should send a commissary to the camp to investigate Görgey's conduct. Kossuth, therefore, charged Klapka with this mission. Klapka arrived in the camp on the 15th May; he soon had reason to find fault with Görgey's arrangements, and

was present at the assault upon the fortress, which was undertaken in the night from the 16th to the 17th May, when the assaulting party were beaten back by the besieged. Klapka, who had been till now a friend of Görgey, returned to the government, filled with doubts and with the conviction of there being a most unfortunate difference of opinion, not to say quarrel, between the two men in whose hands rested now the fate of Hungary. Every observation respecting Kossuth which Görgey had made, testified the hatred he bore him.

During the siege of Ofen, Klapka devoted himself to the execution of the plan for the general land defence, adopted by the ministry, but he met with so many obstacles in carrying out this measure, that he at length, despairing of a successful issue, desired to be sent back to the army, and Ofen being stormed at last, Görgey consented to take the office of minister-of-war upon himself, Klapka joyfully resigning the office into his hands. Klapka was now nominated commander-in-chief of the fortress, and the fortified camp of Comorn, and the 7th and 8th corps posted on the isle of the

Schütt, and the right banks of the Danube were likewise put under his command; he, therefore, left Pesth on the 31st May, for his new appointment. Having arrived the next day at Comorn, General Count Guyon, the late commander, delivered his charge to Klapka. Guyon had been very active in repairing those fortifications which had suffered the most from the fire of the enemy, and had also done a great deal to strengthen the position of the camp around Comorn. After Klapka had inspected the fortress and the garrison, he appointed Colonel Assermann inspector of the works, and of the victualling department, and went to Raab to inspect the 7th corps. Before he left Comorn, he drew up a very elaborate report to Kossuth, respecting the preparations and means of defence, and the progress of the works at the fortified camp at Comorn. He pointed out the various defects which he had noticed, and drew his attention particularly to the great want of provisions of all kinds necessary for the troops, to enable them energetically to defend the fortress. He complained, also, of the movements of different

corps, and the positions which they had taken up, and from which he concluded that an alteration had been made in the plan of defence, of which he had not been informed.

A few days later, Görgey had an interview with Klapka. Instead of the 2nd corps which first had been destined for Comorn, the division of Colonel Kmetty, which had advanced already from Ofen to Papa, was put under his command, and he was also promised from 4,000 to 5,000 recruits to make up the effective strength of his weakened battalions. The corps on the left banks of the Danube were retained at the disposal of Görgey himself.

Thus Klapka's force consisted of the 7th and 8th corps, and the division of Colonel Kmetty ; altogether 29 battalions, 28 squadrons and 76 pieces of artillery. The 7th corps was at Raab, the 8th, with the exception of a few battalions garrisoned at Comorn, was on the isle of the Schütt. Colonel Kmetty was directed upon Raab, and Klapka was instructed to communicate direct with Görgey, or if that was not practicable, with the war-office at Pesth, that thus he might be able to act in

union with the different corps operating on the left shore of the Danube. At Raab, Klapka received authentic news respecting the strength and position of the enemy. General Welden was with 40,000 men on the right shore of the Danube, between Wieselburg and Altenburg, advancing his detachments on the road from Presburg towards Raab, and on which they had reached already Oedenburg. In the little Schütt he occupied Hedervar. In the beginning of June, Welden had been replaced by Haynau, who had strengthened his army by a Russian division. The reserves stood in and around Presburg.

A Russian army of 18,000 men advanced over Galicia upon the mountain towns. On the 12th of June the enemy's columns advanced upon the high road from Oedenburg, over Kapewar and St. Mikály, towards Csorna. Klapka ordered Kmetty to cross the river Raab in two divisions—the one to advance upon Kapewar, the other upon Csorna, which it reached on the morning of the 13th, after a forced march. Kmetty, commanding this division in person, ordered an immediate attack

upon the enemy, who, after a hard struggle, was forced to retreat across the Rabnitz, bearing a great many dead, amongst others, the general in command. Klapka occupied the enemy at Wieselburg, to draw his attention from Csorna. Adhering strictly to the plan adopted at the council of war at Deberczin, on the 12th May, Klapka found in Görgey a most obstinate opponent, who wanted by all means to force the lines of the Austrians on the Waag, in the several attempts of which the lives of his brave soldiers were sacrificed in a shameful and brutal manner. The Austrians had repelled him on the 16th June, with great loss ; still this was not sufficient to make him give up this favourite scheme of his ; he, therefore, immediately ordered a second attempt to be made on the 20th. Klapka hearing this, wrote Görgey a private letter, in which, as a friend, he begged him to desist. But this good counsel was not listened to by Görgey ; the order for the renewed attack upon the Austrian position on the Waag was not withdrawn, but on the 20th, Görgey sent orders to Klapka to undertake the defence of

the bridge at Aszód, with part of the 8th corps, which was thus opposed to the strong force of the enemy at Vásárut.

Klapka returned to the right banks of the Danube, where his corps were bivouacked on the road to Guta. Towards noon the Austrians approached from Vásárut and Alban. Klapka immediately gave orders for his corps to advance to take Národ from the Austrians, and to drive them back upon Vásárut. But it was only with the greatest difficulty that he succeeded in this manœuvre. Fruitless attempts had three times been made, and his cavalry, composed for the most part of young inexperienced soldiers, had suffered dreadfully, in consequence of which the right wing of his infantry, who had stormed the village, had to be recalled again. He now led his infantry forward in person, and narrowly escaped being made a prisoner. In the meantime support had arrived from the reserves; he, therefore, opened a heavy and well-directed fire upon the enemy, repulsing them, and restoring order to the line of battle, and the Austrians were at last obliged to retire,

first upon Nyárasd, and then back as far as Vásárut. On the second day, Klapka was attacked towards evening, Görgey then being defeated at Pered. The former had taken a position at Aszód, against the enemy, now three times his number—to secure an unmolested passage to Görgey's retiring columns, he defended the bridge with great bravery, and although the Austrians renewed their attacks with great vigour several times during the night, he nevertheless, maintained his position valiantly. During the night he held a consultation with Görgey, whom he persuaded to give up Aszód, and to occupy the same position he had held before the 10th June. This plan was executed the following morning. Klapka returned to Comorn, but a severe fever seizing him, he retired to Dotish. Notwithstanding his illness, he afterwards hastened to be present at the battle of Raab, where Pöltenberg, badly supported by the bulk of the army, found himself suddenly attacked on the 28th June, by the enemy, greatly superior in numbers. When Pöltenberg began to retire, Görgey charged Klapka with the command of the left wing,

to cover the retreat upon Szent Iván and Szent János. In opposition to the promises made to the government commissaries, Csány, Aulich, and Kiss, to commence a retreat, Görgey fought the battle of Comorn on the 2nd July, and Klapka was charged with the direction of the right wing and the centre. Klapka arrived on the battle-field just when General Leiningen, having ventured a cavalry attack, in which he was beaten, was retiring behind the entrenchments. He immediately ordered the 3rd corps to form close column, and to stand ready for the support of the right wing. In the afternoon he stormed, with these seven battalions, O'Szöny, which had been lost through Leiningen's defeat. A most obstinate and bloody struggle ensued; twice the storming party having advanced into the centre of the village, were repulsed by the Austrians, who were constantly receiving the aid of fresh troops, but the Hungarians having also received reinforcements, carried the village at the third assault in a most decisive manner. The Austrians had to beat a quick retreat upon Motsa, the battle ending in favour of the Hun-

garians, who had retained throughout their position.

Shortly after this victory, the deposition of Görgey, as commander-in-chief, became known—a most unfortunate moment for such an event—differences and commotions arose in consequence among the army. Klapka exerted himself to his utmost to uphold the authority of the government, and preserve peace, unity, and good feeling amongst the forces, who were secretly worked upon by the creatures of Görgey. Being next to Görgey, the oldest general in rank, he called the different commanders to a council of war, in which he pointed out to them the necessity of Görgey taking personally the direction of the ministry of war, but offering at the same time to make known to government any objections the army might have to such an arrangement. Nearly all the members of the council declared in favour of Görgey retaining the chief command of the army, and that if he had to resign one of the two offices, it should be that of minister-of-war. Klapka, accompanied by General Nagy Shandor, thereupon

undertook to present this resolution to government. The former good understanding was thus in some measure restored, Görgey resigning his office as minister of war, but retaining the chief command on the Upper Danube. The important question was now again discussed, whether the war of defence was to be continued on the right or the left banks of the Danube. Klapka decided for the left shore, the troops being too much exhausted and dispirited to conduct a guerilla warfare, as Görgey had proposed. The only way of saving the country, Klapka considered, would be by a union of all the available forces of the nation, to prepare for a great, general, and decisive battle, the issue of which, he hoped, would be a signal victory over the enemy. If, however, it was decreed by fate that Hungary should fall, he would see it ended by one great heroic struggle, which should secure the sacrificed nation an honourable name in the history of future times. But Klapka could not succeed in convincing Görgey of the advantages of his plan ; nothing, therefore, remained for him but to surrender his firm and patriotic conviction

to the plan of Görgey, which had been adopted by most of the other generals.

On this day, Klapka received from Kossuth an order as to the course he was to act upon under the circumstances in which he was placed.*

Görgey, still suffering from his wound, Klapka sent for Colonel Bäier, to show him the government order, declaring that he would no longer be responsible for the detention of the whole army at and around Comorn, and that if Görgey's state of health would not allow him to attend to the command at present, then he, Klapka, as the oldest general in rank, should consider it his duty to exact and enforce immediate obedience to the instructions which he had received. He, therefore, commanded Bäier to make his arrangements, so that the first columns might be able to commence their march with the dawn of the morning, and the other columns successively to follow in the afternoon. The garrison of Comorn in the fortified camp, as well as in the fortress, was to keep on the alert. Bäier was to inform Görgey of this plan. The columns were already on the

* See "Kossuth," page 110.

march to join Wisoczky and Perczel, when Görgey, to whom the arrangements had not been immediately communicated, threatened to resign the command, if the plan was acted upon. The resignation of Görgey would have led at this moment to the most deplorable disputes. Leiningen, Pöltenberg, and others, therefore, most honourable men, but quite partial to Görgey's views and intentions, hastened to Klapka, and at last succeeded in obtaining from him a counter order for the troops already on the march. The operations were, therefore, now decided to be continued on the right bank of the Danube. The commanders now sent a deputation to Görgey to induce him to recall his resignation. Klapka seeing that his authority was now no more respected on the part of Görgey, determined to withdraw altogether from the army.

Görgey, who began to dislike Klapka more and more, nevertheless sought to gain him for his expedition, by offering him the command of the army at the general attack upon the lines of the enemy. Thus was Klapka induced to remain, and even to assist in the execution

of Görgey's plan, but he assured himself of the promise of the different commanders, that in case of a favourable result, they would insist upon a junction with the other widely-dispersed Hungarian forces. Klapka now pressed for the attack to be made on the 9th July, but Görgey's machinations deferred the same to the 11th. Then began the great battle of Comorn. Klapka was with the 3rd corps-d'armée which advanced upon the road of Igmand, and fell in with the enemy at Csem. The village was taken at the point of the bayonet, but before the reserves could advance to follow up this advantage, the whole of the Austrian reserves, and the Russian division, Paniutin, developed in lines, covering the fugitives by a tremendous fire of their artillery. The loss of the Hungarians was very great, nevertheless they held their position. Leiningen attempted an attack with his reserves, but was obliged to retire with heavy loss. Three times the troops of the right wing had stormed the forest of Acs, but had again to abandon it to the enemy. Another unsuccessful attack convinced Klapka of the heavy loss

and the little advantage which would be the consequence of a continuation of the struggle; he, therefore, commanded a retreat, which was effected in perfect order; the troops could withdraw into the fortified camp of Comorn little or not at all molested by the enemy. Görgey, who in consequence of his illness had been present at the battle merely as a spectator, was at last convinced that his plan could not be carried out, he therefore determined to retreat, in conformity with which the army left Comorn on the 13th July. Klapka, on the same day, informed the government of the state of things, adding that he himself intended to remain at Comorn. The following are the chief passages of his letter:

“The army has marched off at last on the left shore; whether they will be able to reach the Tissa is uncertain, it will at all events cost many a hard struggle. Bäier and Görgey must certainly be blamed as the cause of this unfortunate detention, they were not to be deterred from their plan of breaking through the lines. Nagy Shandor and I have done all we possibly could to ensure obedience to the

wishes of the government, but we did not succeed. May this have been the last bitter fruit of a jealousy and animosity which threatens our poor fatherland with ruin, if means are not found to allay the same. Nagy Shandor goes with the army, a faithful defender of the interests of government, and he will take as much pains as possible to promote harmony and unity. I sincerely trust that Görgey may by this time have seen, that it is only by mutual confidence and our united strength that we can still gain the desired end; and may the lives of so many thousands, which he has sacrificed during the last few weeks, be the last great price which he has paid to gain this conviction."

The main body of the army having now left Comorn, Klapka devoted himself entirely to the preparations for the defence of the fortress. This most important position against any invasion of the country from the west, is situated at the east end of the island of Schütt, at the junction of the Waag river with the chief stream of the Danube, and commands alike the passage to the right shore of the Danube and the left shore of the Waag. The fortifications

consist chiefly of the old and the new fortress, a *tête du pont* on the Waag, and a *tête du pont* on the Danube, the palatinal line on the west end of the town, the Danube and the Waag island. At the commencement, Klapka had a garrison of 18,200 men, with 1,400 horses and 48 pieces of artillery. In the bastions and entrenchments stood 300 pieces of heavy cannon. Colonel Kászonyi with 13 battalions, 6 squadrons and 6 field batteries, stood in the redoubts at the *tête du pont* of the Danube. The palatinal line was occupied by 5 battalions, 3 squadrons and a field battery. Colonel Eszterházy held the old and the new fortress and the *tête du pont* on the Waag, with 4 battalions, 3 squadrons and a field battery. Expecting an attack after the departure of Görgey, Klapka kept his troops constantly on the alert in the redoubts, but the Austrians advanced neither on that day nor on the two following days.

At last, on the 16th, in the afternoon, large masses of troops were discerned to move from Dotis. The troops left for the siege of Comorn, by General Haynau, consisted of the 2nd Austrian corps, under General Csorich,

about 16,000 men, with 40 pieces of field artillery, 30 pieces heavy battering guns, and 6 squadrons of cavalry. The artillery train stood at Presburg. At a former period, the Austrians had already begun to throw up redoubts at Csem, near the forest of Acs, and on the island of the Schütt, near Aranyos, and Keszegfalva. Part of these works were now finished, besides which they had also constructed a bridge to keep up the communication between the Schütt and the right shore of the Danube.

The news of Görgey's defeat at Waitzen produced a bad impression upon the garrison of Comorn, Klapka, therefore, ordered a sortie upon the Austrian troops at Dotis, to rouse the spirit of his troops again, and particularly to keep the hussars busy, who felt very uncomfortable, being pent up in a fortress. He entrusted the command of this expedition to Colonel Kosztolányi, who marched off with eight Honvéd companies, four field pieces, and a brigade of hussars, and was so successful as to drive the Austrians out of Dotis, bringing back with him eight officers prisoners, an Austrian ambulance, and a large quantity of

provisions, but the most valuable of all, was the Austrian mail bag, full of letters and newspapers. Several proclamations of Haynau, and some very important documents and official papers, referring to the movements of the imperial armies, fell also into the hands of Klapka, of which he sent copies to Kossuth and Görgey. Klapka himself thus learnt a number of instructions for the besieging army before Comorn, from which he learnt what description of troops, and in what numbers, were intended to be brought forward.

In consequence of this news, Klapka resolved upon a second sortie, to be conducted this time against the Austrian brigade on the left shore of the Danube. This was equally successful as the first enterprise; the Hungarians on the 30th July thus succeeded in clearing the left shore of the enemy, taking 150 prisoners, and seizing upon some very large and valuable stores of provisions.

These successes stimulated the troops to renewed exertions, and gave new life to them. Klapka having received authentic news of the march of Haynau from Pesth towards Szegedin,

resolved upon a general sortie, on a larger scale than the two preceding ones, in order to support the movements of the south Hungarian army. Leaving only the indispensable garrison in the fortress, his columns marched out at one in the morning; the first, under Colonel Assermann, took the direction from O-Szöny upon Almás, surprised the Austrians, drove them out of Almás, and back upon the high road to Gran. At nine in the morning, Assermann stood upon the heights of Tömörd, where Colonel Kosztolányi joined him with his brigade. The corps of Kosztolányi and Krivácsy, protected by the heights in their front, had advanced upon Mocsá, where they surprised three companies of Austrians, of the regiment Baumgarten, which surrendered after a short resistance.

According to instructions, Kosztolányi then took up a position on the hill of Igmand, until Assermann could join him, when the advance was continued. At three in the afternoon, they had taken Csem. Assermann's instructions were, constantly to march in the rear of the enemy and to move upon Acs and Lovad,

and to do his utmost to gain the heights commanding the latter place, before the enemy should be able to reach them, thereby cutting off the retreat across the Danube.

The Austrians concentrated their forces at Puszta-Herkály; Klapka therefore now gave the signal for the general attack. The Austrian artillery being superior in power made great havoc in the lines of the Hungarians, Klapka therefore quickly ordered the columns to storm, whilst he directed another brigade to attack the redoubts in front. The boldness with which the Hungarians performed this manœuvre startled the Austrians; they turned back and fled towards Acs—the Hungarians had gained the victory—Herkály was the main point of the Austrian position. Klapka, therefore, ordered all his artillery up, which now spread death and terror among the fugitives who were not able to rally again, and, as in the meantime, the forest of Acs had been taken by the Hungarians, the Austrians fled towards Lovad. The horse-artillery immediately pursued them, firing grape and canister whenever the moment was favourable for a halt. Hussars

and Honvéds also were in hot pursuit after them; the road was strewn with the dead and wounded, with arms, cannons, ammunition, carriages, and other *materiel-de-guerre*. Great numbers of prisoners were brought in from all sides by the Hungarian flying-columns.

The enemy made one last desperate attempt to rally again at Acs, but the Hungarian infantry drove him off once more after only a slight skirmish, nothing therefore remained for him but to seek safety in a precipitate flight across the Danube. The vanguard of Colonel Assermann not having been able to reach in time the heights at Lovad, the Austrians for the most part effected their passage, although not without considerable loss; but, at the moment, when their last columns were pressing towards the bridge, Colonel Assermann's artillery opened upon them from the heights, —another Berezina! Had this officer only arrived half an hour sooner, this victory would have been one of the most brilliant which the history of war has had to record—a besieging army would have been made prisoners by the besieged. Darkness had now set in. Here

and there a few shots were still heard; the bridge of Lovad stood in flames, and illuminated with its reddish glare a battle-field, the name of which will always have a glorious place in the history of Hungary.

The morning following, the Austrians evacuated their entrenchments at Lél, they had lost about 1,000 men, dead and wounded; and more than 1,000 men, besides 48 officers, had been taken prisoners. The booty of the Hungarians was immense, they had taken in the battle 12 cannons; 18 large cannons had been left behind in the redoubts at Lél, while 3,000 muskets, a large stock of provisions, ammunition, gunpowder, baggage, and 3,000 head of cattle, fell into the hands of the conquerors. But the most important consequences of all were, that Haynau's line of operations were broken through, while his means of communication with Austria were completely in the hands of his opponents.

Klapka, immediately after the victory, despatched couriers to Kossuth and Görgey, detailing his proceedings, and promising, in a short time, to raise another army of 30,000

men from the population of the Upper Danube; he also sent copies of an intercepted letter from General Berg to the Czar, in which Berg represented to his master his uneasiness that the campaign might be prolonged until the winter should have set in, and which would be very unfavourable for the Russian troops, he, therefore, urged the necessity of bringing the war to an end before that period.

The couriers unfortunately arrived too late to be of any service. Kossuth received the news of the victory of the 3rd August, when he was already on Turkish territory, and Görgey in Gross Wardein, after the surrender at Világos.

The enemy had now entirely disappeared from the road to Presburg; Klapka, therefore, marched upon Raab, which he entered on the 6th August, at the head of 10 battalions, 6 squadrons and 30 field-pieces. The inhabitants received him kindly though with no open demonstrations of joy, as they had already heard reports of the Austrians having taken Szegedin and of the victorious advance of the Russians.

Encouraged by his success, Klapka now

formed plans for more extensive operations. Immense stores of provisions and ammunition then in Raab, had for safety to be taken to Comorn; the enemy's works on the isle of Schütt were to be destroyed, and a levy *en masse* was to be organized on the right shore of the Danube. He also considered it necessary to leave a garrison at Comorn of 18,000 men, and with the rest of the troops, joined by a numerous militia, to begin operations on the right shore of the Danube, to undertake an expedition into Styria, or to annihilate the corps of the Austrian general, Nugent, on the shores of the Platten Lake. If this could have been accomplished, Buda and the whole country on the right shore would have fallen into his hands. But the 7,000 men which he had with him were too small a force to extend his plans any further.

Klaka, therefore, began immediately to increase his forces, and ordered all able men of the surrounding places between the age of 18 and 30 to enter the army. The population gladly obeyed the call, full of hope for a bright future, so that in a few days he had about

6,000 men collected, whom he despatched to Comorn.

About this time several detachments joined Klapka's corps, amongst others, the flying-columns of the government commissary, Noszlopy, who had defended himself a long time against the Austrians on the Platten Lake, and had now cut his way through to Comorn with 3,000 Honvéds, 100 hussars, and 9 one-pounder guns.

Klapka remained six days at Raab, during which time all the stores were brought safely to Comorn, and the levy *en masse* was fully organized. He now resolved to undertake an expedition through the Eisenburgh comitat into Styria. All arrangements for the same had been made when the discouraging news reached him of the defeat of the Hungarians, and of the threatening advance of the Austria-Russian army. The advance of his troops had, therefore, to be countermanded, and all his forces were now concentrated in and around Comorn.

News now reached him of the unconditional surrender of the Hungarians at Világos, and

though this intelligence first came from the Austrian camp, it was soon confirmed by officers and soldiers who had made their escape from Világos, and sought shelter in the fortress. On the 19th, the first messenger arrived from Field-Marshal-Lieutenant Csorich, delivering to Klapka the proclamation of Haynau, and demanding an unconditional surrender of the fortress. Klapka called a general council of war, who were unanimous in forwarding the following short and conclusive answer :

“Comorn, 19th August, 1849.

“In reply to your official notice, we have to state that we have received no authentic information of the state of affairs in the Banat and on the Lower Danube, and that we cannot therefore, unless we would bring the charge of treason upon us, enter into any negotiation.

“For the council of war of the fortress, Comorn.

“KLAPKA, general.”

Klapka was inclined to maintain the defence of the fortress a good while longer, as he was of opinion that the fortune of war might still take a favourable turn for him ; Peterwardein

being still in the hands of the Hungarians, and no authentic news of the situation of the army on the Lower Danube, or of the state of the cause in the country generally having been received.

The proclamations of Kossuth and Görgey of the 11th August, and the letter of the former to General Bem, dated 14th August, from Teregova in Turkey, left at last no doubt that the revolution was done. The troops which, thanks to the energetic endeavours of Klapka, had preserved a cheerful spirit, began now to waver.

The imperialists had received considerable reinforcements from Bohemia, Moravia, and Austria-proper; and on the 19th August, they began to enclose Comorn with a force increased three-fold. Having taken up their position on the 20th, they again demanded the fortress to surrender. One of the messengers was a Russian colonel and aide-de-camp of the Czar, who, to support his object, produced a letter from Görgey to General Rüdiger, in which the former stated his reasons for a surrender, and made an offer to Rüdiger to surrender to him and his Russian troops.

But Klapka still refused all negotiations until he could receive authentic news from the army of the Lower Danube. The following morning, therefore, the Austrian minister-of-war, Count Gyulay, who was then at the head-quarters of the besiegers, offered an armistice for fourteen days, in order that Klapka might send off a deputation to collect information of the position of the country. This proposition was accepted by Klapka, and the deputation left Comorn on the 22nd August. Colonel Thaly and Mr. Katona, a citizen of Comorn, went in the direction of Temesvár and Transsylvania, and Colonel Ruttkay and the sheriff of Stuhlweissenburg, Csapó, were charged to have an interview with Görgey, then in the Russian camp at Grosswardein.

During the armistice, Klapka exerted himself to keep up the courage of his troops and to prepare them for a long siege. At this time he received a letter from Görgey, in which the latter described the events which had befallen him since his departure from Comorn, and also communicated the decisive step he had taken at Világos.

The deputation returned on the 3rd September, confirming the news of the total defeat of all the Hungarian troops, of the uncertainty of the fate of the prisoners, and the surrender of the same by the Russians to the Austrians. Colonel Thaly brought a letter from Haynau in which, elevated by his success in the south, he again, in the most insolent manner, demanded an unconditional surrender of the fortress. The commissioners who were now sent into the fortress did not fail to give assurance of the merciful disposition of the Emperor, and to point out numerous advantages which the country would derive from an immediate surrender, and which would be refused if the fortress should continue an obstinate resistance. These repeated representations at last induced Klapka and the council of war to enter into negotiations, and to offer the following conditions of surrender :

“1. A general amnesty for the nation.

“2. A free pardon for all the Hungarian corps without exception of any particular nationality, for those who had surrendered already, as well as for those who proposed to

do so. Immediate liberation of all prisoners of war now in the hands of the allied armies.

“3. Acknowledgement of the paper money issued by the Hungarian ministry.

“4. A free choice of residence in or out of Austria for every individual, and the assurance of the proper passports for those who wish to leave the Austrian territory.

“5. The garrison to march out with all military honours.

“6. One month's pay for the officers, and ten days' pay for the soldiers, in current coin.

“7. Private property to be safe to whomsoever it belongs.

“8. The exchange of ratified copies of this capitulation to take place within eight days, that is, on or before the 8th September.

“9. A general pardon and safety guaranteed to the inhabitants of Comorn.

“10. Exchange of the paper currency issued by the commander of the fortress.

“Comorn, 1st September, 1849.

“For the council of war of the fortress of Comorn.

“KLAPKA, general.”

These conditions were accompanied by a letter to General Haynau, in which the garrison declared their firm resolve to open the gates of the fortress only after the proposed terms should have been agreed to. Klapka also despatched two messengers to try to make their way to the fortress of Peterwardein to deliver a letter to the commandant, General Paul Kiss, informing him of the steps he had taken with respect to Comorn. Neither of these messengers, it is believed, reached the fortress, which therefore surrendered soon after, unconditionally. To illustrate the manner in which Austria, and her servant Haynau, conducted negotiations, we insert a letter from Haynau, which he wrote to Klapka on the 31st August.

“TO THE COMMANDANT OF THE FORTRESS OF
COMORN, MR. KLAPKA.*

“I have no doubt but that, in consequence of the report of your two commissioners, and in consequence of the late summons which has been addressed to you, you and the garrison will have given up all thoughts of resistance,

* Haynau always adopted this insulting style, in addressing Hungarian officers, never addressing them by their official rank.

and that you are prepared to surrender to the legitimate government. Still, before the expiration of the armistice, I will again repeat my summons to you ; for I would do all, as far as in me lies, to prevent a further sacrifice of human life.

“You are consequently instructed, immediately after the receipt of this letter, to make an unconditional surrender to the commander of the Austrian blockading army. The fortress of Comorn, with all the military stores in it, is to be given up to the organs of your legitimate government. I think it my duty seriously to warn you, lest you should be tempted to surrender the fortress to the Russian army ; for I give you my word of honour that the Russian generals will deliver all the chiefs, troops, and stores into my hands, as they did in the case of Görgey’s army, and in the case of the garrison of Arad.

“But if the garrison of Comorn were to attempt to evade making a surrender to the legitimate sovereign, you would not only have no advantage whatever, but you would also loose all claims to leniency on our side ; for I

again give you my word of honour, that all the insurgents, chiefs, troops and stores, which surrendered to the Russians, have already been handed over to us.

“For your own notice, I will add, that, in case an immediate and unconditional surrender of the fortress be made, you, for your own person, may confidently rely on my generosity, if indeed I am the man who keeps his word in promises as well as threats.

“In conclusion, I will inform you that I have addressed a letter, containing a free pardon, to Arthur Görgey.

“HAYNAU, Feldzeugmeister.

“Pesth, 31st August, 1849.”

The armistice was ended on the 2nd September, and both parties had intimated that hostilities would be immediately resumed. The *morale* of Klapka's troops was at that time good enough, although the enemy, from his overwhelming numbers had, by degrees, gained no inconsiderable advantages, and the fortress might be considered perfectly surrounded on the 5th September.

On the 7th September, the Austrians sent

into the fortress intelligence of the surrender of Peterwardein, and again demanded an unconditional surrender of Comorn. The fall of Peterwardein had destroyed the last hope for the garrison—they felt themselves isolated, without any resources, and entirely cut off from Hungary.

In this state of things the Austrians daily gained more confidence, strengthened their numbers and increased the energy of their operations. At first, their operations were not directed so much against the walls and fortifications, as against the discipline and courage of the troops. Count Nugent, who had replaced General Csorich in the command of the besieging army, had succeeded in smuggling into the fortress thousands of printed addresses to the common soldiers, in which they were encouraged to force their officers to offer an unconditional surrender. Unfortunately, these means to disorganize the soldiers, were seconded by the daily arrival of fugitives from the camp at Világos, whose tales of unconditional surrender, and of the soldiers being sent unmolested home if they so wished it, excited Klapka's

soldiers to desertion, which soon increased to such a dangerous height that he was forced to proclaim "drum-head courts-martial," in consequence of which several deserters were executed. These severe means stopped the desertions for awhile. Meanwhile, letters arrived from the prisoners at Arad, who all, General Ernest Kiss in particular, stated that the future destiny of the prisoners was depending upon the capitulation of Comorn, and that the harsh treatment which they were suffering would be continued, and was even threatened to be increased in rigour until the fortress should have surrendered. Kiss appealed to Klapka in the name of his country, to adopt the means of establishing peace and happiness. All evidently had the false impression that only the holding out of Comorn prevented the young emperor giving way to his feeling of clemency, and that on the surrender of that fortress the doors of their cells would be immediately opened.

The general council of war at Comorn consisted of the commanders of corps and brigades, the chief officers of the engineers, and the

commandant of the artillery. Klapka now increased this number by summoning also the staff-officers and chiefs of battalions to a council on the 20th. At this council it was resolved that the capitulation should be divided into two distinct parts; that an address should be sent to the emperor, entreating him to grant the country the concessions applied for, and that a committee of officers should be appointed to negotiate with General Nugent as to the conditions of the capitulation. The address to the emperor, and the revised draft of the capitulation, were on the evening of that very day sent to General Nugent.

Although the surrender of the fortress of Peterwardein could not be doubted any longer, yet the council of war considered it desirable to have authentic information of the same, and resolved to despatch a deputation to ascertain and report as to the fact. General Nugent gave his consent that four officers should pass free through the Austrian lines for this purpose.

The negotiations were in the meantime continued with General Nugent, but without success, he declaring that certain of the stipula-

tions, the most important for the garrison, were totally inadmissible.

Klapka pointed this out to the garrison, urged them to be jealous of their hitherto untarnished honour, and demanded whether under certain circumstances, they would defend the fortress to the last man. This declaration the garrison gave with the greatest enthusiasm.

Soon after this, Haynau arrived. Whether it was his wish to commemorate the 6th October, by the total subjection of Hungary, or whatever other reason he may have had, certain it is that he seemed exceedingly anxious to get possession of the fortress as soon as possible, and he invited Klapka in far more conciliatory terms than he had used on former occasions, to a personal conference.

To prevent any suspicion, and to give no cause for misapprehension, Klapka delivered this letter to the council of war, who decided that a deputation should be chosen to negotiate with Haynau in person. The commissioners elected repaired to Puszta-Herkály on the forenoon of the 27th September, under an escort of hussars, about a league from Comorn, and

where Haynau also arrived soon after, accompanied by his aide-de-camp, General Suzan, and an escort of cuirassiers. A long discussion took place, and at last all points having been arranged, the deputation returned to lay the treaty before the general council of war, who approved of the same. Klapka also signed it, and thus was Comorn, the last stronghold of liberty surrendered to the despot. The following is a copy of the conditions agreed upon :

“SURRENDER OF THE FORTRESS OF COMORN,*
UNDER THE FOLLOWING CONDITIONS, VIZ. :

“Free withdrawal of the garrison without arms. The officers to retain their swords as their property. Those officers who formerly served in the Austrian army, shall have passports which will enable them to cross the frontiers of the Austrian dominions ; those who do not wish for such passports shall have permission to return to their respective homes—always

* According to the original text the word should be “ Submission,” Haynau having struck out the word “ Capitulation,” and substituted the former, thus evincing his spite against the brave defenders of their country.

excepting those who voluntarily return to the Austrian service.

“The Honvéd officers, that is to say, those officers who were not formerly in service, shall be allowed to remain free in their respective homes, without any reservation as to their future employment in a military capacity.

“The soldiers of the former Austrian regiments are to have an amnesty. What has been said of the Honvéd officers applies also to them, viz., they are to have a free discharge, and no judicial proceedings shall be taken against any of them.

“Passports to foreign countries shall be given to those who claim them within thirty days.

“The officers are to have a month's pay ; the soldiers are to have ten days' pay in Austrian bank notes, and according to the ratio which is generally given to Austrian officers and soldiers.

“To liquidate the liabilities of the garrison, as entered into by draughts on the military chest, the Austrian government engages to pay the sum of 500,000 florins in Austrian bank notes.

“The sick and disabled of the garrison of

Comorn shall have the care and treatment they require.

“The garrison are entitled to their moveable and immoveable private property.

“The place, time and manner of the surrender, to be determined by another document.

“Hostilities are immediately to be suspended on both sides.

“The fortress will be surrendered according to the usages and customs of war, and after the ratification of the convention by the two contracting parties.

“Signed at Pusztá-Herkály,
27th September, 1849.

“HAYNAU, Feldzeugmeister.

“George Klapka, commander-in-chief
of the fortress and army.”

Klapka now felt it his duty, before he should surrender to the Austrians the jewel entrusted to him by the nation, to request that the garrison should honour, by a grand funeral service, the memory of their brothers fallen in the defence of the holy rights of the nation. For the last time the troops drew up under arms, gathering round those glory-crowned standards

which they had followed through so many bloody battles. The "Requiem for the dead" was as much a requiem for the living, for they had now buried their own hopes, they had sealed their own fate. The religious ceremony being over, the troops defiled once more and for the last time, before their beloved general; their dead silence testified their mourning; before being dismissed to quarters their trembling lips gave only one long loud "*Eljen*" for their fatherland. On the 2nd October, the deputation sent to Peterwardein returned, confirming the unconditional surrender of that fortress. Klapka having received their report, issued the following proclamation to his troops:

"Comrades! there is a weight on my heart in addressing you, as I do for the last time, for my thoughts of you are bound up in thoughts of so much joy and so much sorrow, of glory gained by the outpouring of the blood of such numbers of patriots!

"It is not long since we entered on our glorious path. While we sacrificed our private feelings and interests, we struggled to gain the goal at which to aim was our duty. We did

what men can do, and we need not fear to meet either God's judgment, or that of the world. But the decrees of fate were unpropitious to our cause. We leave the path on which patriotism strewed so many flowers,—we leave it, because our blood cannot now benefit our country. We leave that path on the bidding of our country, for in future, too, it will stand in need of its sons; we leave it because we owe our country a sacred duty, and because that country's sole comfort lies in our unalterable affection.

“Comrades! remain as you have been, the pillars and lovers of Hungary, You have manfully and perseveringly, and to the last laboured in the task which was imposed upon you. If you yielded, it was because necessity willed it so. May this reflection be a comfort to you: let your hearts cease from sorrowing, for your honour is safe. Receive the country's warmest thanks for your manly resolution, and with it receive my most heartfelt adieus. May God be with you.

“GEORGE KLAPKA, general.

“Comorn, 3rd October, 1849.”

The surrender of Comorn took place on the 2nd, 3rd and 4th October, according to the regulations drawn up by the commanders of both armies.

On the first day, the troops in the entrenched camp and the *tête du pont* laid down their arms and ammunition, and received their pay and warrants of safe-conduct; on the second, the surrender of the old and new fortresses, with all stores and material of war took place; on the third, the works on the Waag and the palatinal line, the public offices in the town, the sick and wounded, etc., were delivered to the Austrians; on the evening of the 4th October, the fortifications were evacuated by the Hungarians—the proud, pure, and untarnished three-coloured flag had been taken down, to make way for the blood-stained black and yellow standard of the Austrians.

Thus surrendered the last bulwark of the liberty of Hungary. How far the expectations of clemency and justice on the part of the young emperor were realized, the bloody executions of Haynau have testified. Whether Klapka might have successfully held out this

important place against the Austrians, or whether he might not have made still better terms, are points upon which some difference of opinion has been expressed, but all must admit that he displayed in the defence of the fortress, extraordinary courage and skill, and we have the fullest confidence, that at the last hour, he was actuated by the same patriotic feeling which he had displayed all through his glorious career. He may sometimes have erred in judgment, but his patriotism can never be called in question.

On the 5th October, Klapka arrived at Presburg, where he had been ordered to wait for his passport. From thence he went to Hamburg, and after a short stay there, to meet some of his former companions in arms, he arrived at last in London, where he found a secure and honourable asylum from the banded despots of continental Europe—ready as we know him to be, when the hour comes, to devote his great talents and true patriotism once more to the cause of freedom and fatherland.

APPENDIX.

SPEECH OF M. KOSSUTH IN THE HUNGARIAN DIET, ON THE 11th JULY, 1848.

"GENTLEMEN," said Kossuth, "in ascending this tribune, in order to summon you to save your country, I feel the responsibility imposed upon me, in its full weight and importance. It seems to me that God is holding in his hand the trumpet of judgment, and is proclaiming that the weak and faint-hearted are to be cast back into the tomb, and the brave and energetic are to enjoy life everlasting. Yes, gentlemen, God has placed the existence of Hungary in our hands. It is for you to decide whether she shall perish, or be saved. However widely different your political opinions may be, the love of country, of national honour, of liberty and independence, is a sentiment which every one is ready to defend with his life and fortune. I shall not attempt to excite your enthusiasm on this point, for I believe it exists already. When I tell you that your country is in danger, perhaps I am telling you what you know already, for since the revival of our liberty, the veil has been rent which hid from ourselves the position of our own affairs. You

can now see with your own eyes the frightful situation in which you are placed."

He then dwelt upon the state of the army and the volunteers, and continued:—"After the dissolution of the last diet, the Hungarian minister found the treasury empty, and the country defenceless. He has fathomed with terror the abyss that yawns at our feet. I was one of those who long ago called the attention of the government to the grievances under which we laboured, and the defects of our constitution, who demanded that justice should be done towards the people; but now, perhaps, it is too late to commence reforms. Can patriotism and enthusiasm ward off the danger now? The nation and the government deferred the doing of their duty too long, and now, when they have taken the first step in the right direction, the bonds of nationality are beginning to break asunder."

"Such are the circumstances under which we have assumed the reins of administration—in the midst of an open insurrection, of the exasperation caused by reaction, and the hostile passions which the accursed policy of Metternich has left us as an heritage to blast and destroy us." He then spoke of the combination formed amongst the Sclavonic tribes of the north.

"The Croats have risen in revolt. It is now many years since we assured the Austrian government, that in encouraging these intrigues amongst the Slavocs, it was nourishing a serpent in its bosom, which would one day destroy the reigning dynasty. The Croats think that by taking advantage of the present revolutionary crisis they can take up arms with impunity against the Hungarian nation. If we had given them any cause for forming this lamentable determination, I would be the first man to advise you to appease their anger by redressing their grievances, instead of repressing their rebellion by force. But you all know that when we were ourselves unable to obtain all the liberties which of right belonged to us, we refused none of them to Croatia.

“Since the reign of Arpád, Hungary has never enjoyed a privilege which the Croats have not shared, and not content with awarding them a share, we have often bestowed upon them special favours at our own risk. I have read in the history of Ireland, that England despoiled that country of certain political rights; but it is the Magyars alone who have granted to a small province more than they themselves possessed. Where then can we find the cause of this insurrection? No where. Was it the last diet which altered the relations between the two countries? Did it not on the contrary begin a new era? Did it not obtain rights, not for us only, but for the Croats also? They enjoy the same liberties with ourselves. The Hungarian nobility is pledged to indemnify them for abolition of the dues payable by the peasantry. The right of using their language in their own assemblies has been specially reserved to them. Their municipal privileges have been extended. They can manage their elections in whatever manner they please; they can send representatives to the diet to deliberate in common with us for the safety and welfare of the two countries. The last diet said to them, “Regulate your elections, elect your deputies, we do not interfere with you.” We cannot then find in the past any cause for this insurrection. Shall we look for it in the present? The ministry is now responsible to the people for the manner in which it discharges its duty. This diet has decreed that the Croats shall be at perfect liberty to use their own language in their official documents, and in all that relates to the internal administration of the country. All that it insists upon is that they shall henceforth receive from the ministry and the Hungarian counties all official communications in the Magyar language, accompanied by Slavonic administration.”

He then explained the importance attached by the Croats to the office of Bann, or governor, and continued:—“Nevertheless, we, the ministry, have not for a moment hesitated to ask this insurgent Bann to take his seat at the council board, and deliberate in concert with us upon the means for quieting the discontents of his countrymen. We have invited him to state their demands in person, and have declared,

that if in our power, we will comply with them, and, if not, we will make them a cabinet question.

“But he has not complied. He has returned an insolent answer to our invitation; he has placed himself at the head of the insurrectionary party, and threatens to inflict upon the two countries all the horrors of a civil war. I do not deny that Croatia has just grounds of complaint. But these must be imputed to the old government, not to us. On the contrary, the Magyars, in addressing their representations to the Austrian government have always made common cause with the Croats. We are still ready, I repeat, to do justice to Croatia, but we will never put Jellachich upon the same level with the King of Hungary. The King can pardon; the duty of Jellachich is to obey. We declare our belief that the only way to put an end to these unhappy differences is, for the Emperor to act as mediator between us. Let him command the Croats to summon their provincial diet. Let their representatives, lawfully chosen, present themselves in the central diet of Hungary, and there make a plain statement of their grievances, and if their demands are just and reasonable, we pledge ourselves to comply with them, or to retire from office.”

He then laid before the diet a statement of the forces at the disposal of the government, and though expressing his belief that the rebels would not venture to cross their own frontiers, he called upon the assembly to put the country into a state of defence. For this purpose it would be necessary to raise 200,000 men, and to vote 60 million florins, as a loan or extraordinary contribution. The whole house rose in a body, and shouted with one voice, “We vote them, we vote them!” It was one of the most magnificent episodes in the history of a grand and chivalrous nation. Kossuth was overwhelmed with emotion. “You,” he said, with tears in his eyes—“you have elevated yourselves, and I prostrate myself before the greatness of the people.” He then left the tribune amidst thunders of applause.

PROCLAMATION.

" TO THE ARMY OF THE UPPER DANUBE.

"THE advantages which the enemy have gained over the army of the Upper Danube, but particularly the latest events, seem by their discouraging influence to have shaken in the hearts of my brave soldiers that noble self-confidence which united us all in this just war.

"The first duty of a general is to sustain the confidence of the troops under his command. I hasten to fulfil this duty by not only pointing out to the troops the present chances of a favourable demonstration against the enemy, but chiefly also I hope to rouse again their *esprit-de-corps*, when I candidly pronounce my judgment and my firm conviction respecting what has been done, and what remains to be done on our part. I did accept the post offered to me, because I held the struggle of Hungary to be a just and holy one, and I shall retain my charge so long as the same shall be entrusted to me, and if even the best among you should become wavering and withdraw from our just cause.

"I have moral courage enough in taking a review of events since the 1st November, 1848, to point out the errors into which I have fallen myself, hoping thereby, to offer the safest guarantee to the army that I shall, for the future, adopt the most carefully considered measures. I was wrong when I ceased pressing upon the Committee of Land Defence my reasons for their abandoning that unfortunate idea, the defence of the frontiers. All the other mishaps to which the army have been undeservedly exposed, have solely sprung from the hardships it has had to undergo while pursuing that injudicious plan. From this cause too, a better organization of the army, and the increase and consolidation of the same belonged all that time only to the chapter of good wishes. I was wrong when at head-quarters at Bicske, to obey

the strict orders of the Committee of Land Defence to withdraw the army upon the first lines before Ofen, because by this retreat I made the army appear as if shunning the first conflict which might have at once decided our just struggle. But these orders had been issued from that authority, which the Hungarian minister-of-war, General Mészáros, elected by his country (and confirmed in his office by our king, Ferdinand V.,) then acknowledged as the highest authority of the country, and which he still acknowledges as such, by himself accepting under this authority, the command of the army of the Tissa against General Count Schlick, and which command he has retained to this hour. I also could obey such orders at that time with a clear conscience, that I did not commit any illegitimate acts, nor entice the royal Hungarian army, entrusted to my command, to commit the like, especially so long as the Committee of Land Defence did not themselves disavow the orders. But on the 1st day of January, 1849, while the army of the Upper Danube were standing ready for action at Hanzsabég, Tarnock, Sós-kút Bicske, the Committee suddenly left the capital, instead of justifying the confidence which we had in their loyalty, by courageously attending to their duties in the moment of danger; by which abandonment of duty, and particularly by the sending a deputation to the commander-in-chief of the enemy, without our knowledge and consent, they have laid us open to a most unjust suspicion. Many of us have felt the conviction arise, that we had been thrown down from the glory of being the defenders of the constitutional liberty of Hungary, to the degrading position of serving only egotistical private interests.

“GÖRGÉY, general.

“Waitzen, 6th January, 1849.”

APPENDIX.

1800

THE ORIENTAL QUESTION.

WAR or peace? This is the great European question. Inevitable war! cries the true Briton, who believes that the honour and national existence of the nation is in the greatest danger. Peace, cries the merchant, peace at any price. Let the Emperor of Russia take Turkey; let the tyrants of the continent banquet on the blood of the people; let the principles of the reformation be trampled down by a band of Jesuits;—Peace at any price! Neither the one nor the other can decide with barren words. We trust in the statesmen at the head of the present government as men of honour—as Britons. To come back to the question at the beginning of this chapter, we answer confidently—WAR. Yes, only the sword or a shameful, cowardly yielding of one or the other party could decide the Oriental question. Permit us to examine our political views a little closer. The Czar of Russia

has gone too far in his demands upon Turkey, and cannot withdraw with honour. He is also in a position of physical and moral power to give his pretensions effect. On the other hand, Turkey, France, and Great Britain can never permit these pretensions, or they would be like a fool who fancies his narrow cell is a spacious saloon. Yes, we affirm boldly, Great Britain's honour and political existence, as the most powerful and freest nation, is at stake. Nearer and nearer comes the colossus of the North to crush the freedom and the commerce of the West. A cowardly yielding is nothing but a respite. The abject terms which the Christian brothers in Hungary refused in 1849 you are now obliged to grant to the Mussulman. After the Double Cross is trampled down, you lift up the Crescent. How dear was the peace of 1849 obtained? Hungary, Italy, and Germany shamefully betrayed; France robbed of her liberty, and, worst of all, the pope restored to the Vatican. All this for peace! Indeed a nice peace this! What was spared from the sword, the hangman got. God's beautiful world transformed into a prison, and the progress of a reformation arrested by a victorious pope and his Jesuitical assistants;—and with all this self-sacrifice, you are in the year 1853 no farther advanced than in the year 1849. The knife is nearer the throat than it was in 1849.

The government most interested in this question is really Austria—but this power seems to be both blind and weak, for she has by her treason to Hungary sold herself to Russia, and Kossuth is quite correct when he exclaims, “Hungary is fallen down, but Austria is fallen with her.”

The net begins to close and we see the fish sprawl. On the one side Austria is the tool of Russia, and on the other side she begs English support by a marriage, through which she sanctioned a revolution and struggle for independence. Has Austria so short a memory as to forget that the father of the prince of Brabant was made a King through revolution—his mother, the daughter of a King made through revolution—and Belgium, a kingdom taken from Austria also through revolution?

Let the dice fall as they will, Austria is lost. If she acts with her friend Nicholas, then is Italy lost; if she acts against him, the Czar is powerful enough to punish a treacherous vassal. Should Great Britain and France yield (which we do not believe) then will Austria soon be surrounded by Russia, and the Slavonic parts of Bohemia, Slavonia, and Croatia will cease to be Austrian dominions. Even Hungary has, it is strange to say, more sympathies with Russia than with Austria; and I believe the last breath of a dying

Hungarian is a malediction for Austria which he imbibed with the first drop from his mother's breast.

From the time of the Russian Invasion in Hungary, it could not escape the observer, what their real object was. They were so humane with the prisoners of war, they studied the language and localities of the country, and some of the Russian officers went so far as to speak publicly in favour of the Hungarians and against Austria, and some expressed themselves when they were leaving Hungary, "we shall meet again, very soon, as friends."

Duels between Russian and Austrian officers were frequent—the Editor of this work can relate a case which speaks clear enough for his argument, viz.—Whilst he was in the fortress of Comorn, the Hungarian guerillas brought seven Russian officers as prisoners of war to General Klapka, who, in his kindness, desiring to do a favour to the Russians, gave orders to place the prisoners in the same apartment in which the Austrian prisoners were; but the Russians declared this would be the greatest disgrace for them, and requested Klapka to place them in the common goal, as they would prefer it to partaking the comfortable quarters with the Austrians. Does not this fact speak loud enough? And everybody could hear and see it but Austria, who was cruel enough to hand over to

the hangman those whom the Russian conqueror spared. The day of vengeance is not far off, and we already see the first sign, a wonderful omen, a dumb great power.

Russia, it cannot be denied, through her power, wealth, and masterly politics, since the time of Peter the Great, and the errors of other governments, has the national and religious sympathies of one of the most numerous sects in the world. We refer to the vigorous character of the Emperor Nicholas, who as head of the Russo-Greek church would give such a war the stamp of a holy war.

From the position of Russia (we are obliged to confess the fact) the problem which she gives herself is a grand one, viz.—to unite the Slavonic race, to fulfil the prophecy of the Greeks themselves, to restore the cross upon the mosque of St. Sophia. It is another question, has Nicholas chosen the proper moment? We shall see that very soon.

In spite of our sympathies for the Turkish government, we cannot deny that the Turkish element in Europe is unnatural both in religion and costume, a strange plant in a strange soil, and politics will not long be able to sustain, what the powerful action of time destroys.

That Russia should be the heir of Mahommed

no friend of humanity can wish, (and we much doubt the proposition,) but so long as the present alliance exists we have no idea that it is possible for Russia to carry her plans into effect.

Now comes the caviller and replies, It is true that Great Britain, France, and Turkey are powerful, and never can be conquered; but who is guarantee for the man of the 2d of December? We have indeed no reason or intention to look for honesty in Louis Napoleon—to expect honesty in a man who sacrificed for his own selfishness his honour, his oaths, and the liberties of his country. But in this case we believe Louis Napoleon acts honestly, because it is a question of his own existence and that of France in general. The Napoleonist, the Bourbonist, the Orleanist, or the Republic, France is forced to go with Great Britain. Louis Napoleon knows England's power too well not to know that the first act of treason towards her would be the signal to his downfall.

It is also a moral and political chain which unites France and England in the oriental question.

Turkey by herself is not so weak as most people may suppose. Besides a good fleet and numerous army, the first commanded by an English naval officer, the second led by a Hungarian or Polish warrior, Turkey has a powerful ally in her climate. The Asia-

tic sun will make the Icebear a little warm. We also beg you not to forget that in this war, Turkey would struggle defensively, but Russia offensively—a difference as of 1 to 3, according to the rules of defence.

Should Russia commence this war, it would indeed be one of the most unjust which ever was waged, and the rest of Europe, especially Great Britain and France, will eventually see what Russia intends, and we say this to both Governments, “now or never”! The Russians in Constantinople and farewell free trade—farewell India. The Russian, Turkish, and Greek fleets united would probably be little more than child’s play for the British navy.

We repeat, now is the time to act. Weakness is high treason in governments! O may British statesmen understand the high mission intrusted to them by God and the people!

O may they hear the warning shout which comes from patriotic hearts, from hearts which love the liberty of this their second fatherland, are proud to stand under England’s glorious banner, and of being citizens of this happy island.

Let not the battles of Trafalgar and Waterloo have been fought in vain! Stand, British Lion, and permit not the Bear to crush the whole of Europe. Take this opportunity and restore Poland, Hungary, and

Italy. One sign from thee and tens of thousands of these nations are weaponed. The struggle will be short, but glorious. A victory of right, a victory of reformation, and the blessings of millions of free and happy men will be thy reward. A German poet sings "Down, down haste the hours to Eternity; no earthly power brings one moment back."

What we have said is a "minute"—a well-meant warning, but for Great Britain alone. The other European nations will lose nothing, but some of them would even be better off under Russian rulers than they are at present. As we understand it, between a cossack and a gen-darme, between the knout and the stick, between Siberia and Cayenne, between being hanged or flogged to death, between a slave and an Austrian soldier, there is no difference at all.

We are very far from pretending to be prophets, or to mark the political figure of time to come. But this we believe, and trust in God, that the present state of things on the continent cannot exist long. No! there would not be a just God in Heaven if this system of perjury, tyranny, and popish darkness, which now covers the continent, should be permitted to triumph over His eternal rule of freedom, love, and truth.

No! these are only days of trial, and soon, very soon, the chains will be broken by the mighty spirit of

time, which makes progress in spite of all oppression—soaring onwards as the sun from the east to the west, powerful as the lightning from the cloud to the earth, or the billows of the foaming sea which break upon the rocks.

No Emperor Nicholas, no Francis Joseph, no Louis Napoleon, no Ferdinand, no Frederic William, no Pio Nono will keep back this Almighty power a single moment beyond the time fixed by the decree of the God of Heaven.

SPEECH OF CAPTAIN KASTNER,

DELIVERED OVER THE GRAVE OF ONE WHO HAD BEEN HIS COMPANION IN ARMS, IN THE GREAT HUNGARIAN STRUGGLE FOR INDEPENDENCE.

“FRIENDS,—We stand at the open grave of one of our friends and brothers in arms, at the barrier of life and the entrance to eternity. Here the lie is dumb, the power of the tyrants is broken; for “to this spot and no farther,” calls out the voice of the master of life and death. Here the pilgrim finds rest from his wanderings over his thorny path, whilst the soul is in the hand of the God of mercy, who judges not words, or the vain show made, but the spirit of the deeds performed. Friends, you know that these slumbering remains belonged to a defender of freedom, of the people. He was one of the heroic race of the Poles who hastened from Poland to assist the Hungarians in their great and holy struggle in the years 1848 and 1849, under the colours of immortal Bem, and who after the treachery of Gorgey quitted the land where they had

performed their heroic deeds, emigrated into Turkey, and came in February 1851 to Liverpool, and afterwards to this noble town; his hope, his prayer, was devoted only to the delivery of Poland, Italy, and Hungary; but it was his fate never to see them again, because God, the Almighty Creator of the world, the Father of men, took him into his everlasting glory, in the regions of which there is no difference between poor and rich, between weak and strong. No cold marble-stone, no proud monument will decorate this sacred place; but a number of noble, feeling men, honour it in the present solemn moment, by their presence; and a later generation will, at a future time, bless the ground in which he slumbers the everlasting sleep, remembering that in this spot rests a martyr of freedom, a victim to cruelty. No ribbon of an order, no star, not the laurel of victory—it faded in the hands of our oppressors—decorates his plain coffin; not the sound of muffled drums or trumpets accompanied us to this spot; not the thundering of cannon gives a mourning salvo; no bishop reads the death prayers; this coffin sinks noiseless into the arms of the mother earth. The land for which he bled is oppressed, and his brothers in arms are poor; both have nothing more than tears and mute prayers; and only another plain refugee, warmed by the spirit of freedom, the spark


of God, speaks in a strange dialect to strange people. But no, Englishmen, it is not a strange dialect, it is the language of that freedom which you are so happy to possess. What though our swords are broken, our colours torn, our laurels withered, our hope, our trust is not trampled down! Yes, let us be strong in the belief that the God of love will give to all nations the freedom which he wrote on the heart of man, on the bright sunny sky, and on the star-sparkling night; free is the man born, free soars his spirit heavenward, his body only the tyrants can enslave!

“Our present fate is only a day of trial, and purified, like the gold through the fire, we shall in coming time rejoice at our delivered father-land, remembering Great Britain’s greatness, and the noble spirit of this town! How far or how near may be the moment in which our hopes shall be fulfilled, our prayers heard, is in the hands of the Ordainer of the fate of us all; but, we are assured, that all which he inflicts upon us is good for our future; we bow to his holy will, speaking with Job, ‘Father, thy will be praised.’


“And should it be our lot not to see our home again, our Carpathians, our Danube, our Tissa, our Pusten, our golden cornfields, our vineyards—no more to listen to the song of the sweet nightingale—not again to meet our fathers, mothers, brothers, sisters, friends, our

wives, and our children—let us bear our fate as Christians, as men, worthy of the hospitality of Great Britain—let us live on in the hope of the liberty of our native land, and die in our faith in God ; and when our last hour sounds, and the cold arm of death embraces us, let the last breath be a prayer, which, on the wings of the cool morning breeze, or with the sound of the sweet evening bell, goes heavenward : Father, in heaven, ‘into thy hands I commend my spirit :’ save Poland, Italy, and Hungary ; and have mercy on our tyrants !

“You, my brother, may you slumber sweetly, far from oppressed father-land, in Great Britain’s free ground !”







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